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Articles
Daubert & Danger: The "Fit" of Expert
Predictions in Civil Commitments
ALEXANDER SCHERR*
INTRODUCTION
"Never make predictions, especially about the future."' But in civil
commitments, courts do just that, predicting the future behavior of a
mentally ill individual. Judicial prediction can have severe results for that
person: deprivation of liberty for an indeterminate time; potentially un-
wanted medication and physical restraint; and the stigma of mental ill-
ness. Judicial inaction also poses risks: Erroneous release can lead to
harm for the person or for others. Resolving these risks requires deter-
mining whether the person poses a danger to self or to others because of
the person's mental illness.' Such illnesses force fact-finders to come to
terms with disturbing, chaotic, and unfamiliar mental conditions. To un-
derstand these conditions requires knowledge, insight, discipline, and
professional balance. In short, it requires expertise.
* Assistant Professor. University of Georgia School of Law. I thank Dan Coenen, John
Monahan, Ron Carlson, and Randy Beck for their generous and very useful comments on a draft of
this piece. Thanks also go to Rebecca Aubin, Sebastian Suma, and Lisa Taylor for diligent research
and thoughtful reflection at various phases of this project. Finally, I express my appreciation to Dean
David Shipley both for his direct support of my research, and for his support of the clinical programs
under my care.
I. Variously attributed to Yogi Berra, Samuel Goldwyn, Casey Stengel, and others. See Gary
John Previts, Comment. Global Multi-Disciplinary Practice: A Word on "The Future", 52 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 947, 959 (2002) (attribution to Goldwyn); Eugene Volokh, Technology and the Future of
Law, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1375, 1403 n.t56 (1995) (reviewing M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD
(1995)) (citing attributions to Berra, Goldwyn, Stengel, Will Rogers, Leo Durocher, Mark Twain. and
Niels Bohr); James A. George, Wilander-Light at the End of the Labyrinth, 16 TUL. MAR. L.J. 31
,
164 n.208 (I991) (attribution to Stengel).
2. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 48, 432-33 (1979) (requirement of 'clear and convincing' evi-
dence); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975) (requirement of danger); see infra Part
II.C.5 (discussing legal definitions of danger in civil commitment actions).
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The opinions of experts in prediction should help the courts in this
task, but over thirty years of commentary, judicial opinion, and scientific
review argue that predictions of danger lack scientific rigor. The United
States Supreme Court has commented regularly on the uncertainty of
predictive science.3 The American Psychiatric Association has argued to
the Court that "[t]he professional literature uniformly establishes that
such predictions are fundamentally of very low reliability."4 Scientific
studies indicate that some predictions do little better than chance or lay
speculation, and even the best predictions leave substantial room for er-
ror about individual cases.' The sharpest critique finds that mental health
professionals perform no better than chance at predicting violence, and
6perhaps perform even worse.
Given these critiques, we should expect the rules of evidence, and
specifically the reliability standards of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc.,7 to require the exclusion of predictive expertise from the
civil commitment process. Daubert overturned the seventy-year-old Frye
8
v. United States standard for admissibility of expert opinion, replacing it
with a standard focused (at least in part) on the scientific reliability of
expert opinion.9 Civil commitment is a matter of state law, governed by
state rules of evidence, and not all states have followed the Supreme
Court's lead.'" But this should not matter: Given their notorious unreli-
ability and deep division in the professional community, we might predict
that no court would admit predictive opinions either under Daubert or
under Frye.
Yet no appellate court has ever ordered exclusion of expert psychi-
atric testimony about danger in a civil commitment case, either before or
after Daubert. Courts have shown an extraordinary receptiveness to such
opinions, admitting and relying on them in their commitment decision-
making. Moreover, courts have had their eyes open: Judicial opinions
regularly refer to, and explicitly accept, the imperfections of predictive
3. See infra Parts I.B.2, I.C.i, and I.C.3 (discussing various aspects of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence dealing with psychiatric predictions of danger).
4. Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association at 8, Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454 (i98i) (No. 79-1127).
5. See infra Part I.B.i (describing clinical and actuarial forms of predictive expertise, as well as
the scientific assessments of the relative validity of these techniques).
6. Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 734-35 (1974).
7. 509 U.S. 579, 589-92 (993).
8. 293 F. 013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ("sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs").
9. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
io. See infra Part II.A (discussing admissibility of expert predictive testimony in states using
Daubert, Frye and other standards).
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testimony." What is going on? How can such unreliable opinions survive
Daubert's stress on scientifically valid and reliable expertise?'2
The answer is simple: Daubert requires more than assessing scientific
reliability. Trial courts must also assess how the expert testimony fits the
demands of the case. 3 Even without scientific validation, a court may still
use a given opinion if it has a sufficiently strong fit to the demands of the
case." This Article uses the example of predictive expertise both to de-
velop a methodology for assessing Daubert's notion of "fit," and to find
factors for applying that standard. The methodology appraises civil com-
mitment for its characteristic features: its substantive standards; its bur-
dens of proof; its patterns of proof for danger, including expert
testimony; and the legal definition of danger. This methodology helps to
identify four factors for assessing the fit of expertise in a given case, 5 and
to ratify the extraordinary fit between predictive opinions and civil com-
mitments.
The argument proceeds in two phases. Part I discusses how Daubert
and its progeny have articulated a dual standard of reliability and fit. The
first section concludes that, under Daubert, the "reliability" of an opinion
means not just its scientific validity, but also its practical utility for resolv-
ing disputes. It also concludes that Daubert's test for "fit" asks not just
about bare relevance; it also suggests a comparison of the expert's spe-
cialized inferences to the inferences required for fact-finding.' 6 The sec-
ond section then reviews the available modern standards for validating
predictive expertise, and concludes that the relevant scientific community
has reached a state of guarded optimism about its reliability for judicial
II. See infra Part I.C (discussing the role that predictive uncertainty plays in civil commitments).
12. The related question asks, how can such vilified expertise survive Frye's mandate of general
acceptance? See infra Parts II.A.2- 3 , and notes 370, 386 (discussing the admissibility of predictive tes-
timony under Frye).
13. Other explanations exist, most prominently the idea that the imperatives of civil commitment
justify a waiver of evidentiary rules. See I DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 9-1.2 (2002) (arguing that either explicit statutory suspen-
sion or tacit waiver of the evidentiary rules best explains the universal admissibility of predictive opin-
ions). "[C]ourts ignore evidence rules that would otherwise exclude testimony on future violence
because of a sense of imperative created by the substantive law in these areas." Id. This Article ad-
vances the notion that the rules of evidence and specifically the standards of Daubert provide coherent
justification for admitting these opinions.
14. A complete explanation of all different combinations of reliability and fit, while productive,
goes well beyond the scope of this Article.
I5. See infra Part I.C. The four factors include: how far courts have absorbed concerns over reli-
ability in shaping the structure and process of a case; the inherent difficulty of fact-finding on the cen-
tral issue, and the extent to which the expertise eases that difficulty; the prevalence of the particular
expertise in litigating the case; and the similarity of the inferential process embodied in the opinion to
the fact-finding required for resolution.
i6. See infra Part I.A.
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use. 7 Finally, the third section examines the substance and process of
civil commitment, assessing how predictive expertise fits the features of
commitment, so as to articulate with specificity elements of Daubert's fit
criterion."
Part II turns to evidentiary doctrine, analyzing those cases that have
admitted expert predictive opinion in civil commitment proceedings,
whether the jurisdiction uses tests from Frye, Daubert or no test at all.
The Part confirms the widespread receptivity of courts to expert opinion
evidence about future danger. It also critiques the existing rationales for
those results, and proposes a rationale that fully explains the case law
and accommodates developments in predictive science.'9 This Article
concludes that Daubert should permit the admission of expert predic-
tions, but not because of their scientific reliability. Instead, the Article
uses the example of civil commitments to develop the notion that
Daubert's concern with evidentiary fit better explains the courts' recep-
tivity to this form of predictive testimony.
A need exists for this analysis. Most states have yet to rule on the
admissibility of expert predictive opinions in commitment cases." More
broadly, Daubert and its successor cases are in danger of being viewed
17. See infra Part I.B.
I8. See infra Part I.C.
19. See infra Part lI.C.
20. General civil commitment remains a fundamental concern of most states. After the Supreme
Court's decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370-71 (1997) (upholding a Kansas "sexual
predator" statute against constitutional challenge), many states have renewed their focus on special
commitment statutes focused on particular classes of individuals with mental disorders. As will be
seen, the most recent cases to have ruled on the admissibility of predictive testimony have done so in
sexually violent offender commitments. See infra Part II.B (discussing cases to have ruled on the ad-
missibility of these opinions). Moreover, the most recent statistical methods for assessing risk actuari-
ally apply similar theories and methods to the assessment of criminals, the mentally ill, and sexually
violent offenders. See also Mara Lynn Krongard, Comment, A Population at Risk: Civil Commitment
of Substance Abusers After Kansas v. Hendricks, 90 CAL. L. REV. I I1, 131 (2002) (arguing that the de-
cision in Kansas v. Hendricks may permit the expansion of types of special commitment statutes to
include substance abusers).
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solely as cases on scientific reliability.2 ' This Article counteracts such a
view, suggesting that Daubert's reliability requirement rests on more
than science, that its fit requirement requires exploring how specialized
inferences support judicial fact-finding, and that reliability and fit exist in
a dynamic relationship. Put another way, there is need for a refined
model of Daubert, and the cases on prediction of danger help point the
way towards construction of that model.
I. EXPERT PREDICTIONS IN CIVIL COMMITMENTS
This Part explores the evidentiary, scientific, and legal dimensions of
the use of expert predictions of danger in civil commitments. It begins
with a brief assessment of Daubert and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
continues with an assessment of the science of predicting danger, and
ends with an exploration of the use of expert predictions in civil com-
mitment case law. This Part thus lays the groundwork for discussing the
"fit" requirement and leads to an assessment of the evidentiary case law
in Part II.
A. EXPERT TESTIMONY
i. Expert Testimony Before Daubert
The admissibility of expert testimony represents a special application
of customary rules differentiating fact from opinion. Opinions consist of
collections of inferences conveyed to the fact-finder as "facts," and in-
clude two mutually exclusive sub-categories: lay opinion and expert opin-
ion. 3 In functional terms, expert witnesses can testify in ways that lay
witnesses cannot. Lay witnesses must describe the factual bases for their
21. See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting
Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDozo L. REV. 1845, 1856 (2003) (addressing the use
of predictive opinion in death penalty cases, and arguing that Daubert's requirement of scientific valid-
ity should inform the constitutional admissibility of predictive expertise). "[R]elevance and reliability
in the context of scientific testimony now requires scientific validity." Id. at 1853. Beecher-Monas and
Garcia-Rill argue that Daubert would lead to the exclusion from evidence of clinical predictions of
violence in death penalty cases, but should permit admission of actuarial assessments in those cases, at
least for limited purposes. Id. at 1897. They assume that Daubert requires no more than "scientific va-
lidity," and that Daubert's "fit" component only a minimal connection between an expert's methodol-
ogy and conclusion. Id. at 1857-58. "Unless an expert can demonstrate sound methodology and
scientific reasoning, no opinion testimony is admissible." Id. at 1858.
The present Article reaches an opposite conclusion, at least with respect to civil commitments. In
so doing, it focuses more on the notion of "fit" as a test rooted in the courts' role as pragmatic deci-
sion-makers, rather than in a presumed role for courts as validators of scientific reliability.
22. 526 U.S. 137 (999).
23. See FED. R. EVID. 701 & 702. Under the current version of the Federal Rules, lay opinion re-
fers generally to opinions "not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge." FED. R.
EvIo. 701(c). The quoted language dovetails with that found in Rule 702 governing the admissibility of
expert testimony.
November 20031
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opinions; expert witnesses need not (and may not be permitted) to do
So.24 The lay witness may only testify to opinions that are "rationally
based" on their own perception; the expert witness is not necessarily so
limited.25 Finally, the information on which a lay witness relies (the basis
for the opinion) must itself be admissible evidence; by contrast, the ex-
pert may use inadmissible information, provided it is "of a type reasona-
bly relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming [comparable]
opinions.'26
Taken together, these functional differences shift the burden of
drawing inferences about critical facts away from the fact-finder and to-
wards the expert. A fact-finder listening to a lay witness hears all of the
factual predicates for the opinion, which rest upon the witness's first-
hand knowledge and bear a "rational" relationship to the opinion. By
contrast, a fact-finder listening to an expert hears an opinion without
necessarily hearing all of the factual predicates, some of which may be
inadmissible. For experts, no familiar connection need exist between
predicate facts and their opinions; expert inferences are by definition
specialized, and potentially unfamiliar to the fact-finder. Finally, by rea-
son of professional or intellectual status or credentials, an expert's opin-
ions may carry greater weight. These functional differences (coupled
with the expert's status) have led courts to perceive that fact-finders
might attribute an "aura of certainty" to expert testimony, justifying spe-
cial rules of admissibility. 7
Frye represented the past century's most prevalent standard of spe-
cial admissibility."' Indeed, Frye itself dealt with a form of behavioral or
psychic science, the detection of lies based on purported changes in
blood pressure resulting from specific psychic states. The proponent had
argued standard evidentiary doctrine: The interpretation of blood pres-
sure changes "does not lie within the range of common experience or
common knowledge, but requires special experience or special knowl-
24. FED. R. EVID. 703. "[An expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those
that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
25. FED. R. EvIo. 701(a) & 702.
26. FED. R. EvID. 703 ("Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the
jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative
value ... substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.").
27. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Cal. 1976) (stating that Frye ensures that the "aura of
certainty" which can attach to expert scientific testimony does not attach to untested, experimental
evidence).
28. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (excluding testimony based on a "sys-
tolic blood pressure deception test").
[Vol. 55:1
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edge." 9 Rejecting this argument, the court articulated what came to be
the standard form of the rule: "[W]hile courts will go a long way in ad-
mitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific prin-
ciple or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particu-
lar field in which it belongs."3
Frye left many questions unanswered.' The most salient include:
which kind of expertise falls within Frye's ambit; which part of the pro-
fessional community must a trial court consult (or, what is the "particular
field" to which the expertise belongs); and exactly what kind of consen-
sus must exist to support a finding of "general acceptance." Many states
still retain Frye; and courts in at least four of them have used it to review
the admissibility of expert predictions in civil commitment cases."
2. Daubert & Kumho
Daubert and its two companion cases, General Electric Co. v. Joiner33
and Kumho Tire,' changed Frye's "general acceptance" standard to one
more attuned to the merits of the particular expertise itself. This subsec-
tion articulates the parameters of Daubert and Kumho Tire's new ap-
proach.35 The next subsection addresses questions left open by these
cases, especially those related to the "fit" requirement.
a. Daubert
Daubert arose out of a dispute over the admissibility of scientific ex-
pertise. Relying on Frye, the trial court had excluded affidavits from cer-
tain experts offered in summary judgment proceedings. The Supreme
29. Id. Defendant sought to admit the expertise in evidence, and the trial court rejected the prof-
fer; the appellate court affirmed. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
Half-Century Later, 8o COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1250 (I98O) (reviewing the history and progress of the
Frye standard). See also PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 204
(i99 I ) (critiquing judicial handling of novel scientific evidence prior to Daubert, and suggesting a re-
newed emphasis on Frye's approach).
32. See infra Part II.B.i and II.B.3 (discussing direct application of Frye to predictive testimony,
and the exemptions from Frye of the same).
33. 522 U.S. 136 (I997).
34. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
35. In General Electric, the Court applied an "abuse of discretion" standard to review trial court
decisions. 522 U.S. at 146-47. The Court rejected plaintiffs argument that "outcome-determinative"
opinions should receive stricter review. Id. at 142-43. In applying the long-standing abuse of discretion
standard, the Court placed the burden of assessing the inferences implicit in opinion testimony
squarely in the hands of trial judges. Id. at 141-43, 146-47. The case accepts and asserts the primacy of
the trial judge's discretion in ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony. Id.
36. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 583-84 (1993). The factual issue before
trial centered on proof of past causation, specifically proof that ingestion of Bendectin by women
caused birth defects in their children. Id. at 582. In support of their motion for summary judgment,
November 20031
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Court reversed and remanded, holding that Frye had not survived the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.37 The Court then articulated
a new evidentiary standard for the admissibility of expert testimony, a
test focused on reliability and fit.3"
In rejecting Frye, Justice Blackmun wrote that the language and
premises of the rules required trial judges to "ensure that any and all sci-
entific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reli-
able."39 The opinion discussed science, 4" but did not restrict "evidentiary
reliability" to scientific validity. Rather,
in order to qualify as "scientific knowledge," an inference or assertion
must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be
supported by appropriate validation-i.e., "good grounds," based on
what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert's testimony
pertain to "scientific knowledge" establishes a standard of evidentiary
reliability.4'
defendants had offered an affidavit from an expert, who concluded that "maternal use of Bendectin
during the first trimester of pregnancy [had] not been shown to be a risk factor for human birth de-
fects." Id. In opposition, plaintiffs offered affidavits from eight experts, all of whom concluded that
"Bendectin can cause birth defects." Id. at 583. Plaintiffs' experts based their conclusions on review of
studies on animal fetuses and on the chemical similarities between Bendectin and other substances
"known to cause birth defects," as well as on a reanalysis of prior epidemiological studies. Id. The trial
court used the Frye standard to conclude that "expert opinion which is not based on epidemiological
evidence is not admissible to establish causation." Id. at 583-84. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 573-76 (S.D. Cal. 1989). The Ninth Circuit affirmed. See Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1991).
37. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. Justice Blackmun compared Frye, which predated enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and relied in part on other cases which had held that common law doc-
trines had not survived enactment. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51 (1984); Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 177 (1987). It found no reference to the "general acceptance" standard in
the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, nor in the drafting history. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. Finally,
it described Frye as a "rigid" test, inconsistent "with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules and their
'general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to "opinion" testimony."' Id. (quoting Beech Air-
craft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
38. On remand, the Ninth Circuit applied the new standard, articulating factors additional to
those identified by the Supreme Court. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317-22
(9th Cir. 1995). But instead of remanding the case, it affirmed the exclusion of the plaintiff's proffered
expert testimony because of an inadequate fit between fact-finding and expertise. Id.
39. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
40. The parties had litigated the case at least in part on the premise that Frye no longer had au-
thority as a test for admissibility of "scientific" evidence. The Court was not presented with an issue
about non-scientific expertise, an issue to which it would turn later. See infra Part I.A.2.b (discussing
Kumho Tire).
41. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (emphasis added). The quoted language arguably leaves ambiguous
whether "scientific method" overtakes and becomes the measure for reliability of "scientific" exper-
tise. On the one hand, the language states that the opinion "must be derived [from] scientific method."
Id. On the other hand, the language requires that it be supported by "appropriate validation"; and it
notes that the rules establish "a standard of evidentiary reliability." Id. Whatever ambiguity the
Daubert opinion left, however, the Court later resolved in Kumho Tire. See infra Part I.A.2.b.
[Vol. 55:1
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The Court saw reliability as an "evidentiary" standard, rooted in the
pragmatic demands of trial, and not tied solely to scientific validity. The
Court expanded on Frye and articulated four factors to use in assessing
reliability, including "general acceptance." Moreover, the Court pre-
sented these as "general observations" or "pertinent consideration[s],"
not as exclusive points of reference for every case.42
The Court's use of "relevance" also rests on evidentiary and not sci-
entific grounds.43 Not restricted to simple logical relevance, the Court's
opinion focuses more on a notion of "fit" or "appropriateness."'  It cites
an important pre-Daubert case for the proposition that expert testimony
must be "sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in
resolving a factual dispute."" According to the Court, the notion of fit
was not absolute, but functional and relativistic: "'Fit' is not always obvi-
ous, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific va-
lidity for other, unrelated purposes.""4
The Daubert Court thus fashioned an overarching standard with the
potential to go beyond science per se. It used the language of "scientific
method," but its articulated factors neither excluded other methods nor
applied to all kinds of expertise. Its standard focused primarily on the re-
lationship between expert opinion and the fact-finding it would influ-
ence. It sought to assure that such opinions would cast a spell on the fact-
finder only after the trial court had found a sufficient connection between
the expert inferences and the facts at issue.
42. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. The four considerations it discussed were: whether the theory or
technique has been or can be tested; whether it has been subjected to peer review; what the known or
potential error rate of inferences drawn from the technique might be; and whether it has in fact re-
ceived "general acceptance." Id. at 593-94. These four "Daubert factors" threatened to take on a life
of their own; references to the "four part test" of Daubert were occasionally seen. This restrictive un-
derstanding of Daubert proved not to survive close examination by the Court. See infra Part I.A.2.b
(discussing Kumho Tire).
43. See FED. R. Evio. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."). This definition denotes logical relevance, con-
cerned solely with the existence of an inference to be drawn from the proposed evidence and a 'fact of
consequence' in the litigation.
44. The Court derives this concept from the stated requirement in Federal Rule of Evidence 702
that the expert's knowledge "assist the trier of fact," a notion of "helpfulness." See discussion infra
Part II.C.5 (discussing the fit of expert predictions to civil commitments) and II.B (assessing doctrinal
approaches to the fit of clinical and actuarial opinions).
45. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir.
1985)).
46. Id. (citing James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal To
Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 249, 258 (1986)).
November 2003]
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b. Kumho Tire
In Kumho Tire,47 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the views that
Daubert dealt only with scientific evidence and that the four Daubert fac-
tors provide necessary tests of the admissibility of scientific evidence."8 In
taking this approach, the Court constructed a highly flexible framework
within which trial courts should evaluate expertise.
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer expanded Daubert to cover any
kind of specialized expertise, even if it does not rest specifically on scien-
tific knowledge. Daubert had involved purportedly scientific studies of
the health effects of a particular drug; by contrast, Kumho Tire involved
opinion evidence on the observation of tire wear. Justice Breyer noted
that the language of Federal Rule 702 created "no relevant distinction"49
among "'scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. ' '5. The
very heart of expertise in evidentiary terms rests on specialization, not
science: "[W]hether the specific expert testimony focuses upon special-
ized observations, the specialized translation of those observations into
theory, a specialized theory itself, or the application of such a theory in a
particular case, the expert's testimony often will rest 'upon an experience
confessedly foreign in kind to [the jury's] own......
Rejecting slavish reliance on the Daubert factors, 2 the Court reas-
serted reliability and relevancy as the principal goals. For example, the
testimony facing the court below consisted of opinions by an expert on
47. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
48. Id. at 141-42. The trial court had excluded evidence by a plaintiff's expert in "tire failure
analysis," offered in a products liability action to prove causation. Id. at 145. The trial court agreed
that, even though the proposed expertise was more "technical" than "scientific," it could still review it
using the Daubert standard. Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc. 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1521-22 (S.D. Ala.
1996). In so doing, the trial court at first used solely the four Daubert factors; but upon request by
plaintiff for reconsideration, it agreed that these factors were illustrative, and applied a more flexible
standard. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 145-46. Nonetheless, it again excluded the proposed testimony, fo-
cusing especially on the expert's methodology of analysing data obtained from a visual inspection. Id.
at 146-47.
49. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147.
5o. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702). Justice Breyer noted that each of the adjectives in the quoted
phrase modify the word "knowledge," and quoted Daubert for the proposition that the word "estab-
lishes a standard of evidentiary reliability." Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90).
51. Id. at 149 (alteration in original) (quoting Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considera-
tions Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40,54 (1901)).
52. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149-52. Specifically, the Court indicated that trial courts "may con-
sider" the four factors articulated in Daubert, but that they were not required to use them. Id. at 149-
5o. Relying on arguments presented by the Solicitor General, the Court noted that "[t]he factors iden-
tified in Daubert may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the
issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony." Id. at I5o (alteration in origi-
nal). It quoted Daubert specifically for the proposition that the four factors "do not constitute a 'defini-
tive checklist or test,"' id., but that they retained vitality, even when evaluating non-scientific
"experience-based testimony." Id. at 151.
[Vol. 55:1
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tire wear, using a hotly contested methodology of determining tire wear
in a tort claim based on tire failure. While the Court reviewed the four
considerations posed in Daubert, its opinion focused more on how the in-
ferences drawn by the expert did or did not support the fact-finding re-
quired by the trial court.
The opinion described the goal of a reliability assessment as an ef-
fort "to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon pro-
fessional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the
same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert
in the relevant field."53 The Court encouraged trial judges to inquire how
experts in the given field determine the reliability of opinions, but did not
restrict a trial judge to these definitions. Instead, the Court left to trial
judges the discretion to determine which standard of reliability to use for
a particular form of expertise."
But reliability answers only part of the question. The Court's opin-
ion stresses that the fit of the opinion to the case should constitute the
primary influence on the trial court's discretion. Indeed, the fit of the
opinion to the case constituted the primary influence on the trial court's
discretion. The Kumho Tire opinion stressed that trial judges should not
evaluate admissibility generally and abstractly. Instead, they should do so
specifically, with respect to the expert's method of drawing "a conclusion
regarding the particular matter to which the expert testimony was directly
relevant."55 The Court took pains to assess the methodology of the par-
ticular expertise in the case, not in general, but rather as it applied to the
particular facts of the case: "The relevant issue was whether the expert
could reliably determine the cause of this tire's [failure].,,16 It thus articu-
lated a notion of fit that serves the demands of resolving particular dis-
puted issues: "district courts must 'scrutinize' whether the 'principles and
methods' employed by an expert 'have been properly applied to the facts
of the case."'57
53. Id. at 152.
54. In so doing, the Court built on the groundwork it had created in General Electric Co. v. Joiner,
where it applied an abuse of discretion standard of review. 522 U.S. 136, 139 (997). In the Court's
approach, this discretion extended not only to the decision on admissibility, but also to the selection of
measures for reliability, and to the process through which decisions on admissibility would occur.
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152. For example, trial judges have discretion to avoid unnecessary hearings
on the admissibility of expert testimony, "where the reliability of an expert's methods is properly
taken for granted," reserving more extensive review for testimony "in the less usual or more complex
cases where cause for questioning the expert's reliability arises." Id.
55. Id. at 154.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 157 (citing Advisory Committee's Note on Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 702, Preliminary Draft
of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence: Request for Comment
126 (1998)).
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3. Reliability and Fit After Kumho Tire
Despite its reaffirmation of Daubert's core concern about pseudo-
science, Kumho Tire created a remarkably open-ended analytical struc-
ture. The Court avoided limiting its reliability inquiry to the Daubert fac-
tors or other factors and emphasized that the fit inquiry relates to the
factual contentions of particular cases. The Court presented this open-
endedness as desirable, and expressed its trust of trial courts to work
through the tough line-drawing problems in the crucible of litigation. Yet
surprisingly basic questions about judicial assessments of expertise re-
main after Kumho Tire, questions that this Article will explore in the
context of predictive testimony in civil commitments.
a. Relative Reliability
The opinion in Daubert speaks of reliability in terms of scientific
method: "[I]n order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or
assertion must be derived by the scientific method.' ' , 8 Despite this, the
Court made clear that "[p]roposed testimony must be supported by ap-
propriate validation," and described its standard as one of "evidentiary
reliability."59 Later, the Court confirmed the more expansive reading: in
some cases scientific validation may matter; "[i]n other cases, the rele-
vant reliability concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or experi-
ence. ' '.. This flexible notion of reliability raises four questions. First, what
standards of reliability apply in a given context and what role should the
professional community play? Second, will reliability permit less than
perfect expertise? Finally, do some forms of expertise so lack reliability
that Daubert would require per se exclusion, regardless of context?
As to sources, the Court clearly expressed comfort with the practice
(well-established under Frye) of consultation with the relevant expert
community. Both Daubert and Kumho Tire permit the trial judge to ask
whether the particular method (or its application to the issues at hand)
has received "general acceptance" in the expert community.6' Both
Daubert and Kumho Tire advise the trial judge to look directly at the in-
ferential process underlying the expert opinion, assessing, where appro-
priate, its verifiability, its error rate, and its history of publication and
58. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (993).
59. Id. (emphasis added).
6o. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1999) (rejecting the four Daubert fac-
tors as the sole tests of reliability, but noting their utility even in assessing "experience-based testi-
mony").
61. Id. at 151. "In certain cases, it will be appropriate for the trial judge to ask.., whether such a
method is generally accepted in the relevant.., community." Id.
[VOL. 55:1
DAUBERT & DANGER
critique. Other courts have added additional factors." Yet the Court
clearly does not consider any of these factors conclusive. Instead, it
leaves trial courts free to reject any particular form of inference, even
when recommended by the relevant community, and to select between
methodologies or inferences about which no common consensus exists.63
This flexibility strongly suggests admissibility even if the expertise is
less than perfect; it also suggests that, in the right case, highly unreliable
expertise might also satisfy the new standard. The Court's opinions con-
sistently speak of "appropriate validation ''6, or "reasonable measures of
reliability,"6' suggesting that reliability itself exists on a continuum of
strength. Perfect reliability would clearly satisfy its test, while other kinds
of expertise, even if well-structured and well-accepted within the field,
may completely lack reliability. (Intriguingly, the Court names two disci-
plines, astrology and necromancy, which both involve prediction to some
degree.66) How can a trial court determine where on this continuum of
strength a given expert opinion rests? The Court has answered this ques-
tion as well, albeit in general terms: sufficiently strong to help the fact-
finder.6 7
b. Fit
Both Daubert and Kumho Tire describe the second concern of the
new standard as one of "relevance." This notion of relevance goes be-
yond logical relevance under Rule 401, and beyond the balancing of pro-
62. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317-21 (9th Cir. 1995). On re-
mand from the Supreme Court, additional factors included: whether the testifying expert had con-
ducted supporting research solely for the litigation; whether the expert used some recognized
methodology in reaching their conclusions. Id. The Ninth Circuit indicated that, if the sole question
were the reliability of the expertise at issue, it might remand the case to allow plaintiffs to supplement
affidavits under the new standard. Id. at 132o. However, the Court of Appeals refused to remand,
given what it saw as an inappropriate "fit" between the inferences offered by the experts and the de-
mands of proving causation in the case. Id. at 132o-22. See infra Part I.A.3 .b. See also E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. 1995) (additional factors include "the non-
judicial uses which have been made of the theory or technique" and "the extent to which the technique
relies upon the subjective interpretation of the expert").
63. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153 (approving the trial court's determination that the expert
testimony "fell outside the range where experts might reasonably differ"). See, e.g., infra Part I.B (dis-
cussing differing methodologies for predicting dangerousness).
64. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (993)-
65. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153.
66. Id. at 151. ("Nor, on the other hand, does the presence of ... general acceptance... help
show that an expert's testimony is reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for example,
do theories grounded in any so-called generally accepted principles of astrology or necromancy.").
67. See FEO. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue .... ); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591
("Rule 702 further requires that the evidence or testimony 'assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.' This condition goes primarily to relevance. 'Expert testimony
which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful."').
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bative value and prejudicial effect under Rule 4o3. 6' While the Daubert
opinion approaches a logical version of relevance, 6' it typically uses more
expansive language, describing the concern as one of "helpfulness" or
"fit." Kumho Tire takes the concern for helpfulness further, specifically
assessing how the expertise in a case relates to the specific factual con-
tentions it means to address.7" The Court approved a standard that as-
sesses "the reasonableness of using [a given expertise] to draw a
conclusion regarding the particular matter to which the expert testimony
was directly relevant."'" Trial judges have "the discretionary author-
ity.., to determine reliability in light of the particular facts and circum-
stances of the particular case."72
At the extreme, this approach would prevent a generalized model of
fit; not until trial, when the proponent of expertise had developed its
probative purpose, might a trial judge assess the fit of the expertise to the
case. Yet the Court's opinions do suggest some general parameters: They
articulate a dynamic relationship between reliability and fit. One version
of this relationship would see reliability as the dominant factor, with
helpfulness as solely a relevance check.73 But it is more plausible to see fit
as more than just relevance, operating in a dynamic relationship with re-
liability. A trial court might exclude demonstrably reliable expertise if it
had an insufficient fit to the facts of the case. By the same token, a trial
court might admit clearly unreliable evidence if it bore a sufficiently
strong connection to the facts at issue.
Kumho Tire excluded questionable expertise because it did not help
the fact-finder in that case, for the proffered purpose. In a sense, it af-
firmed the exclusion of weak (but not valueless) expertise because the
particular inferences it expressed did not fit the necessary fact-finding.
The Court's cases do not address and thus do not answer whether a trial
court might accept questionable expertise which has an especially strong
fit to a particular case. The existence of this possibility suggests yet an-
other range of questions: What factors (in addition to logical relevance)
68. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevant evidence) & 403 (requiring a balance of probative
value and prejudicial impact).
69. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92 ("Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the
case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.") (internal quotations omitted).
7o. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153-57.
71. Id. at 153-54. "The trial court had to decide whether this particular expert had sufficient spe-
cialized knowledge to assist the jurors 'in deciding the particular issues in the case."' Id. at i56 (inter-
nal quotations omitted).
72. Id. at 158.
73. The Court's reference to the phases of the moon in Daubert appears to approve this dynamic;
here, the science of tracking moon phases appears relatively reliable, but the irrelevance of a particular
moon phase to prove a given individual's state of mind ("irrationality") fails to satisfy our baseline
notion of "relevance." See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92.
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might a trial court use in assessing the strength of fit between expert
opinions and the evidentiary demands of a given case?
This Article answers these questions by exploring predictive testi-
mony in civil commitments. As the next subsection indicates, predictive
testimony is not only "questionable," it has been roundly and thoroughly
denigrated for forensic purposes, often by the very community of experts
from which it derives. 4 Yet, predictive expertise bears a special relation-
ship to civil commitment determinations, as explained further below.75
B. DANGER
Mental health professionals use two primary approaches in predict-
ing danger: clinical predictions and actuarial assessments. v6 The relevant
literature reveals intense criticism of each of these techniques, criticism
rooted both in science and in policy. As a result, some experts have per-
sistently argued for the exclusion of psychiatric predictions from judicial
proceedings, including civil commitments, while others have typically
made guarded, and carefully limited, claims for admissibility.
i. Methods of Inferring Future Violence
Clinical predictions and actuarial assessments use different inferen-
tial processes. The first entails review of disparate information about a
given individual, followed by the exercise of judgment about the risk of
danger that individual might pose. The second entails the identification
of specific characteristics of the individual that have been statistically
correlated with a specified risk of violence. Clinical predictions make
statements about the individual; actuarial assessments make statements
about a group with which the individual shares characteristics, and from
which one might draw inferences about the individual.77
a. Clinical Opinions
Clinical opinion represents the earliest, and still the most wide-
spread, form of predictive expertise. As we will see below,"' psychiatrists
and psychologists play a significant role in the initiation, continuation
74. See infra Part I.B (discussing the science of prediction, and the literature critical of that sci-
ence).
75. See infra Part I.C (discussing the integration of predictive expertise into civil commitments).
76. William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impres-
sionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical Statistical Contro-
versy, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POLY & L. 293, 294 (1996) ("[There are] two ways of forecasting behavior.
One, a formal method, uses an equation, a formula, a graph, or an actuarial table to arrive at a prob-
ability, or expected value, of some outcome; the other method relies on an informal, 'in the head,' im-
pressionistic subjective conclusion, reached . . . by a human clinical judge.")
77. See Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 109-1O (984).
78. See infra Part L.C (discussing the roles that psychiatrists play in initiating, advocating, review-
ing and terminating civil commitment orders).
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and termination of commitment orders; a majority of the reported deci-
sions involve clinical predictions. Moreover, clinical opinions play a regu-
lar role in the routine practice of hospitals, including those designated to
treat committed patients, as well as in other forensic contexts.79
Clinical opinions share a common methodology. The clinical asses-
sor interviews the patient directly, obtains the patient's medical history,
and formulates a diagnosis of the patient's psychiatric condition. Data
may include conversations with people familiar with the patient, written
medical records of that patient, or conversations with other clinicians.
The clinician may also compare the collected information to other similar
cases with which the clinician is familiar, and may consult literature that
provides further bases for comparison. This literature review may also
include review of actuarial methods as they might apply to the patient. 
S
The clinician then applies his or her judgment to this collected data in
order to reach an opinion about whether the patient is likely to act dan-
gerously.
Descriptions of clinical opinions stress their subjective and intuitive
aspects: "[T]he clinical method relies on human judgment that is based
on informal contemplation and, sometimes, discussion with others (e.g.
case conferences)."'" During the late 197os and into the i98os, a second
(or perhaps a third) wave of clinical approaches emerged, combining tra-
ditional clinical judgment with structured integration of actuarial conclu-
sions into an overall opinion."2 Even when they incorporate actuarial
information, however, clinical judgments apply intuitive and subjective
assessments to patient-specific data."3
79. See Kirk Heilbrun & Gretchen Witte, The Macarthur Risk Assessment Study: Implications for
Practice, Research and Policy, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 733, 734-38 (i999) (listing the following uses of risk
assessments, including clinical predictions: civil commitments; child custody and parental fitness; mal-
practice cases involving breach of a duty to warn; criminal sentencing; criminal commitment; correc-
tional transfers: and sexual offender commitment).
8o. See infra Part .B. I.b. (discussing the uses of actuarial data in clinical assessments).
81. Grove & Meehl, supra note 76, at 293 (comparing different studies of the effectiveness of
clinical as opposed to actuarial assessments, and concluding that "the mechanical method is almost
invariably equal to or superior to the clinical method"). See also Caroline M. Mee & Harold V. Hall,
Risky Business: Assessing Dangerousness in Hawai'i, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 63, 90 (2001) ("A psychiatrist
or psychologist reviewed medical records and conducted a personal interview, which formed the basis
for a professional judgment as the subject's potential dangerousness. Unstructured clinical opinions
were, by definition, subjective ....").
82. Mee & Hall, supra note 81, at 90 (identifying "structured clinical opinions" as the second
stage of violence prediction methods, and "empirically guided evaluations" as the third phase).
83. See R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk Assessment?, 4 PSYCHOL.,
PuB. POL'Y & L. 50, 52-53 (1998) (distinguishing still further between "guided clinical" approaches and
"adjusted actuarial" approaches).
In the guided clinical approach, expert evaluators consider a wide range of empirically vali-
dated risk factors and then form an overall opinion concerning the offender's recidivism
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Clinical opinions have never received high marks for reliability.
Early literature and studies almost completely discounted them, finding
that clinicians did little better than chance.8' A 1981 study by John
Monahan, an early critic of predictive accuracy, summarized these stud-
ies, and critiqued their methodological shortcomings, 85 resulting in a
"second generation" of research into the accuracy of clinical methods. 6
Over the past decade, these second generation research methods have
led to a conclusion that clinical methods perform somewhat better than
random, but are still deeply imperfect s7 Assessments that incorporate ac-
tuarial data appear to have performed somewhat better than unguided
and particularly unstructured assessments, 8 increasing the rate of reli-
risk. In the guided clinical approach, the method for translating the identified risk factors
into recidivism rates is not explicitly determined.... The adjusted actuarial approach begins
with an actuarial prediction, but expert evaluators can then adjust (or not) the actuarial
prediction after considering potentially imporant factors that were not included in the ac-
tuarial measure.
Id. at 52-53 (internal quotations omitted). The key distinction remains the explicitness (and presuma-
bly the statistical soundness) with which the clinician translates the data into predictions of danger.
84. See JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 44-56 (1981) (reviewing
HENRY J. STEADMAN & JOSEPH J. COCOZZA, CAREERS OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE: EXCESSIVE SOCIAL
CONTROL OF DEVIANCE (1974); TERENCE P. THORNBERRY & JOSEPH E. JACOBY, THE CRIMINALLY INSANE:
A COMMUNITY FOLLOW-UP OF MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS 200-201 (1979); Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J.
Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29
RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976) [hereinafter Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predic-
tions]; Harry L. Kozol et al.. The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 371
(972); Henry J. Steadman, A New Look at Recidivism Among Patuxent Inmates, 5 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 200, 200 (1977)).
85. Id.
86. See Randy K. Otto. On the Ability of Mental Health Professionals to "Predict Dangerousness":
A Commentary on Interpretations of the "Dangerousness" Literature, I8 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 43, 63
(1994). The changes in methodology implemented in this second generation include: greater use of
clinicians' predictions and assessments of risk (rather than on those of non-clinicians, including courts
through commitment orders); expansion in the categories of behavior considered violent (such as the
inclusion of verbal threats in addition to acts); expanding the range of sources from which violence
after a prediction may be detected; and greater exploration of the role of situational and environ-
mental factors.
87. See John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary Admissibil-
ity, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 903-05 (20O0) (reviewing two studies in the 199os which attribute
greater reliability to clinical predictions than mere chance; Charles W. Lidz et al., The Accuracy of
Predictions of Violence to Others, 269 JAMA ioo7 (1993); Dale E. McNiel & Renee L. Binder, Clinical
Assessment of the Risk of Violence Among Psychiatric Inpatients, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1317 (1991)).
See also Joseph T. McCann, Risk Assessment and the Prediction of Violent Behavior, 44. FED. LAW. 18,
18 (1997) ("Research over the past several years has shown that mental health professionals' predic-
tions of violence are better than chance .... ").
88. See Hanson, supra note 83, at 6o-67 (distinguishing between and assessing clinical, guided
clinical, actuarial and adjusted actuarial methods of prediction).
Although most clinical assessments would be expected to have little predictive accuracy,
there is some evidence that empirically guided risk assessments can provide estimates wor-
thy of consideration .... Guided clinical assessments include a range of empirically vali-
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ability from I in 3 to I in 2. 89 Overall, Monahan concluded that "the sober
conclusion that clinicians are 'modestly better than chance' at predicting
violence appears to be becoming the consensus view."'
The community of prediction researchers remains divided between
experts who advocate use of clinical methods and those who stress the
use of actuarial methods. Indeed, some of the sharpest critiques of clini-
cal prediction come from those advocating actuarial approaches.9 ' How-
ever, clinical assessments remain dominant in the judicial process.
Indeed, to the extent that clinical predictions reflect statements about a
particular individual, rather than a group with which the individual
shares some characteristics, they may receive warmer welcome at trial,
which necessarily focuses on the individual.92
b. Actuarial / Statistical
While statistical methods for assessing risk have existed since the
early 1950s, only over the last ten to fifteen years have they become for-
mally and widely used.93 During this period, an extraordinarily diverse
range of methodologies has emerged, both for the assessment of violent
dated risk indicators and then make recidivism estimates on the basis of the offenders' rank-
ings on these factors and the expected base rates for similar offenders.
Id. at 61-62 (internal citations omitted). See also Otto, supra note 86, at 63 ("[T]his body of research
generally suggests that mental health professionals have some ability to assess risk and make predic-
tions of violence (i.e. they do better than chance).") (citing Randy K. Otto, Prediction of Dangerous
Behavior: A Review and Analysis of "Second Generation" Research, 5 FORENSIC REP. I03 (I992)).
89. Otto, supra note 86, at 63 ("[W]hereas first generation research suggested that perhaps one
out of three people predicted to engage in some kind of violent behavior will actually go on to do so,
more recent studies suggest that one out of every two people predicted to be violent would go on to
engage in some kind of legally relevant, violent behavior.").
90. John Monahan, Predictions of Violence: The Scientific Status of Research and Actuarial Pre-
dictions of Violence § 9-2, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTI-
MONY (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2002) (assessing modern status of clinical predictions).
91. For example, Paul Meehl has proven a persistent and articulate critic of clinical approaches
and advocate for stastically based methods. See Grove & Meehl, supra note 76, at 293; see also Mee &
Hall, supra note 8t, at 293.
92. See Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for Predictions of Danger-
ousness in Sex Offender Commitment Proceedings, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POLY & L. 33, 6o-61 (1997) (argu-
ing that clinical predictions also rest on assessments of groups, but acknowledging a "contemporary
American value" for assessing the unique features of individuals).
Many courts, however, appear chary of actuarial methods of prediction. These methods
treat the subject of commitment as a member of a group rather than as an individual, which
appears to be contrary to contemporary American values....
... [T]he use of actuarial methods may appear too mechanical and too general, under-
cutting the ideal that decisions about personal liberty should be individualized, taking into
account the unique constellation of facts that make up this person.
Id.
93. Mee & Hall, supra note 81, at 9t-92 (identifying the mid-i99os as the date for first develop-
ment of pure actuarial measures, followed by two additional stages of refinement (combined actuarial,
and classification tree approaches)).
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behavior generally and for assessment of more specific populations, in-
cluding the mentally ill and sex offenders.94 The sources, methods, and
purposes of the tools vary substantially, and this Article neither cata-
logues nor critiques them in detail. However, they share common as-
sumptions and have similar effects. Literature (and case law) discusses
them together under the rubric of "actuarial approaches."
Actuarial researchers collect and analyze data on the characteristics
and behaviors of a given group of individuals. The researchers identify
features in that data that statistically correlate to acts of violence (gener-
ally or of a certain type) by members of that group. The assessments
make statements about statistical correlations: for the given group, one
94. Id. at 97-113. The authors catalog seventeen different methods for violence risk assessment,
including: a seriousness scoring system for quantifying the harmful consequences of past violence; a
violence meta-analysis which compared predictors of recidivism for mentally disordered with those of
non-disordered offenders; the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), which "measures behaviours
and personality traits that are considered fundamental to the clinical construct of psychopathy," id. at
tot (quoting Ivan Zinger & Adelle E. Forth, Psychopathology and Canadian Criminal Proceedings:
The Potential for Human Rights Abuses, 40 REVUE CANADIENNE DE CRIMINOLOGIE 237, 248 (1998)); the
Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG), which produces a weighted score based on i I different pre-
dictors of violence, including the PCL-R; the Sex Offender Risk Appraisal Guide (SORAG), which
"predicts the risk that an adult male sex offender will commit another sex offense within a seven to ten
year period," id. at 104: a sexual recidivism meta-analysis, which measured a base-rate for reoffending
for 28,972 sex offenders, as explored in eighty-seven articles; the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual
Offense Recidivism (RRASOR), which "predicts the risk that an individual will commit a new sex
offense within the next five to ten years," by using a 4 factor weighted scoring system, id. at Io6; the
Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Test-Revised (MnSOST-R), which "predicts the risk that violent
offender will commit another act of violence within the next six years," using a sixteen factor weighted
scoring system, id. at tOT static and dynamic risk assessment tools, which "yield low, medium and high
risk predictors for sexual offenders," id. at io8; a Dangerousness Prediction Decision Tree, which inte-
grated both static violence risk factors and dynamic factors to predict risks of violence within the next
three months: the Spousal Assault Risk Assessment Guide (SARA), which assesses risks of violence
towards an intimate partner the Sexual Violence Risk-2o (SVR-2o), which act as a "set of professional
guidelines for evaluating the risk of sexual violence." id. at i so, but do not predict the risk of future
sexual violence: the Historical Clinical Risk Management -20 (HCR-2o), which act as a "set of profes-
sional guidelines to assess the risk of violence." id. at i io: the California Actuarial Risk Assessment
Table (CARAT) which present the base rates for reoffending of both child molesters and rapists the
Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R), which includes both static and dynamic factors to help
assess the appropriateness of various professional interventions: and the Workplace Violence Risk
Assessment Checklist (WVRAC). which serves as a screening tool to help those who manage person-
nel in a workplace make appropriate referrals for staff. The authors also take note of other methods
about which they had insufficient data, including the Static-99, "which attempts to predict sexual re-
cidivism by using a stepwise regression approach to classify offenders." Id. at 113. See also Hanson,
supra note 83, at 62-65 (describing and comparing the MnSOST. the VRAG, the RRASOR);
Monahan, supra note 87, at 905-11 (assessing actuarial methods generally, including: the VRAG; a
version of the PCL-R (Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised); the HCR-2o; and the MacArthur Vio-
lence Risk Assessment Study, which uses an Iterative Classification Tree (ICT)). It is beyond the
scope of this Article to offer an exhaustive review of all forms of statistically based violence risk as-
sessment.
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or more factors do or do not correlate to violence. In other words, the as-
sessments identify "risk factors." '95
To some extent, assessors can use these risk factors individually. The
assessor notices which of these risk factors a particular individual exhib-
its, takes note of the probabilities associated with those various factors,
considers them in light of overall base rates for violence for someone like
the individual, and produces an individualized assessment of risk for that
individual. 6 For example, in 1998, Hanson and Bussibre examined a
number of different risk factors for sexual recidivism, using a dataset that
covered 28,972 sexual offenders. 97 As summarized later by Karl Hanson,
ten factors had statistically significant correlations with later sexual reof-
fense. 8 An assessor who identifies any of these factors in a particular in-
dividual (and accepts the validity of the underlying study) can validly
assert that the given risk factor in one individual correlates with violence
in a group of other individuals with the same risk factor.
Risk factors also separate into categories. The differences influence
the weighting of multiple risk factors. Static (or fixed) factors permit dif-
ferent inferences from dynamic (or changeable) risk factors.' Static fac-
tors include relatively long-term characteristics of a given individual,
"such as a history of childhood maladjustment or prior offenses."" Dy-
namic factors include characteristics that are either short-term or more
susceptible to change. Literature recognizes a further subdivision of dy-
namic factors into stable and acute factors.'"' Stable dynamic factors
95. Monahan, supra note 87, at 905 n.27 (citing Helena Chmura Kraemer et al., Coming to Terms
With the Terms of Risk, 54 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 337 (1997)). To say that a particular characteris-
tic is a risk factor means that: "(i) the variable correlates with the outcome (in this case, violence), and
(2) the variable precedes the outcome. To call a variable a 'risk factor' does not imply that its relation-
ship to the outcome is in any sense 'causal."' Id.
96. See Hanson, supra note 83, at 56-58 (describing the use of individual risk factors in clinical
assessments).
97. R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussi~re, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual Of-
fender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 348, 351 (1998).
98. Hanson, supra note 83, at 57 tbl.i. The factors included: sexual preference for children; any
deviant sexual preference; prior sexual offenses; failure to complete treatment; antisocial personality
disorder: any prior offenses; age (youth); never married: any unrelated victims; any male child victims.
Id.
99. Id. at 51-52 (describing the differences between different kinds of risk factors). The discussion
which follows draws heavily on Hanson's overview of different risk factors.
ioo. Id.
Ioi. Id. ("Stable factors have the potential of changing but typically endure for long periods of
time (e.g., deviant sexual preferences or alcoholism). Acute factors, in contrast, are rapidly changing
states (e.g., sexual arousal or drunkenness) that immediately precede sexual crimes."). Knowledge of
static factors for a given individual permits inferences about that person's long-term tendency towards
particular kinds of behavior, but does not help to predict when violence might occur, or whether the
individual has a reduced risk of offending (or reoffending). Dynamic factors "are those that predict
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permit inferences about likely fluctuations in a given person's risk pro-
file; by contrast, acute risk factors "help to determine the timing of reof-
fense."'I 2
The categorization of risk factors informs a central effort of modern
actuarial research: the creation of overall risk assessment scales. An as-
sessor using a "guided clinical" approach to prediction may attend to the
statistical research underlying the identification of individual risk factors,
but has no explicitly defined method for combining them; the combina-
tion rests on the clinician's judgment.' 3 By contrast, modern risk assess-
ment scales select a limited group of salient risk factors, assign values to
these risk factors (often weighting some more heavily than others), and
create a formula for producing an overall probability of risk (a "risk
score") for the person who exhibits the relevant risk factors. The combi-
nation rests on tested pre-weighting of factors, not on clinical discretion.
For example, Hanson describes the creation of the Rapid Risk As-
sessment for Sex Offense Recidivism (RRASOR) as an "objective risk
assessment procedure" designed to predict sexual recidivism.' 4 Hanson
reviewed and reanalysed data from eight different data sets, then reas-
sessed the data using variables that had been identified as significant in a
previous analysis. Using various statistical methods," Hanson produced
"[f]our variables that independently predicted recidivism": the number of
prior sexual offenses; age at the time of release (over or under 25); ear-
lier targeting of male victims; and targeting of unrelated victims by the
offender.' 6 He weighted each of these factors separately, then added
them together. 7 The assessor uses the score so obtained to assess the
recidivism, have the potential of changing, and, when changed, are associated with corresponding in-
creases or decreases in recidivism." Id.
The scientific literature appears to divide these factors in different ways: the discussion here
seeks only to describe the utility of categorizing risk factors, especially for purposes of creating overall
risk assessment scales, without offering any view on which categorization is most appropriate. See, e.g.,
Mee & Hall, supra note 8I, at 9o-91 (contrasting historical factors, opportunity factors, and triggering
stimuli).
102. Hanson, supra note 83. at 51.
103. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; Hanson, supra note 83, at 63-64.
Io4. See Hanson, supra note 83, at 63-64.
io5. Id. ("[T]he average intercorrelations between the factors were calculated using standard
meta-analytic procedures. The averaged correlation matrix was then analyzed using stepwise regres-
sion to identify the best subset of nonredundant predictors.").
so6. Id. at 64.
107. Id. For example, "[p]rior sexual offenses were coded as follows: o = none: i = one prior con-
viction or one to two prior arrests; 2 = two or three prior convictions or three to five prior arrests; and
3 = four or more prior convictions or six or more prior arrests." Id. The assessor can adjust the score
further for age, targeting of male victims, and offending against an unrelated victim. Id. "In practice,
this scoring procedure gives the lowest scores to incest offenders with no prior records and the highest
scores to young, boy-object child molesters with multiple prior sexual convictions." Id.
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risk of reoffense for any member of the group who has the same configu-
ration of factors. In effect, "actuarial approaches use explicit, formal pro-
cedures for translating ratings on a limited number of risk factors into an
overall risk score."' 8
Hanson and others acknowledge a range of weaknesses and imper-
fections in such models, including:
(i The lack of comprehensiveness in the included factors-
the underlying risk factors in the RRASOR, as in other
devices, are "static and [thus] cannot be used to measure
change."" Other devices may include greater reliance on
dynamic factors, thus improving the responsiveness of the
device to changeable conditions; but to date, none appear
to have an authoritative inventory of both static and dy-
namic factors.''
(2) The imprecision in the categories of risk factors-for ex-
ample, under the RRASOR, offending against a family
member is weighted lower than offending against a
stranger. Hanson asks, "what about an offender who se-
lected a 14-year-old foster child who had been living in the
home for 2 months as compared with a foster child who
had been living in the home for 5 years? ..... Even the
RRASOR's age cut-off of twenty-five, which appears to
offer a bright line, will still leave "borderline cases ....
(3) Errors in identifying individual characteristics, such as fre-
quent reliance on the individual's self-reporting, the lack
of relevant records, and contradictions in otherwise com-
io8. Id.
I19. Id. at 65.
Iio. Id. Hanson refers to the MnSOST as an example of a scale that includes at least a potential
"dynamic risk factor." Id. Moreover, he reports on his own efforts to develop a more comprehensive
cataloging and assessment of dynamic factors. Id. at 58-6o. Harold Hall identifies another such device,
the Dangerousness Prediction Decision Tree, which seeks to incorporate a range of dynamic and static
factors, together with both internal and external triggers. Mee & Hall, supra note 8I, at lO8-09 (de-
scribing the Decision Tree as another scoring instrument). The Decision Tree draws on a research
conclusion that "[t]he best predictor of short-term dangerousness [was the presence of] multiple stimu-
lus triggers (at least two), short-term in duration (less than one month), high in impact, superimposed
on past violence." Id. at IO9 (second alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). The purpose
of the Decision Tree is thus "to predict the risk that an individual will commit another violent offense
within the next three months." Id.
This Article offers these as illustrations of possible methods of combining risk factors. A more
subtle and nuanced cataloging of all methods is beyond the scope of this Article.
it1. Hanson, supra note 83, at 61.
112. Id.
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plete records, which can lower confidence in the overall
score."3
How effectively do actuarial scales measure the probability of dan-
ger? To answer this question, one must distinguish between accuracy
about groups and accuracy about individuals. As to groups, the "accu-
racy" of the scale means the number of correct predictions (both positive
and negative) divided into the total number of predictions (including
both correct and incorrect predictions). "4 When a given scale has an ac-
curacy of seventy-five percent, that percentage of the individuals scored
as high risk did in fact commit the relevant violent act, as determined by
actuarial studies.
To individualize these statements (i.e., to use the data to make pre-
dictions about individuals) requires knowledge of the "base rate" of vio-
lence (i.e., the frequency with which the behavior defined as violent
occurs in the overall group). Even assuming a high accuracy for the over-
all group, the probability that a "positive" result is true varies with the
base rate of the group on which a test is applied. If a condition is rela-
tively rare in a group, even accurate tests identify lots of "false posi-
tives.",I'5
The group accuracy rate of most pure actuarial instruments is rela-
tively high. Janus and Meehl posit accuracy rates hovering around sev-
enty or seventy-five percent." Group rates thus compare favorably to
those achieved by clinical predictions for individuals. As a result, many
actuarial proponents argue the superiority of actuarial over clinical
113. Id. See also Donna Cropp Bechman, Sex Offender Civil Commitments: Scientists or Psychics?,
16 CRIM. JUST., Summer 2001, at 24, 26-30 (identifying the "five fatal flaws" of actuarial instruments,
including underuse of dynamic factors, lack of peer review, uncertainty about the margin of error, lack
of appropriate cross-validation, and disparities in results between different users of the instruments
("inter-rater reliability")).
114. See Janus & Meehl, supra note 92. at 47-48.
115. Id. at 48. Janus and Meehl offer the following example of the interaction between test accu-
racy and base rates in computing individualized probabilities. Assume a scientist has developed a
blood test that can detect cancer with 99% accuracy; 99 out of too times, the test reaches the correct
result. Assume also that we test a screening group of i,ooo. The example offers two different scenarios,
involving different base rates:
Example i: o.s% base rate: that is, one person out of the iooo will have cancer. With 99% accu-
racy, the test will almost certainly identify that one person correctly. But a 99% accuracy rate also
means a i% error rate; applied to the remaining 999 cancer-free patients means that the test will pro-
duce around ten (9.9) "false positives," bringing the total identified with cancer to eleven people.
"[Tjhe probability that any of the ii 'positives' actually has cancer is only i/ii, or about 9%." Id.
Example 2: 5o% base rate: that is, 500 people out of the iooo will have cancer. With 99% accu-
racy, the test will almost certainly identify 495 people correctly; with a i% error rate, it will identify
five people incorrectly, for a total of 500 people identified with cancer. "The probability that any one
of those 5oo actually has cancer is 495 / 5o or 99%." Id.
ii6. Id. at 49.
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methods."7 The most moderate advocates of actuarial approaches accept
a combination of clinical and actuarial methods, with increasing reliance
on actuarial methods as research techniques advance. ' More stringent
advocates reject any form of clinical judgment, including an "adjusted ac-
tuarial" approach,"9 or the cumulation and combination of disparate ac-
tuarial methods.' A few actuarial advocates claim that predictions based
on actuarial methods can "reliably identify.., offenders with an endur-
ing propensity" to act violently, translating statistical data about risk fac-
tors for a group into a statement about an internal psychic state of a
single member of that group. '
While general consensus does exist about the statistical validity of
actuarial tools as statements about group risks, no comparable consensus
appears to exist about the respective merits and appropriate combina-
tions of clinical and actuarial methods to predict violence, especially for a
single individual. Even strong actuarial advocates acknowledge that "the
proactuarial position is apparently held by only a minority of practitio-
ners .... .As we will see, clinical approaches have also dominated the pre-
117. Id. at 48-49 (citing Grove & Meehl, supra note 76, at 298 (using meta-analytical techniques to
compare the outcomes of studies of clinical and actuarial methods, and concluding, inter alia, "of the
136 studies, 64 favored the actuary .... 64 showed approximately equivalent accuracy, and 8 favored
the clinician"). "Meehl's thesis, confirmed in many contexts, is that clinical judgment is at best as good
as, but often worse than, actuarial methods." Id.
118. Hanson, supra note 83, at 67.
I have argued that there are three approaches that can provide credible risk assessments:
the empirically guided clinical approach, the pure actuarial approach, and the adjusted ac-
tuarial approach.... [E]ach of these approaches can be expected to reliably identify a small
subgroup of offenders with an enduring propensity to sexually reoffend.
Id. Hanson estimates the accuracy rate for these three methods as ranging between fifty percent and
eighty percent, id. at 67-68, but separately cautions that "evaluators should, nevertheless, be exceed-
ingly cautious about how much they adjust actuarial estimates." Id. at 66.
ii9. Id. at 65. "The adjusted actuarial approach begins with actuarial predictions and then adjusts
these assessments on the basis of other compelling evidence." Id. Hanson asserts that "[e]ven the
strongest advocates of actuarial prediction have always believed that adjustments to the statistical pre-
dictions can be justified in certain circumstances." Id. (citing Grove & Meehl. supra note 76). Hanson
also notes that "[t]here has been ongoing controversy concerning the likelihood that clinical adjust-
ments will dilute rather than enhance actuarial predictions." Id.
I2O. See Janus & Meehl, supra note 92, at 50.
It might be argued that the cumulative accuracy of seriatim review by a number of different
evaluators will tend to increase the accuracy of the entire process. But this would be true
only if the clinicians regularly knew when to overrule the actuarial studies or their col-
leagues' predictions.... Further, a weak link in the chain could actually decrease accuracy.
Id.
12t. Hanson, supra note 83, at 67.
122. Grove & Meehl, supra note 76, at 317. "How is it possible that thousands of MDs, PhDs, and
MSWs... could be so wrong, as we allege?" Id. Grove and Meehl speculate about a range of reasons:
fear of technological unemployment; self-concept; attachment to theory; misperception of the actuarial
method as dehumanizing; general dislike of computers in competition with the human mind; and poor
education. Id. at 317-18.
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dictive expertise used in and reviewed by courts.' 3 Yet whatever the
opinion in the professional community, until recently, courts have taken
a negative view of any prediction, clinical or otherwise. The next subsec-
tion offers a brief history of this skeptical view.
2. Attitudes Towards Predictions
Until the early 197os, psychiatric testimony in civil commitments
went largely unchallenged, both in courts and in the literature. However,
for nearly fifteen years after 197o, a series of articles assessing psychiatric
prediction appeared, much of it sharply critical.'24 John Monahan's influ-
ential study of both legal and psychiatric research literature concluded in
1981 that "the 'best' clinical research currently in existence indicates that
psychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of
three predictions of violent behavior..' 2. In other words, "mental health
professionals.., are more likely to be wrong than right when they pre-
dict legally relevant behavior. When predicting violence, dangerousness,
and suicide, they are far more likely to be wrong than right.""' Indeed,
according to some critics, not only were mental health professionals no
better than lay people (or chance) at predicting violence, they might even
be worse.'
7
The intensity and frequency of the critique had at least two notable
consequences. First, largely as a result of Monahan's seminal critique of
the methodology of earlier psychological studies, the scientific commu-
123. See infra Part II.C. (reviewing predictive expertise in civil commitments).
124. Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions, supra note 84, at 1o98-11oo;
Alan M. Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL. EDUC.
24, 46-47 (1970); Bernard L. Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 439, 440 (1974); see also George E. Dix, The Death Penalty, "Dangerousness," Psychiatric Testi-
mony, and Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151, 212 (1977); George E. Dix. Clinical Evaluation of
the "Dangerousness" of "Normal" Criminal Defendants, 66 VA. L. REV. 523. 546-47 (198o); George E.
Dix, Expert Prediction Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Evidentiary and Constitutional Considerations,
19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. I, 16 (I98I); Ennis & Litwack, supra note 6, at 734-35; Kozol, supra note 84. at
392. (concluding that dangerousness can reliably be diagnosed): MONAHAN, supra note 84, at 44-5 6 ;
Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL.
L. REV. 527, 6oo (1978); Bernard Rubin, Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals, 27 AR-
CHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 397, 398 (1972); Slobogin, supra note 77, at xII; Henry J. Steadman, Some
Evidence on the Inadequacy of the Concept and Determination of Dangerousness in Law and Psychia-
try, I J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 409, 410 (973); Henry J. Steadman & Joseph P. Morrissey, The Statistical
Prediction of Violent Behavior, 5 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 263, 272-73 (i981); Andrew von Hirsch, Prediction
of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 717, 736
(1971); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, TASK FORCE RETORT 8, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL
28 (974) (concluding that "[n]either psychiatrists nor anyone else have demonstrated an ability to
predict future violence or dangerousness"); Comment. The Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in
the Courtroom?, 38 MD. L. REV. 539,577- 8 1 (1979).
125. MONAHAN, supra note 84, at 47-49 (emphasis omitted).
126. Morse, supra note 124, at 6oo.
127. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 6, at 734-35.
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nity entered into a second generation of assessments of the accuracy of
clinical predictions. ,8 That community renewed its efforts to discover
more verifiable empirical bases on which to make those predictions, lead-
ing to a wave of statistical and actuarial studies and prediction methods
in the i990s.'29
Second, the attitude that predictive expertise lacked any reliability
took root in reported legal opinions. In a series of constitutional cases,
the United States Supreme Court assessed the due process implications
both of civil commitments and of the use of predictive testimony."3 In
many of these cases, the Court strongly criticized the reliability of psy-
chiatric predictions, noting a consensus opinion that psychiatric opinions
predicting danger lack any reliability.'3' To some extent, the Court devel-
oped its attitude from citations to the early literature."32 However, its
views were also shaped by submissions from the American Psychiatric
Association (APA), which filed repeated amicus briefs during this pe-
riod, expressing its views on the lack of psychiatric expertise to make
predictions about future behavior.'33 These opinions matched the harsh-
ness of the strongest critics of predictive expertise:
The professional literature uniformly establishes that such predictions
are fundamentally of very low reliability, and that psychiatric testi-
mony and expertise are irrelevant to such predictions. In view of these
findings, psychiatric testimony on the issue of future criminal behavior
only distorts the factfinding process. To the extent that there are im-
portant facts for a jury to consider on this issue, they can be fully pre-
sented by lay witnesses who do not testify with the mantle of
professional expertise."'
128. MONAHIAN, supra note 84, at 44-56. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (identifying
methodological reforms accomplished in the second generation research).
i29. See infra Part l.B.i.b (discussing modem actuarial methods of assessing risk).
130. See infra Part I.C.I (discussing the constitutional parameters of civil commitments and predic-
tive testimony) and I.C. 3 (discussing constitutional requirements for burdens of proof).
131. See infra Parts I.C.i & I.C.3. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (I979) ("Given
the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether
a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to
be dangerous.").
132. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920-24, (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. Addington, 44i U.S. at 431-33 (holding that due process required at least a "clear and con-
vincing" evidence burden of proof in civil commitment actions); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467-69
(I98I) (requiring the knowing waiver of right of self-incrimination prior to court-ordered psychiatric
examination); Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896 (holding that use of psychiatric predictions in death penalty
determinations, however unreliable, did not violate due process). See also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71, 78-80 (1992) (holding continued confinement of an insanity acquittee unconstitutional in the
absence of a finding of mental illness).
134. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychiatric Association at 8; Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454
(i98i).
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The APA carefully limited its argument to long-term predictions,
such as those required as part of the penalty phase in capital cases.'35 Yet
its argument cut broadly, casting doubt on assessments in both civil and
criminal cases and identifying weaknesses in methodology that applied to
all predictive testimony."
As we will see, modern state cases dealing with the admissibility of
expert predictions of danger have tended to assume the worst about pre-
dictions, yet still have readily used them as evidence.'37 The developing
psychiatric literature has found a slightly improved reliability for clinical
predictions and much stronger reliability for actuarial assessments in re-
cent years.' The legal academy has also begun to embrace a more ac-
cepting view. Some analysts have continued the critique of psychiatric
predictions as evidence, especially after Daubert.'39 John Monahan, how-
ever, has applied a slightly modified Daubert test to reach the conclusion
135. By contrast, it asserted that "in civil commitment cases.., psychiatrists often can and do
make reliable predictions about short-term prognoses, and such predictions often include potential
violence." Id. at n.5. The amicus brief clearly refers to clinical prediction methods with respect to
short-term prediction: "the psychiatrist is able to evaluate the patient's current mental condition and
to discern likely behavioral patterns, including potential violent behavior in the near future, if the ill-
ness remains untreated." Id. Interestingly, later cases and scholars rarely note this limitation on the
A.P.A.'s opinion.
136. Its primary methodological complaint related to clinical reliance on base rates. Clinicians may
produce reliable predictions where, for example, "past behavior clearly and repetitively evidence
physical abuse of his or her children." Id. at 13. However, this confidence results from knowledge of
high base rates for violence in those situations. "Thus, to the extent that a psychiatrist's prediction of
'dangerousness' is based solely on this knowledge of base rates of behavior, his prediction involves no
more 'expertise'-and certainly no more 'psychiatric expertise'-than does that of the average nonex-
pert." Id. at 14.
137. See infra Part n.B. (analyzing cases which address the admissibility of expert psychiatric pre-
dictions under evidentiary standards).
138. See supra Part I.B. (discussing current psychiatric literature).
139. Gary Gleb, Comment, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: The Need to Bar Unreli-
able Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness from Civil Commitment Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. REV.
213, 248-49 (s99 1) (recommending adoption of a modified Frye standard, and arguing that, under this
standard, psychiatric predictions of long term danger "would be admissible in criminal proceedings but
not in civil commitment proceedings"); Clayton Skaggs, Kansas' Sexual Predator Act and the Impact of
Expert Predictions: Psyched Out by the Daubert Test, 34 WASHBURN L. J. 320, 342 (1995) (assessing
psychiatric predictions under the four identified Daubert factors, and concluding "a trial judge apply-
ing the Daubert Court's 'general observations' would find the expert predictions inadmissible."); Mi-
chael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double Error, 40 ARiZ. L.
REV. 753, 755 (1998) (arguing that Daubert will require the exclusion of psychiatric predictions and
that "Daubert cannot be squared with Barefoot."); Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, The
Law and The Brain: Judging Scientific Evidence of Intent, i J. APp. PRAC. AND PROCESS 243, 273-74
(1999) (critiquing psychiatric predictions, and suggesting that "[i]t is doubtful that testimony about
future dangerousness could withstand Daubert analysis"); Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill,
Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1845, 1895-19O1 (2003) (arguing that Daubert requires the exclusion of clinical predictions, but
that actuarial instruments may improve judgments of juries in death penalty sentencing proceedings).
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that predictive testimony should ordinarily be admissible. " Finally, many
primary treatises and texts on scientific or expert evidence have con-
cluded that Daubert will not result in the exclusion of expert predic-
tions. 4 ' As stated in The Handbook of Forensic Psychology, "it is highly
unlikely that the Daubert decision will affect the admissibility of profes-
sional assessments of dangerousness in federal courts or in states that fol-
low the Daubert decision." '42
This Article agrees that Daubert should permit the admission of ex-
pert predictions, both clinical and actuarial, but not because of their sci-
entific reliability. Instead, the Article uses the example of civil
commitments to develop the notion that Daubert's concern with eviden-
tiary fit better explains the courts' receptivity to this form of predictive
testimony.
C. CIVIL COMMITMENT
Civil commitment law requires a finding of "danger" as a prerequi-
site to commitment for an indefinite period. How well does psychiatric
expertise fit this requirement? This section develops the proposition that
trial judges make decisions about the fit of expertise in the context of
standardized elements characteristic of any litigation. These elements in-
clude: the nature and purpose of the cause of action; the constitutional
limits within which the litigation occurs; the allocation and measure of
burdens of proof; the types of evidence offered and found sufficient to
meet the burden; and the legal definition of the specific facts towards
which the expert testifies. Some of these elements have special signifi-
cance for civil commitment, '43 yet each will influence a trial judge in de-
140. Monahan, supra note 87, at 91o-18. Monahan uses a six-factor test proposed by the Texas
Supreme Court in adopting its version of Daubert. Id. at 911. See also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549,557 (Tex. 1995).
141. See I DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL.. Modern Scientific Evidence. The Law and Science of Expert
Testimony 420-21 (2002) (arguing that Daubert is unlikely to change judicial receptivity to predictive
expertise, especially as predictive science develops greater demonstrated reliability); GARY B. MELTON
ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSION-
ALS & LAWYERS, 292-93 (2d ed. 1997) (arguing that both empirical and clinical predictions entail non-
obvious interpretation of data that require expertise, and thus justify expert testimony).
142. Thomas R. Litwack & Louise B. Schlesinger, Dangerousness Risk Assessments: Research, Le-
gal, and Clinical Considerations, in THE HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 192-93 (Allen K. Hess &
Irving B. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1999). The authors identify six different factors in support of this predic-
tion: the Supreme Court's historical receptivity to predictive testimony; the likelihood that predictions
will rest on validated risk factors; the argument that validation of expertise would require release of
potentially dangerous individuals; the prevalence of professional predictions of danger in other parts
of society; an asserted rise in the "general acceptance" of clinical predictions; and the likelihood that
psychiatric witnesses will better communicate and assess risk factors than law people. Id.
143. In particular, the constitutional limits on civil commitment have no counterpart in the cases
from which Daubert, Joiner and Kumho Tire have emerged.
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ciding how particular expertise will affect the disposition of a given litiga-
tion. In assessing these elements, this section suggests a more refined
model of Daubert's concerns for reliability and fit, one rooted less in sci-
ence and more in the demands of dispute resolution.
i. Purpose and Constitutional Dimensions of Civil Commitment
Every state has enacted a form of civil commitment law.'" In every
jurisdiction, the law serves as the vehicle through which public or even
private actors can obtain (or compel) treatment for those who need it.
These laws mandate treatment of those with mental illness in the exercise
of the state's parens patriae and police powers.'45 States' commitment
laws usually distinguish among mental illness, developmental disability,
46
and other mental disorders justifying long-term treatment. 47 Civil com-
mitment of any kind embodies and constrains conflict over three impor-
tant policy goals: assuring public safety against predictable violence
(including self-directed violence); alleviating the mental anguish of those
suffering from an illness; and maximizing an individual's personal liberty.
Federal constitutional concerns place boundaries on state commit-
ment laws. "Danger" itself has a constitutional dimension. In O'Connor
144. See infra Part I.C.5 (describing and citing to state commitment statutes' definitions of danger).
145. Mary Lynn Krongard, A Population at Risk: Civil Commitment of Substance Abusers After
Kansas v. Hendricks, 90 CAL. L. REV. II I, I117-27 (2002). These same justifications underlie the han-
dling of the mentally ill through the criminal justice system, a topic beyond the scope of this Article.
Common examples of criminal proceedings in which predictions of danger might affect the outcome
include: bail proceedings; sentencing proceedings; and criminal commitment proceedings.
146. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321-28 (1993) (assessing constitutionally required burden of
proof in commitment for the developmentally disabled, and discussing differences). As an element in
legal cases brought to compel treatment, "danger" plays a comparable role in the treatment of devel-
opmentally disabled patients. The author has found no cases which have assessed the admissibility of
predictive testimony in these cases.
147. Recent statutory efforts to impose civil commitment as a remedy for "sexual predators" have
received greater attention over the last decade. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346. 359 (997) (up-
holding a Kansas "sexual predator" statute, and according state legislatures broad leeway in formulat-
ing the terms it uses to describe mental illnesses and mental disorders). But see Mary Lynn Krongard,
A Population at Risk: Civil Commitment of Substance Abusers After Kansas v. Hendricks, 90 CAL. L.
REV. III, 131 (2002) ("Justice Thomas transformed the issue from a question of whether the new stat-
ute's target population fulfilled Foucha's constitutionally required 'mental illness' standard to a matter
of synonym choices .. "). States enact these special commitment statutes separately from general
commitment statutes; while the mental condition required by law varies between special and general
commitment statutes, both have been held to require a finding of "danger." Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. at 357. Many of the most recent evidentiary assessments of predictive testimony have occurred in
cases dealing with these special commitment statutes.
The current round of controversy over "sexual predators" represents only a recent phase of a
longer term use of commitment process to confine sexual offenders. See Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107, iO (1966) (requiring state to provide an equivalent access to jury trials in general commitment
and sexual offender statutes); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (holding that a prisoner
was entitled to prove that the denial of a jury trial under a sexual predator statute violated equal pro-
tection).
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v. Donaldson,'48 the U.S. Supreme Court held that "a State cannot consti-
tutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capa-
ble of surviving safely in freedom .... .""' The Court found that the U.S.
Constitution required a finding of danger, even if the state statute re-
quired less.'50 It held that the state must prove dangerousness both at the
time of initial commitment, and at the time of any later request for re-
lease. 5' The state and the patient have multiple occasions to litigate the
issue, in multiple procedural contexts, and thus have regular opportunity
to assess the patient's danger at different stages of treatment.' 5
The O'Connor decision came down in the midst of the first wave of
criticism of predictive expertise.'53 The strength and pervasiveness of the
critique raised a constitutional question: If expert predictions have so lit-
tle reliability, how can their use satisfy due process? The Court had al-
ready adverted to the unreliability of psychiatric predictions in
commitment cases,'5 ' but it resolved the due process concern in a sepa-
rate context, evaluating psychiatric predictions of danger during the
death penalty phase of capital prosecutions.
148. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
149. Id. at 576. The Court's ruling affirmed both trial and appeals court decisions in favor of a
Florida man who had been held for 15 years in the absence of any showing of dangerousness. Id. at
568-70. It held that Donaldson's confinement violated a constitutional guarantee of treatment suffi-
cient to create "a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition." Id. at 572
(quoting O'Connor v. Donaldson, 493 F.zd 507. 520 (I974)). The Court rested its ruling solely on the
lack of any evidence that Donaldson was dangerous. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 573. Because no evidence
of danger existed, the Court had no occasion to deal with testimony about danger, expert or otherwise.
150. Id. at 574 ("The fact that state law may have authorized confinement of the harmless mentally
ill does not itself establish a constitutionally adequate purpose for the confinement.").
151. Id. at 574-75 ("Nor is it enough that Donaldson's original confinement was founded upon a
constitutionally adequate basis, if in fact it was, because even if his involuntary confinement was ini-
tially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after that basis no longer existed."). See also
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 (reaffirming the danger requirement, while holding that states
have latitude to define "mental illness" to include any "volitional impairment rendering them danger-
ous beyond their control"). But see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 620 (1979) (holding constitutional a
statute that permitted commitment of children by the voluntary act of the parent, without considera-
tion of the child's possible dangerousness).
152. Most statutory schemes contemplate multiple findings of dangerousness for a given patient:
upon first entry into compulsory treatment; upon continuation of that treatment; upon transfer from
hospitalization to community treatment, and upon return to the hospital: and upon the termination of
treatment entirely. The nature of the danger determination may vary from issue to issue: the statutory
definition of danger required for initial commitment, for example, may differ from the statutory defini-
tion required for subsequent release. Moreover, as we will see below, statutes define danger itself in
different ways, and the range of different fact patterns which might justify a finding of danger are simi-
larly diverse. See infra Part I.C.5 (discussing statutory definitions of danger).
153. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
154. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)).
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In Barefoot v. Estelle,'55 the Court reviewed the adequacy of a sen-
tencing hearing in which psychiatrists testified that the defendant "would
probably commit further acts of violence and represented a continuing
threat to society."'' 6 Barefoot contended that psychiatric predictions
lacked sufficient reliability to satisfy federal due process concerns and
the APA concurred in an amicus brief.' 7 The Supreme Court rejected
the argument, however, over a sharply worded dissent by Justice Black-
mun.'5 The majority reasoned that, because the Constitution did not
prevent a state from requiring a jury to consider future dangerousness,' 9
155. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 88o (I983).
156. Id. at 884. The jury agreed, and sentenced the defendant, Thomas Barefoot, to death. The
defendant pursued appeals both through state and federal court systems, by direct appeal and by ha-
beas corpus petition. Id. at 884-87. The appeal to the Supreme Court originated in a federal district
court's denial of Barefoot's habeas corpus petition; the Fifth Circuit reviewed and affirmed that denial.
Both lower court's denied Barefoot's claims with respect to the use of psychiatric expertise.
157. Id. at 899-902. See supra notes 133-36 (describing the position of the APA).
158. Justice Blackmun argued that, as a matter of due process, the defects in psychiatric testimony
on danger run too deep to justify its use in a death penalty case. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916-38. He re-
views the then current critique of predictive accuracy, noting the lack of professional support for the
opinion, and the error rate of two in three. Id. at 920.
Interestingly, Justice Blackmun sounded themes that would reappear later in his majority opinion
in Daubert: the need for trial court review of the impact of expert testimony; a mandate (albeit consti-
tutional, not evidentiary) that expert evidence survive a scan for reliability; and his careful assessment
of the scientific basis for the particular evidence in question. Id. at 929-36; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (10993). He expressed strong reservations that the rules of evidence or the
safeguards of cross-examination would adequately point out the deficiencies of such evidence. Bare-
foot, 463 U.S. at 931-32.
Were Justice Blackmun's arguments in Daubert and Barefoot in some way related? On at least
three of the four illustrative Daubert factors, Justice Blackmun's views of psychiatric predictions in
Barefoot could well have led to their exclusion under Daubert. Compare Barefoot. 463 U.S. at 932 ("in-
tuitive clinical judgments not susceptible to cross-examination and rebuttal"). with Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 593 ("whether [the scientific expertise] can be (and has been) tested"); compare Barefoot, 463 U.S.
at 928 ("Psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness are not accurate: wrong two times out of three,
their probative value ... is virtually non-existent"), with Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 ("the court should
ordinarily consider the known or potential rate of error"); compare Barefoot. 463 U.S. at 920 (quoting
the American Psychiatric Association's Brief saying " [t]he unreliability of psychiatric predictions of
long-term future dangerousness is by now an established fact within the profession"), with Daubert,
509 U.S. at 594 ("'general acceptance' can yet have a bearing on the inquiry ....'A known technique
which has been able to attract only minimal support within the community' ... may properly be
viewed with skepticism.") (citation omitted). One can hear echoes of Barefoot in the Justice's rhetoric
in Daubert.
On the (evidentiary) merits, some indication exists in Barefoot that Justice Blackmun would have
found actuarial assessments more reliable than clinical predictions. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 922 n.4
(contrasting the unreliability of clinical predictions with the greater reliability of statistical predictions:
"Statistical prediction is clearly more reliable than clinical prediction.").
See also Flores v. Johnson, 25o F.3d 456, 464 n.hI (5th Cir. 2000) (concurring opinion) ("It bears
mentioning that Justice Blackmun, the author of Daubert, was also the author of the Barefoot dissent
which harshly criticized the use of psychiatric evidence of future dangerousness.").
i59. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896-97. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (976) (approving Texas
statute permitting consideration of the "likelihood of a defendant committing further crimes" as a fac-
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it likewise did not limit the methods by which a state might choose to
prove future danger, specifically including psychiatric testimony.' The
majority worried that an opposite conclusion would call into question the
use of psychiatrists in other contexts, especially civil commitment pro-
ceedings. 6' It saw no reason to assume that psychiatrists were any less re-
liable than lay persons in finding a likelihood of danger.'6,
At first blush, the Barefoot opinion appears not only to cut off due
process objections to predictive testimony, but also to override objec-
tions to its reliability, including in civil commitment proceedings.6 ' Yet a
careful reading indicates that Barefoot specifically splits the evidentiary
from the constitutional questions, and reserves the former for resolution
at trial. In this view, the rules of evidence, and the processes of cross-
examination, would adequately expose deficiencies in psychiatric testi-
mony on danger: "Psychiatric testimony predicting dangerousness may
be countered not only as erroneous in a particular case but also as gener-
ally so unreliable that it should be ignored."' 64 Barefoot says that if such
opinions pass evidentiary muster under sub-constitutional evidentiary
standards, they do not violate any constitutional notions of sufficiency to
support the death penalty.'6 5 The opinion leaves open the question as to
what such evidentiary standards might require.
tor in imposing the death penalty). See also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463-66 (i981) (reversing a
trial based on testimony by a psychiatrist that included statements made by defendant without advising
the defendant of Miranda rights and without the benefit of his attorney).
16o. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896-97.
161. Id. at 898-99 (citing O'Connor v. Donaldson and Addington v. Texas). See supra notes 149-51
(discussing O'Connor) and infra notes 169-73 (discussing Addington).
162. Id. at 899-903. "[lit makes little sense, if any, to submit that psychiatrists, out of the entire
universe of persons who might have an opinion on the issue, would know so little about the subject
that they should not be permitted to testify." Id. at 897. The Court noted that many psychiatrists dis-
agreed with the position of the A.P.A., and it reviewed with some care the conflict in testimony both at
the state trial and in the District Court's habeas proceedings. The Court stressed the dissent within the
psychiatric community about the validity of predicting danger, and noted that the only witness to sug-
gest directly that "no reliable psychiatric predictions of dangerousness could ever be made" had con-
ceded that evidence existed of some degree of accuracy in the predictions made by psychiatrists. Id. at
899- oi & n.7, (citing JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICrION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47-49 (ig8i));
see infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text (discussing further analysis by Professor Monahan).
163. The majority raised the prospect of damage to civil commitment process as a justification for
its decision. Id. at 898 (citing O'Connor and Addington: "Acceptance of petitioner's position.., would
immediately call into question those other contexts in which predictions of future behavior are con-
stantly made"). Even Justice Blackmun in dissent noted differences which made such predictive tesit-
mony more palatable in civil commitment cases. Id. at 936 n.14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun distinguished civil commitments as cases which involve short-term predictions with short-
term consequences, and argued both that the predictive accuracy was higher and the constitutional
stakes lower in commitments. Id.
164. Id. at 898.
165. Id. at 9oI ("[Tihe submission is that this category of testimony should be excised entirely from
all trials. We are unconvinced ... that the adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable
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The Court's due process analysis in Barefoot adds two elements to
our discussion of the evidentiary admissibility of predictive expertise.
First, as noted, the majority opinion at once agreed with the widespread
skepticism of predictive testimony, yet found that such testimony had
some reliability. As the Court itself stated, "[w]e are not persuaded that
such testimony is almost entirely unreliable." Second, even with such a
minimalist assessment, the majority felt that predictive testimony had
sufficient reliability for use in the courtroom, if subjected to fair adver-
sarial testing. Indeed, both majority and dissent saw a special need for
such evidence in the context of civil commitment. This balancing of help-
fulness and reliability for constitutional purposes anticipates the similar
approach of Daubert. It also set a pattern that would recur in both pre-
and post -Daubert evidentiary rulings.'6 In effect, Barefoot established an
analytical template for admitting unreliable testimony in light of its close
fit with the issues raised by a particular case.
2. Burden of proof
Part of the difficulty of predictive testimony lies less with the exper-
tise than with the task itself: Prediction inevitably brings with it a risk of
error. We can hope to reconstruct past events, but future events have not
yet happened. Making "findings" about the future thus carries a greater
risk of error. In civil commitments, error has severe consequences either
way: loss of liberty for the patient if commitment wrongly succeeds; and
violent behavior if commitment wrongly fails. States regulate this zone of
risk in civil commitment by allocating burdens of proof, and the legal al-
locations take account of the unreliability of prediction and of predictive
testimony.
In Addington v. Texas,'6, the Court held that the proponent of civil
commitment must prove all elements of a civil commitment action, in-
cluding future dangerousness, using the standard of "clear and convinc-
ing evidence."'" 8 The Court found in this standard a sensible middle
from the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness .... "). See also In re Brown, 493
A.2d 447, 450 (N.H. 1985) (holding that use of psychiatric predictions of danger in civil commitment
cases does not violate due process, given the presence of procedural "safeguards" against error, citing
In re Scott L, 469 A.2d 1336, 1337 (N.H. 1983) (dicta that a stringent burden of proof and the re-
quirement of recent overt acts constitute adequate safeguards)); Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 329
S.E.2d 8o7, 813 (Va. 1985) (approving use of expert psychiatric predictions of danger in death penalty
cases); Saunders v. Commonwealth, 406 S.E.2d 39, 43 (Va. i99i) (while constitutionally admissible,
juries not bound to accept expert psychiatric predictions of danger).
i66. See infra Part II.B (assessing cases affirming evidentiary admission of predictive opinion).
167. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (979).
i68. Id. at 433. See supra note 92.
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ground, '6' rooted in the special characteristics of civil commitments.
Given the deprivation of liberty and profound stigma imposed on pa-
tients, something more than a preponderance should be required.'7 ° But
the fallibility of predictions, and especially of psychiatric testimony, ren-
dered the "reasonable doubt" standard unworkable:
[W]hether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous... turns on the
meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists
and psychologists. Given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psy-
chiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether a state
could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both
mentally ill and likely to be dangerous. '
The Court stressed the fundamental uncertainties of psychiatric tes-
timony:
The subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render certainties
virtually beyond reach in most situations.... Psychiatric diagno-
sis ... is to a large extent based on medical "impressions" drawn from
subjective analysis and filtered through the experience of the diagnos-
tician. This process often makes it very difficult for the expert physi-
cian to offer definite conclusions about any particular patient. ... If a
trained psychiatrist has difficulty with the categorical "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" standard, the untrained lay juror-or indeed even a
trained judge-who is required to rely upon expert opinion could be
forced by the criminal law standard of proof to reject commitment for
many 72patients desperately in need of institutionalized psychiatric
care.
The Court established the clear and convincing standard as the minimum
required by the U.S. Constitution; states remained free to adopt higher
burdens.'73
The Court revisited these questions in Heller v. Doe, when it decided
that equal protection did not require the same burden of proof for differ-
ent kinds of commitments. 174 The statute in question required a "clear
169. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-24 (comparing the "three standards or levels of proof for different
types of cases," including a preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence and beyond
a reasonable doubt). The Court also expressed skepticism that burdens of proof really mattered. Id. at
424-25 ("Candor suggests that, to a degree, efforts to analyze what lay jurors understand concerning
the differences among these three tests ... may well be largely an academic exercise ... ").
170. Id. at 426-27 ("Loss of liberty calls for a showing that the individual suffers from something
more serious than is demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior. Increasing the burden of proof is one
way to impress the factfinder with the importance of the decision ... .
171. Id. at 429.
172. Id. at 43o. Note that the Court's description of expertise entails clinical rather than actuarial
prediction.
173. Id. at431.
174. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 326-28 (1993). Plaintiffs challenged a Kentucky statute which set
a "clear and convincing standard" for commitment of mentally retarded individuals, and a "reasonable
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and convincing" standard for committing the mentally retarded and a
"reasonable doubt" standard for committing the mentally ill. The Court
found a rational basis for the disparity.'75 It noted three distinctions be-
tween mental illness and mental retardation that satisfied this minimal
standard; one of these distinctions was the relative difficulty of proving
dangerousness., 6 In discussing predictions of danger, Justice Kennedy
noted that "mental retardation is a permanent, relatively static condition,
so a determination of dangerousness may be made with some accuracy
based on previous behavior.""' The Court contrasted this with mental
illness:
Manifestations of mental illness may be sudden, and past behavior may
not be an adequate predictor of future actions. Prediction of future be-
havior is complicated as well by the difficulties inherent in diagnosis of
mental illness. It is thus no surprise that many psychiatric predictions
of future violent behavior by the mentally ill are inaccurate.
Given the greater uncertainty of predicting the behavior of the men-
tally ill, Kentucky could rationally allocate a higher burden of proof in
this case: "a higher burden of proof for [commitment of the mentally
ill] ... tends to equalize the risks of an erroneous determination .... .""'
Like Kentucky, some states have imposed the more stringent, "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" standard,"" while others use the less stringent
doubt" standard for commitment of mentally ill individuals. Id. at 315-17 (discussing Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 2o2B.i6o(2) (mental retardation) and Ky. Rev. Stat. § 2o2A.076 (2) (mental illness)).
175. Id. at 319-21 (seeking "any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis' for the difference in standards).
176. Id. at 321-28. The other two were the relative ease of diagnosis; and relative intrusiveness of
treatment. As to ease of diagnosis, the Court rested its view largely on the proposition that, unlike
mental illness. "mental retardation is a developmental disability that becomes apparent before adult-
hood": the disparity in ease of diagnosis justified the state's use of a stricter standard where the risk of
error was higher. Id. at 32i-23. As to intrusiveness of treatment, the Court noted that mentally ill pa-
tients often undergo "intrusive inquiries into the patient's innermost thoughts.., and use of psycho-
tropic drugs": the disparity in ease of diagnosis justified a stricter standard where the respondent
suffered more severe consequences. Id. at 324-25. The Court also noted both the historical and the
modern day division of statutes regulating the commitment of the two different categories of condi-
tion. Id. at 326-28.
1 77. Id. at 323 (citation omitted).
178. Id. at 323-24 (citation omitted).
I79. Id. at 322. (discussing the relationship of more difficult diagnosis of mental illness to Ken-
tucky's allocation of the burden of proof). The majority opinion on this point drew only 5 votes.
18o. People v. Burnick, 535 P.2d 352, 369 (Cal. 1975) (requiring "beyond a reasonable doubt" for
civil commitments of sexual offenders); Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 372
N.E.2d 242, 245-46 (Mass. 1978) (requiring "beyond a reasonable doubt standard" for mental health
commitments): but cf Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1271 (Mass. 1992) ("in cases involving
important personal rights, 'we have refused to apply either the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
or the "clear and convincing" standard.' Rather, we have determined that 'fact-finding is enhanced by
requiring that it be done in writing and in meticulous detail."'): In re D.D., 920 P.2d 973, 975 (Mont.
1996) (noting that MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-2t-I26(2) requires proof of "any physical fact or evidence"
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standard required by Addington."' The rationales in state cases which
discuss burdens typically focus on the need for a stringent standard in
light of the difficulty of predicting danger and the uncertainty of psychi-
atric testimony on the point. In People v. Burnick,5 2 for example, the
California Supreme Court reviewed the "first generation" critique of
predicting danger, and articulated a severely critical assessment' of the
science of prediction:
In the light of recent studies it is no longer heresy to question the reli-
ability of psychiatric predictions. Psychiatrists themselves would be the
first to admit that however desirable an infallible crystal ball might be,
it is not among the tools of their profession .... The evidence, as well
as the consensus of opinion by responsible scientific authorities, is now
unequivocal.".... In the words of spokesmen for the psychiatric profes-
sion itself, "Unfortunately, this is the state of the art. Neither psychia-
trists nor anyone else have reliably demonstrated an ability to predict
future violence or 'dangerousness.' Neither has any special psychiatric
'expertise' in this area been established." (Task Force Report, Clinical
Aspects of the Violent Individual (American Psychiatric Assn., 1974)
p. 28.) s3
The court used this harsh assessment to justify a "reasonable doubt"
standard, while rejecting calls for an absolute constitutional exclusion.5 4
These opinions deal with the most unreliable form of predictive ex-
pertise, clinical opinion. They accept and stress the unreliability not just
of prediction, but also of predictive testimony. In Addington and Heller,
the Court showed its willingness to use the burden of proof in civil com-
mitments to accommodate the risk of error inherent in both predictive
fact-finding and expert testimony on prediction. This accommodation re-
inforces the fit between predictive opinion and the civil commitment
process, and helps to identify the burden of proof as another element of
the context within which trial courts can make determinations of fit un-
der Daubert.
beyond a reasonable doubt, and proof of "all other matters" by clear and convincing evidence). See
also Proctor v. Butler, 380 A.2d 673, 677 (N.H. 1977) (establishing "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard for civil commitments), overruled by In re Sanborn, 545 A.2d 726, 736 (N.H. 1988) (establishing
"clear and convincing evidence" standard for civil commitments).
181. See, e.g., State v. Ward, 369 N.W.zd 293, 295 (Minn. 1985) (requiring "clear and convincing
evidence" in commitment of sexual offenders); People v. Taylor. 618 P.2d 1127, 1135-36 (Colo. 198o)(requiring "clear and convincing evidence" in civil commitments).
182. 535 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1975).
183. Id. at 365-66. See also Part II.B.3 infra (discussing California's exemption of predictive testi-
mony from the Frye standard of "general acceptance.")
184 Id. ("Nor do we go so far as to join in the conclusion of certain well-known writers that in civil
commitment proceedings no psychiatrists should be permitted to give their opinions as to future dan-
gerousness ... ").
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3. Other Evidence
"A brick is not a wall."' 8 Experts typically do not testify in an evi-
dentiary vacuum. In commitment proceedings, the proponent of predic-
tive testimony not only has other statutory elements either to establish
(or rebut),' but also has other means to prove future danger. In assess-
ing the "fit" of expert testimony to the demands of a particular kind of
case, then, it makes sense to assess the evidentiary patterns within which
the expert's opinion will be offered. Trial court decisions about the fit of
expertise to a case will most certainly consider the body of other evi-
dence. In other words, one should know what other bricks are needed for
the wall to stand. If one means for a flawed brick to bear weight, one
must consider not only its flaws but also its fit with other bricks, and its
impact on their arrangement.
While avoiding a comprehensive review of all evidence on danger,
this section does attempt to categorize that evidence and to assess how
predictive expertise fits as part of a greater whole. First, the section con-
siders the prevalence of expert testimony. Then, it discusses its suffi-
ciency to sustain a finding of danger, in the absence of other evidence.
Finally, we assess rules requiring additional proof of danger, including
proof of "overt acts."
a. The Prevalence of Expert Testimony
Many jurisdictions trump the evidentiary question about expert psy-
chiatric predictions by requiring experts to testify in commitment cases. 87
In some states, statutes require the testimony,'8 while court-made rules
185. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § I85, at 542-43 (E. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
186. These statutory elements include the constitutionally required finding of mental illness, see
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILrrY
10-15 (I994) (discussing the mean of the statutory requirement of mental illness-"there can be no
doubt that some finding of 'mental illness' is a prerequisite to an application for involuntary civil
commitment ...."), as well as a finding that commitment is the "least restrictive alternative" form of
treatment. PERLIN, supra. at 114-20 (discussing the "least restrictive alternative" doctrine-"this prin-
ciple has been incorporated in many civil commitment statutes, and is routinely invoked at individual
commitment hearings on a daily basis .... [Tihe importance of the concept to the fabric of the com-
mitment process cannot be overstated.").
187. I DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 411-15 (2002): "Psychiatric predic-
tions are thus admissible on the basis of substantive law, and neither lack of general acceptance nor
lack of scientific validity effects this conclusion." Id. at 414.
188. See, e.g., 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/3-807 (West 1997) (requiring at least one mental
health professional). Other states strongly imply the testimony of a physician. See, e.g.. R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 40.1-5-2 (1997). ("In determining whether there exists a likelihood of serious harm the physician and
the court may consider previous acts, diagnosis, words or thoughts of the patient."). As does Rhode
Island, some statutes limit the requirement to particular topics. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B,
§ 3864 (West 1964 & Supp. 2002) (requirement of expert testimony on the proposed treatment plan for
a potential committee). See also Matter of Oseing, 296 N.W.2d 797, 799 (Iowa 198o) (noting an Iowa
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require it in others."' Requirements such as these obviate the decision on
admissibility; evidence that must be offered necessarily must be heard.'"
Absent such provisions, however, how prevalent is predictive expertise in
commitment cases?
The answer is "very prevalent," not just as a matter of effective
proof, but also as a matter of statutory structure.' 9 Virtually all statutes
have provisions requiring an examination by a physician or psychiatrist,
which typically includes an assessment of the person's dangerousness. '
Typically, this assessment results in the petition for commitment. More-
over, some states also require written assessments, or even the presence
statute requiring recommendations by the chief medical officer of the state hospital concerning alter-
native placements).
189. Many cases note and apply a relevant statutory requirement. See, e.g., J.W.K. v. State, 370
N.W.2d 294 (Wis.App. 1985) (unpublished opinion) (applying Wis. STATE. ANN. 5 1.20(4) (West 1997));
State for Interest of P.W., 8oi S.W.2d I, 4-5 (Tex.App. 199o) (noting requirement in TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5547, §50(c) (Vernon Supp. i99o)); People v. Henderson, 162 Cal. Rptr. 886, 892 (Cal.
Ct. App. i98o) (noting requirement of expert testimony on danger in sexually violent predator stat-
ute). Other state courts express the requirement without referring to a statutory basis. See, e.g., In re
Cochran, 487 N.E.2d 389, 391 (I11. App. Ct. 1985) ("[I1n order to meet its burden of proof, the State
must proffer explicit medical testimony asserting that as a direct result of mental illness, the respon-
dent can reasonably be expected to harm himself or another."). Still other states do not impose a re-
quirement of expert predictive testimony, but argue that it is usually necessary. See cases cited infra
note 194.
19o. Again, one should distinguish between rules of sufficiency and those of admissibility. Where
the jurisdiction requires expert testimony before a valid commitment order can issue, a rule of suffi-
ciency exists, and only questions over the wisdom of such a provision as a matter of substantive com-
mitment law remain. This Article's analysis governs those states in which no requirement of predictive
expertise exists, nor any statutory rule of admissibility.
19I. No empirical study exists on the frequency with which experts appear at commitment hear-
ings, nor have I attempted one. Virtually all of the appellate decisions dealing with commitment chal-
lenges contain descriptions of psychiatric testimony. To some degree, this reflects structural choices by
the relevant jurisdiction to encourage and even require the involvement of psychiatric experts in the
commitment process. To some degree, it reflects the high likelihood of admissibility, coupled with the
persuasive advantages of having testimony from a skilled witness on critical issues of proof.
192. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.300(2) (2000).
If, as the result of personal observation or investigation, the mental health coordinator has
reasonable cause to believe that such person is mentally disordered and, as a result, presents
a likelihood of serious harm to himself or others, the mental health coordinator may file an
application with the court ....
Id. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 5003 (995).
No person shall be involuntarily admitted to the hospital as a patient except pursuant to the
written certification of a psychiatrist that based upon the psychiatrist's examination of such
person, such person suffers from a disease or condition which requires him to be observed
and treated at a mental hospital for his own welfare and which either renders such person
unable to make responsible decisions with respect to his hospitalization, or poses a present
threat, based upon manifest indications, that such person is likely to commit or suffer seri-
ous harm to himself or others or to property, if not given immediate hospital care and
treatment.
[WoI. 55: 1
DAUBERT & DANGER
of the initial psychiatrist, at trial.'93 Mental health professionals thus play
a critical role in initiating the commitment process.
Courts have also expressed the view that expert predictions are
pragmatically necessary in commitment actions: "In civil commitment
cases, where the trier of fact is required by statute to determine whether
a person is dangerous or likely to be dangerous, expert prediction may be
the only evidence available."'94 This necessity rationale acknowledges the
limitations of expert testimony on danger, but finds it either better than
other available proof, or the only available proof of danger.
Yet strictly speaking, expert testimony which predicts danger is not
required. Fact-finders can receive (through independent proof) the same
data available to the expert.'95 While experts may add an "aura of cer-
tainty," their demonstrated (in)accuracy makes their opinions something
less than conclusive on the issue. Moreover, as Justice Blackmun noted in
Barefoot, if expert opinion is little better than lay opinion, "statistical
prediction is clearly more reliable than clinical prediction.... and predic-
tion based on statistics alone may be done by anyone.' ' 96 It seems best to
characterize expert testimony as a preferred, but not essential, form of
proof.
For present purposes, it suffices to note that information from psy-
chiatric sources permeates civil commitment actions, including initial cer-
tification, medical histories maintained by psychiatric personnel,'" and
193. Note that requiring a mental health expert to appear does not require testimony on danger.
As noted elsewhere, the elements of civil commitment cases include multiple elements, including many
about which a mental health professional will have specialized knowledge. These facts include the di-
agnosis of mental illness, the appropriateness of different treatments, and the availability of treatments
both in restricted and unrestricted settings. It would be plausible to have a commitment proceeding
where mental health experts testify only on these issues, leaving the prediction of danger as a task for
judicial resolution based on other proof.
194. People v. Ward, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (admitting expert psychiatric
predictions in a sexually violent predator commitment); accord People v. Bennett, 182 Cal. Rptr. 473,
497 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) ("In the context of a petition for an extension of commitment.., a finding on
whether the individual is dangerous to others because of mental illness is essential. Testimony by men-
tal health experts in this context will often be the only way to establish whether such dangerousness
exists."); People v. Devers, No. Ao95661, 2002 WL 724931, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2002) ("The
question of whether an individual suffers from a mental disease, disorder or defect that renders him or
her a danger to others in not a question of law, but one of fact to be resolved with the assistance of
expert testimony.").
195. See infra text accompanying notes 362-63 (discussing the use of lay opinion testimony).
196. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 88o, 992 n.4 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
197. See, e.g., Devers, 2002 WL 724931, at *3 (holding psychiatric testimony sufficient to support a
commitment: "Aside from his testimony, [the psychiatric expert] made reference to numerous records
and reports, which appear as part of the court record. These reports reflect that appellant suffers from
a mental disorder described variously as, Substance Induced Psychotic Disorder with Hallucinations,
In Remission, and Antisocial Personality Disorder with Borderline and Narcissistic Traits. These hear-
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proof of other elements of a commitment proceeding. Psychiatric wit-
nesses, psychiatric facts, and psychiatric opinion constitute practical and
legal commonplaces at trial, and are neither novel nor unfamiliar.' 9' This
familiarity assures the exposure of trial judges to the opinions and meth-
odologies of mental health experts on matters relating to the commit-
ment. Moreover, if we assume competent advocacy, the prevalence of
these experts assures full and fair testing of the weaknesses and inherent
uncertainties of predictive testimony. In short, one can more readily ac-
cept the risk of failure in a particular brick if one regularly sees similar
bricks placed under stress in other parts of the structure.
b. The Sufficiency of Predictive Expertise
An overwhelming majority of cases holds that expert testimony
standing alone without other proof cannot sustain a commitment.' 9 Some
courts reach this result with only a bare assertion of insufficiency.2" Many
others have specifically adopted a prediction-plus-more approach. These
courts emphasize both the difficulty of prediction, and the unreliability of
predictive expertise, in requiring additional proof as a check on these un-
certainties. '°' In some states, this requirement rests on an argument about
say materials provide ample details about appellant's mental condition and his need for further treat-
ment.").
598. Compare Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[Olne
very significant fact to be considered [in determining the reliability of expert testimony] is whether the
experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have
conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for
purposes of testifying."). Judge Kozinski noted that some forms of opinion are so closely tied to the
judicial system as to have the courtroom as "a principal theatre of operations," a fact which he would
not weigh against determining such an opinion reliable. Id. at 1317 n.5. Judge Kozinski's concerns re-
lated to the reliability component of Daubert, not the relevance component.
199. See infra Part IV.D.2-3 (noting that virtually all states require some proof of danger in addi-
tion to the expert's opinion).
200. See, e.g., Broussard v. State, 827 S.W.2d 619, 622 (Tex. App. 1992) ("We find no evidence that
Broussard was likely to cause serious harm to others as a result of her mental illness. Though the ex-
pert medical witnesses acknowledged this as a 'possibility' and there is a vague reference to some sort
of incident involving another person's child, both experts agreed that it was not likely or a clear immi-
nent risk. Bare psychiatric expert opinion of a 'potential danger' to others is insufficient to support a
commitment."); Mezick v. State, 920 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. App. 1996) (finding adequate factual basis
in testimony of lay witness "expert diagnosis alone is not sufficient to confine a patient for compulsory
treatment .... The expert opinions and recommendations must be supported by a showing of the fac-
tual bases on which they are grounded"); In re Interest and Protection of C.O., 65 S.W.3 d 175, 181
(Tex. App. 2001) ("Expert testimony is essential.., but expert diagnosis alone is not sufficient to con-
fine a patient for compulsory treatment .... The State cannot meet its burden of proof without pre-
senting evidence of the behavior of the proposed patient that provides the factual basis for the expert
opinion.").
201. See, e.g., State v. Stanley, 843 P.zd ioi8, 1oo (Or. Ct. App. 1992) ("Apprehensions and
speculation alone are not enough to find a person in need of treatment .... There must be facts and
observations that lead to such a conclusion.") (finding no other evidence sufficient to justify commit-
ment).
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a court's institutional role: Courts have the institutional duty to predict
danger, not doctors:
A person suspected of mental illness ought not to be deprived of lib-
erty on the basis of expert opinion alone.... If the conclusion of a psy-
chiatrist were sufficient for a civil commitment, no necessity would
exist for a court, with or without a jury, to make a judicial determina-
tion of the facts necessary for involuntary hospitalization."'
In this vein, courts often stress that a finding of danger requires a
balancing of societal and individual interests that is primarily a judicial
function:
The determination of dangerousness involves a delicate balancing of
society's interest in protection from harmful conduct against the indi-
vidual's interest in personal liberty and autonomy. This decision, while
requiring the court to make use of the assistance which medical testi-
mony may provide, is ultimately a legal one, not a medical one.203
Even those rare cases that accept bare psychiatric testimony as suffi-
cient stress the judicial function in making the ultimate decision on dan-
202. Moss v. State, 539 S.W.2d 936, 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976 ) (finding insufficient other proof of
danger to justify commitment).
203. State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 302 (N.J. 1975) (reviewing and reforming New Jersey's then exist-
ing commitment scheme, and requiring proof of mental illness and danger by clear and convincing evi-
dence); followed in "Matter of" Newsome, 424 A.2d 222. 225 (N.J.Super., i98o); "Matter of" D.C., 679
A.2d 634, 648 (N.J. 1996). See also Hatcher v. Wachtel, 269 S.E.2d 849, 852 (W. Va., 1980) (finding
sufficient evidence to commit, and rejecting an argument that West Virgina law required a finding of
"imminent danger"); Application of Noel, 6oi P.2d 1152, ii66 (Kan. 1979) (affirming an order denying
release to a criminally committed patient). "We conclude the determination of whether the patient
continues to be dangerous to himself, herself or others is a legal rather than a medical decision .... A
medical opinion as to dangerousness, even if undisputed by other medical opinions, is not conclusive
upon the court and must be weighed with the other evidence." Id.
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ger. °4 Those cases that reject psychiatric opinion as factually insufficient
also stress the ultimate role of the court to find danger.
These cases assume that predictive expertise lacks reliability; it
comes as no surprise that they would find expert opinion insufficient on
its own to sustain the stringent burden of proof. The fact of insufficiency
adds another influence on the assessment of admissibility. If a jurisdic-
tion has repeatedly held predictive testimony insufficient, a trial judge
ruling on admissibility can assume that the proponent of the testimony
will need to come prepared with other evidence. An expert prediction
will not be the only brick; and a judge can consider using it (or not),
knowing that it will not bear the whole weight of decision.
These cases also add a theme to the discussion. Courts, not mental
health professionals, have the power to order commitments and bring
specialized tools to the task: the adversarial presentation of evidence, the
weighing of credibility, the balancing of societal interests, and the "tribu-
nal's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct. ''2° One might
204. See, e.g., Lindquist v. Bisch, 542 N.W.2d 138, 140-41 (S.D. 1996) (affirming a commitment
based solely on psychiatric testimony at trial, and rejecting a claim that the appellate court perform a
de novo review of the evidence).
An individual's potential dangerousness is an essentially factual inquiry, founded on the ap-
plication of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human con-
duct .... Assessing a person's dangerous propensities does not require the consideration of
legal concepts and involve the exercise of judgment about the values underlying legal prin-
ciples-the hallmarks of an essentially legal inquiry .... Furthermore, in assessing an indi-
vidual's dangerous propensities, "the trial court is in the best position to determine the
credibility of the testifying witnesses and weigh the evidence.
Id. at 140-41 (citations and quotation marks omitted). See also People v. Devers, No. A095661, 2002
WL 724931, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2002) (unpublished opinion affirming commitment). "Expert
testimony is a substantial factor to be considered in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. By itself,
it provides a sufficient basis for the trial court's conclusion." Id.
205. Riley v. State, 396 N.W.2d 595, 598-99 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming a trial court's refusal
to release a criminal committee, in which the court found future danger despite contrary expert opin-
ion).
In Johnson v. State, 331 N.w.Ed 757 (Minn. 1983) the supreme court held that the district
court was not required to rely on a psychiatrist's expert testimony that the petitioner's early
release would not present danger to the public. Similarly, here the court was entitled to lis-
ten to and evaluate, but not necessarily accept the expert's testimony. Dr. Osekowsky's tes-
timony was clearly admissible, but its weight and credibility were for the trial court.
Id. at 599. See also State v. Putnoki, 51o A.2d 1329, 1335 (Conn. I986) ("Although psychiatric testi-
mony as to the defendant's condition may form an important part of the trial court's ultimate determi-
nation, the court is not bound by this evidence .... It may, in its discretion, accept all, part, or none of
the experts' testimony."); followed in State v. Jacob, 798 A.2d 974,986 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
2o6. Lindquist, 542 N.W.2d at 141.
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question the adequacy of the judicial forum as a predictor of danger.'"'
Yet it seems unlikely that society will transfer the function of civil com-
mitment from courts to other professionals, or that it will abandon litiga-
tion as the vehicle for resolving the conflict between private and public
values embodied in commitment cases. Courts have willingly accepted
their role, and have developed some confidence in their competence to
make the required findings. This assumption of institutional competence
to predict danger, with or without expertise, constitutes another element
of the context within which Daubert's fit criterion will operate.'
°8
c. Other Evidence
If predictive testimony cannot bear the weight of fact-finding, how
has the task of prediction and the unreliability of expertise affected other
proof in commitments? Many courts have made no effort to structure the
other proofs of danger in civil commitment, leaving it to fact-finders in
individual cases to assess the strength of the other evidence in relation to
the expert testimony.2" Yet some courts have imposed restrictions on this
evidence, by categorizing different types of evidence which they require
in addition to expert testimony. These categories include "overt" acts,
"recent" acts, or "prognostic evidence." Still other courts accomplish the
same end by requiring complex fact-finding with multiple proofs.
(i) Overt Acts
The "overt act" rule requires the proponent of commitment to prove
some act of the respondent, committed before the proposed commit-
ment, to serve as a basis from which to infer future dangerousness. The
rule operates as a rule of sufficiency; it bars commitment without proof
of the overt act. The rule often rests on a statutory footing;1 0 however, it
207. Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for Predictions of Dangerousness
in Sex Offender Commitment Proceedings, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 33. 41 (1997) (suggesting that
the judges commit individuals whose probability of recidivism falls between thirty and seventy-five
percent).
Even on the most optimistic assumptions, the actual probability standards used by the
courts do not reach the 75% mark. With realistic but still optimistic assumptions, predic-
tions of future violence could exceed the 50% "likely" rate. On pessimistic assumptions,
courts are applying a standard that commits people with probabilities of recidivism as low as
30%.
Id.
208. See Part I.C.5 infra (discussing similarities between clinical predictions and judicial fact-
finding as a basis for the judicial acceptance of these opinions).
209. See supra notes 188-200 (describing the requirement of other evidence in various states).
210. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126(2) (2002) ("Imminent threat of self-inflicted injury or
injury to others must be proved by overt acts or omissions, sufficiently recent in time as to be material
and relevant as to the respondent's present condition."); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(9.I) (1995) ("'Inpa-
tient' means a person who is mentally ill and: (A) (i) Who presents a substantial risk of imminent harm
to that person or others, as manifested by either recent overt acts or recent expressed threats of vio-
lence which present a probability of physical injury to that person or other persons .... ").
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originated in decisions which rested on constitutional grounds. 1' The rule
is also a minority rule; the Supreme Court has never addressed it, and
many states explicitly reject it.2"'
The requirement of overt act evidence rests on a central assumption:
that proof of such an act creates a stronger basis from which a fact-finder
can infer future dangerousness. "[C]ivil confinement can be justi-
fied.., if ... dangerousness is based upon a finding of a recent overt act,
attempt or threat to do substantial harm to oneself or another. 213 More-
211. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated 414 U.S. 473 (1974)
("we believe civil confinement can be justified in some cases if the proper burden of proof is satisfied
and dangerousness is based upon a finding of a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial
harm to oneself or another"); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1974) ("To confine a
citizen against his will because he is likely to be dangerous in the future, it must be shown that he has
actually been dangerous in the recent past and that such danger was manifested by an overt act .... );
Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 514-15 (D. Neb. 1975) (striking Nebraska commitment statute:
"Due process and equal protection require that the standards for commitment must be (a) that the
person is mentally ill and poses a serious threat of substantial harm to himself or to others; and (b) that
this threat of harm has been evidenced by a recent overt act or threat. The threat of harm to oneself
may be through neglect or inability to care for oneself."); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 451
(S.D. Iowa 1976) (striking Iowa commitment statute: "This Court therefore holds that the commit-
ment standards of Chapter 229 of the Code violated substantive due process by not requiring that sub-
jects pose a serious threat to themselves or others, as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or
threat"); Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 198o) (requiring overt act). See also Cross v. Har-
ris, 418 F.2d 1095, IlOO (D.C. Cir. 1969) (upholding a sexual psychopath commitment statute, and in-
dicating a preference for other evidence in addition to expert testimony); See also Note, Overt
Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirement for Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
44 U. Cm. L. REV. 562, 584 (1977) (discussing litigation asserting a constitutional requirement of overt
acts).
212. See People v. Sansone, 309 N.E.2d 733, 740 (I11. App. Ct. 1974) (declining to overturn an Illi-
nois statute for lack of an "overt act" requirement); United States ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F.
Supp. 707, 712 (N.D. I11. 1978) (declining to overturn the same Illinois statute); Matter of Monroe, 270
S.E.2d 537, 541 (N.C. Ct. App. 198o) ("This Court has not required 'overt acts' under the former stan-
dard of 'imminent' danger and the present statutory definition of 'dangerous to others' does not re-
quire a finding of 'overt acts."'); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973 (2d Cir. 1983) (refusing
to overturn a New York statute for lack of an "overt act" requirement); In re L.R., 497 A.2d 753, 755-
57 (1985) (declining to adopt an overt act requirement); People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768, 774 (Colo.
1988) (relying on In re L.R. and declining to adopt an overt act requirement). Compare Matter of Gat-
son, 593 P.2d 423, 426 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (declining formal adoption of an overt act requirement,
but stating a belief that "a showing of present dangerousness will normally require evidence of a recent
act, attempt, threat or omission of a serious nature."), with In re Harris, 654 P.2d 109, 113 (Wash. 1982)
(interpreting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020 (West 2002) to require "a showing of a substantial
risk of physical harm as evidenced by a recent overt act"); In re LaBelle, 728 P.2d 138, 144 (Wash.
t986) (refusing to extend the overt act requirement to proof that the respondent is "gravely dis-
abled").
Note also that, in 1996, the District Court in Lynch v. Sessions, 942 F. Supp. 1419, 1427 (M.D.
Ala. 1996), dissolved the injunction under which Alabama had operated its civil commitment process,
after the state had passed a new commitment statute. The new statute contained no "overt act" re-
quirement, and subsequent Alabama cases refused to imply such a requirement. See, e.g., Webster v.
Bartlett, 709 So. 2d 1226, 1228 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
213. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at IO78.
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over, the requirement arises from concerns about the adequacy of expert
predictions of danger, and reasserts the judicial role:
While the actual assessment of the likelihood of danger calls for an ex-
ercise of medical judgment, the sufficiency of the evidence to support
such a determination is fundamentally a legal question. A mere expec-
tancy that danger-productive behavior might be engaged in does not
rise to the level of legal significance when the consequence of such an
evaluation is involuntary confinement."4
Even courts that have rejected the "overt act" requirement draw a
clear connection between the unreliability of expert opinion and the
need for evidence of an overt act. In United States ex rel. Mathew v. Nel-
son, an Illinois District Court rejected a due process challenge to an IEli-
nois statute that lacked an overt act requirement. Appellants had cited
the first generation critique of commitments, then in full flower."5 The
court recognized the force of this line of argument, but found no evi-
dence that an overt act requirement would help: "No study has at-
tempted to measure the extent to which the predictability of
dangerousness is enhanced by a history of a recent overt act.,,,26 In reject-
ing a per se attack on the statute, the court advised respondents instead
to attack the unreliability of predictive opinion on a case-by-case basis:
It may well be that in most cases the psychiatric determination neces-
sary to support the finding of reasonable expectation that the statute
requires could not be made in the absence of an overt act, just as it
could not be made in the absence of other facts found in the patient's
history or discovered in examining him. In those cases, the evidence
will not justify a determination of dangerousness."7
The "overt act" rule requires separate proof but does not affect the
basis of the expert's opinion. Some courts approximate an overt act re-
quirement by requiring the proponent to show that the expert based his
opinion on some form of first-hand knowledge"1 Other courts have gone
further, by requiring the proponent of an expert prediction to prove the
factual basis for the opinion through separate evidence. In Illinois, the
214. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. at 391 (footnote ommitted).
215. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the scholarly critique of predictions).
216. United States ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707,710 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
217. Id. at71I.
218. See, e.g., Judicial Commitment of J.M., 560 So. 2d 100, 102-03 (La. App. 199o). The appellate
court reversed a commitment in which the only evidence of defendant's behavior consisted of the tes-
timony of a psychiatrist about acts which he had not seen. While the court noted that the medical his-
tory on which the psychiatrist relied included evidence admissible under the "medical diagnosis and
treatment" exception to the hearsay rule, it refused to find them sufficient to support the commitment,
in the absence of testimony by observers with first hand knowledge. But see People v. Lane, 581 P.2d
719, 722 (Colo. 1978) (affirming a commitment where the "only evidence at the hearing was the testi-
mony of" a psychiatrist, who testified directly from the respondent's medical record at the hospital).
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proponent of a psychiatric opinion on danger must prove the facts form-
ing the basis for the expert testimony by clear and convincing evidence:
We recognize that the medical science of predicting future dangerous-
ness is inexact and that a court is not required to wait until respondent
harms himself or another before ordering involuntary admission. How-
ever, of primary concern in an involuntary admission proceeding is the
right of the individual to be free from unjustified and unreasonable
confinement. Both the facts upon which the medical opinion is based
and the medical testimony upon which the decision to admit is based
must be established by clear and convincing evidence.2 9
Texas courts apply a similar rule: "Expert diagnosis alone is not suf-
ficient to confine a patient for compulsory treatment. The expert opinion
and recommendations must be supported by a showing of the factual
bases on which they are grounded."'..
(ii) Recent Acts
Where the jurisdiction does require an overt act, courts have some-
times imposed an additional requirement that the prior act be "recent, ....
on the theory that the recency of the act makes it more probative of the
likelihood of danger .... "In determining whether a person is dangerous,
the focus must be on the subject's condition at the time of the hearing.
Actions and statements of a person alleged to be mentally ill and dan-
gerous which occur prior to the hearing are probative of the subject's
present mental condition." '223 No court uses a bright-line rule to deter-
mine how recent is recent. Instead, courts have phrased the rule in terms
of whether "evidence of dangerousness [is] sufficiently probative to pre-
219. In re Cochran, 487 N.E.2d 389, 390-92 (Ill. Ct. App. 1985) (citations omitted) (reversing a
commitment order for failure to prove basis of expert's opinion). Accord Matter of Gregorovich, 411
N.E.2d 981, 987 (Ill. App. Ct. i98o) (affirming commitment): In re Cutsinger, I86 Ill.App.3d 219, 542
N.E.2d 414, 419 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (reversing commitment).
220. Johnstone v. State, 961 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. App. 1997) (citations omitted). Accord Mezick
v. State, 920 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. App. 1996); see In re Breeden, 4 S.W.3d 782, 784 (Tex. Ct. App.
1999). Note that these cases do not address an issue made explicit by recent revisions to the Federal
Rules of Evidence: whether and when the proponent of expert testimony can introduce otherwise in-
admissible evidence on the theory that it reflects the basis for the expert's opinion. FED. R. EvID. 703.
To the extent that these cases require introduction as basis of inadmissible evidence (such as hearsay
reports), these cases would significantly diverge from the Federal approach, which excludes inadmissi-
ble basis information, subject to a balancing of prejudice and probative value. Id.
221. The District Court in Lessard v. Schmidt required that "civil confinement can be justified in
some cases if the proper burden of proof is satisfied and dangerousness is based upon a finding of a
recent overt act.... 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1078 (E.D. Wis., 1972) (emphasis added).
222. See, e.g., In re Interest of Blythman, 302 N.W.2d 666, 671-73 (Neb. I98i) (affirming a recency
requirement, but upholding a sexually violent predator civil commitment which relied on five-year-old
acts).
223. Id. at 671.
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dict future behavior and the subject's present state of dangerousness... 4
Even states that have rejected a recency requirement note that trial
courts will need to assess the probative value of the respondent's past
history against the other available evidence of danger.25
(iii) Prognostic Evidence
Other courts regulate the strength of the evidence required for
commitment by insisting that the proponent of commitment use past acts
that are "prognostic" of future violence. This rhetoric seeks to mark off a
sub-category of actions that justify a finding of future danger: "A court
can use what has happened in the past as 'prognostic' evidence to help
predict future conduct. ' '2 6 The phrase "prognostic evidence" does not as-
sume any particular degree of reliability, and may even acknowledge that
the court's abilities to predict do not exceed those of experts: "Just as we
recognize 'the fallibility of psychiatric opinions on the issue of whether a
person meets the criteria for involuntary commitment.., we recognize
the fallibility of particular acts offered as proof of dangerous mental con-
224. Id. at 672. But see In the Matter of D.D., 920 P. 2d 973, 975 (I996) (affirming a commitment
order based on recent threats: "imminent threat of self-inflicted injury or injury to others must be evi-
denced by overt acts sufficiently recent as to be material and relevant to the person's present condi-
tion."); Davis v. North Carolina Dept. of Human Res., 465 S.E.2d 2, 8 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) The court
affirmed a commitment order based on acts over two months old:
We therefore construe the term "recent past" to mean "relevant past" and as such deter-
mine that the violent acts... within the six months prior to the district court hearing to be
the "relevant past." These acts are relevant because they occurred close enough in time to
the district court hearing to have probative value on the ultimate question before the court
of whether there was a "reasonable probability that such [violent] conduct [would] be re-
peated." 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 915, § I; see N. C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-I, Rule 401 (1992) (de-
fining relevant evidence). We do not attempt to define the term with any greater degree of
preciseness and each case must be viewed on its own facts in determining whether violent
acts are relevant to the inquiry of involuntary commitment. The courts will be the ultimate
judge of whether the conduct occurs within a relevant time.
Id. But see 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 730I(b) (2O01) ("Clear and present danger to others shall be
shown by establishing that within the past 30 days the person has inflicted or attempted to inflict seri-
ous bodily harm on another and that there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be re-
peated.").
225. See, e.g., In re L.R., 497 A.2d 753, 756 (Vt. 1985) (rejecting respondent's claim that Vermont
law incorporated a recency requirement, and noting that the other constitutional protections assure a
sufficiently strong inference of danger: "Overt acts occurring shortly before the hearing may be given
more weight than remote acts, but where the evidence is otherwise sufficient, recent acts are not a pre-
requisite to involuntary commitment.").
226. In Interest of J.S., 545 N.W.2d 145, 149 (N.D. 1996) (affirming commitment; citing In Interest
of R.N., 513 N.W.2d 370. 372 (N.D. 1994) (respondent claimed that "a court should not speculate that
she may be a risk in the future based on her past treatment history. However, a court is entitled to
consider what has happened in the past as relevant 'prognostic' evidence of what is likely to occur in
the future.")). See also In re Renz, 507 N.W.2d 76, 78 (N.D. 1993) (stating that patient's history may be
predictor of dangerousness to self or others, and noting that "we consider prognostic evidence in other
proceedings which bear on an individual's rights").
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dition. 2. 7 In effect, the language once again reasserts the shift from psy-
chiatric to judicial definitions of danger: "[T]he Legislature shifted from
a focus on the necessarily imprecise element of psychiatric prognostica-
tion to an emphasis on the evidentiary underpinnings of the diagnosis;
from that which is least capable of proof, to that which is most capable of
proof.""' 8
(iv) Multiple Proofs
Other states require multiple sources of proof (including but not lim-
ited to expert testimony) to support a conclusion of danger. This ap-
proach often finds expression in conclusory terms: the trial court should
consider the "totality of the circumstances... 9 But on occasion a court
will spell out the multiple factors which undergird a "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test. In In re Burton, for example, the court explained:
Factors which are to be considered by the court in a commitment hear-
ing include, but are not limited to, the following: (I) whether, in the
court's view, the individual currently represents a substantial risk of
physical harm to himself or other members of society; (2) psychiatric
and medical testimony as to the present mental and physical condition
of the alleged incompetent; (3) whether the person has insight into his
condition so that he will continue treatment as prescribed or seek pro-
fessional assistance if needed; (4) the grounds upon which the state re-
lies for the proposed commitment; (5) any past history which is
relevant to establish the individual's degree of conformity to the laws,
rules, regulations and values of society; and (6) if there is evidence that
the person's mental illness is in a state of remission, the court must also
consider the medically suggested cause and degree of the remission
and the probability that the individual will continue treatment to main-
227. In re Fasi, 567 A.2d 178, 182 (N.H. 1989) (holding that a civil commitment action does not
permit a justification defense, since prior acts are offered not as the basis of the commitment order,
but as "prognostic" proof).
228. People v. Super. Ct. (Dodson), 196 Cal. Rptr. 431, 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding a com-
mitment statute against a constitutional challenge that it focused on the past rather than the future).
229. See, e.g., People in Interest of King, 795 P.2d 273, 275 (Colo. Ct. App. 199o) ("[B]ased on the
totality of the evidence including the psychologist's professional opinion as to respondent's potential-
ity for danger, the court was justified in ordering continued involuntary treatment.").
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tain the remissive state of his illness should he be released from com-
mitment.3 '
Such a requirement reduces the probative importance of the expert
opinion predicting danger, and therefore the risks caused by its admis-
sion, by emphasizing other evidence and assuring broad evidentiary sup-
port for the statutory finding. Requiring multiple proofs serves to
counteract the weaknesses of predictive expertise. 3' The requirement of
multiple proofs also bears interesting similarities to the approach of ex-
perts using guided clinical assessments that combine in-person appraisal
with consideration of a wide range of objective "risk factors."2 '
Supplementary proof requirements form part of the evidentiary con-
text within which to fit predictive expertise. The requirement of some
other evidence, the effort to regulate the strength of the inference to be
drawn from that evidence, and the effort to assure a varied, complex pool
of information serve a vital purpose: they justify the fact-finder's consid-
eration of predictive evidence by providing stronger and more diverse
data against which to gauge the prediction. These rules can, of course,
find justification in their own merits, regardless of the weaknesses of ex-
pert predictions. The fact remains, however, that many courts justify
these approaches by reference to the weakness of predictive expertise.
230. In re Burton, 464 N.E.2d 530, 534 (1984) (affirming a commitment order); see also State v.
Mullins, No. 73315, 1999 WL 148479, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. I8, 1999). See also In re Linehan, 518
N.W.2d 6o9, 614 (Minn. 1994):
Where, [as here,] utter uncontrollability of sexual impulses is found. ... the court, in pre-
dicting serious danger to the public, should consider six factors: (a) the offender's relevant
demographic characteristics ... ; (b) the person's history of violent behavior (with special
attention to recency, severity, and frequency of violent acts); (c) the base rate statistics for
violent behavior among individuals of this person's background; (d) the sources of stress in
the environment; (e) the similarity of the present or future context to those contexts in
which the person has used violence in the past; and (0 the person's record with respect to
sex therapy programs.
Id. See also In re Preston, 629 N.W.2d 104, I5 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
231. See, e.g., State v. Putnoki, 51o A.2d 1329, 1335-36 (Conn. 1986):
Although a trial court may choose to attach special weight to the testimony of medical ex-
perts at a hearing to determine mental status, the ultimate determination of mental illness
and dangerousness is a legal decision (citations omitted). Partly because definitions of dan-
gerousness are necessarily vague ... and partly because there are no "psychological or
physical signs or symptoms which can be reliably used to discriminate between the poten-
tially dangerous and the harmless individual," ... psychiatric predictions of future danger-
ousness are tentative at best and are frequently conceded, even within the profession, to be
unreliable....
... In reaching its difficult decision, the court may and should consider the entire record
available to it, including the defendant's history of mental illness, his present and past diag-
noses, his past violent behavior, the nature of the offense for which he was prosecuted, the
need for continued medication and therapy, and the prospects for supervision if released.
232. See Part I.B.i infra (discussing guided clinical and adjusted actuarial predictions).
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4. Defining Danger
So far, this Article has assumed a uniform standard of danger, '33 a
reasonable assumption given the uniform constitutional requirement to
find danger. All states have enacted statutory definitions, however, and
these definitions reflect distinctive approaches. Some jurisdictions, for
example, use uncomplicated standards: a person who poses a danger to
self or others as a result of mental illness.234 However, greater refinement
is common with respect to some critical elements of proof: how soon the
potential harm might occur ("immediacy"); how likely it is to occur
("probability"); and what and how severe the harm could be ("nature
and severity"). Assessing the legal definitions of danger permits us to
identify another element in Daubert's fit requirement: the degree of simi-
larity between the inferences inherent in the expert's opinion and the in-
ferences required by the legal standard. As we shall see, the statutory
definitions of danger require fact-finding that is strikingly similar to the
methodology used in forming clinical predictions of danger.
a. Immediacy of Danger
Some statutes require that the prospective danger be "imminent" or
"immediate." For example, Georgia defines a person subject to commit-
ment as someone "who is mentally ill.., and presents a substantial risk
of imminent harm to that person or others [or] is so unable to care for
that person's own physical health and safety as to create an imminently
life-endangering crisis." '235 Other formulations speak of "immediate dan-
ger" ;236 "clear and present danger";37 and "danger in the near future.23
8
233. More general definitions of danger include an inherently predictive element in them, defining
it to include the "[l]iability or exposure to harm or injury; the condition of being exposed to the chance
of evil; risk, peril" or the "[plower (of a person...) to inflict physical injury." IV OXFORD ENGLISH Dic-
TIONARY 240-41 (2d ed. 1989).
234. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(c) (2002) ("mentally ill and as a result.., likely to cause
harm to the respondent or others or... gravely disabled"); CAL. WELF. & INST. § 5256.6 (1998) ("as a
result of a mental disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism, a danger to others, or to himself or
herself, or gravely disabled"); MD. CODE. ANN., Health Gen § io-617(3) (2000) ("presents a danger to
the life or safety of the individual or of others"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 433A.310 (2000) ("because of
that [mental] illness, is likely to harm himself or others if allowed his liberty"); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 4 26.005(1)(d)(A) (1995) ("because of a mental disorder, is... (d)angerous to self or others").
235. GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-I (9.i)(A)(i) (1995). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-12 (2OO1)
("imminent threat of injury to the respondent or to others"); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (1996) ("the
person presents an imminent danger to himself or others as a result of mental illness").
236. UTAH. CODE ANN. § 62A-I2-23 4 (io)(b) (2000) ("because of the proposed patient's mental
illness he poses an immediate danger of physical injury to others or himself").
237. ALA. CODE § 22-52-IO.4(a)(ii) (1997) ("[A]s a result of the mental illness the respondent poses
a real and present threat of substantial harm to self and/or others."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 5001
(1995) ("a real and present threat, based upon manifest indications, that such person is likely to com-
mit or suffer serious harm"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.oi(B)(2) (West 2001) ("a substantial risk of
physical harm to others as manifested by evidence of recent homicidal or other violent behavior, evi-
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These immediacy requirements reflect a concern about the indefiniteness
of predictions; an "imminence" approach appears to assume that requir-
ing danger in the near future is likely to produce more reliable predic-
tions. 39 To be sure, many courts have found that due process does not
require "imminence"; in these cases, the relevant statutes produce suffi-
ciently reliable results for constitutional purposes."0 Where it exists,
however, an immediacy requirement narrows the range of permissible
commitments, and thus creates a commitment scheme that constrains the
uncertainties of expert prediction.
dence of recent threats that place another in reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical
harm, or other evidence of present dangerousness"). Note that in at least one state, the statute further
defines the language "clear and present danger" in such a way as to eliminate a requirement of immi-
nence. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-207(c)(i)(A) (1987) ("[Cllear and present danger" means "serious
bodily injury... and... a reasonable probability that the conduct will be repeated.").
238. FLA. STAT. ch. 394.467(I)(b) (2002) ("substantial likelihood that in the near future he or she
will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or herself or another person"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:2
(2O 0 1) (danger to others: "a person whose behavior or significant threats support a reasonable expec-
tation that there is a substantial risk that he will inflict physical harm upon another person in the near
future"); but cf LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §28.2(4) (2001) (danger to self: "a person whose behavior, signifi-
cant threats or inaction supports a reasonable expectation that there is a substantial risk that he will
inflict physical or severe emotional harm upon his own person"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.2 (1997)
("by reason of mental illness there is a substantial likelihood that the person will inflict serious bodily
harm upon another person or cause serious property damage within the reasonably foreseeable fu-
ture").
239. See State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 302 (N.J. 1975).
It is not sufficient that the state establish a possibility that defendant might commit some
dangerous acts at some time in the indefinite future. The risk of danger, a product of the
likelihood of such conduct and the degree of harm which may ensue, must be substantial
within the reasonably foreseeable future.
Id. See also supra notes 133-36 (discussing amicus brief of American Psychiatric Association, which
claimed that psychiatrists have greater skill at making short-term predictions).
240. In re P.S.. 702 A.2d 98, 104-05 (Vt. 1997) (rejecting a claim that the federal or state constitu-
tions required a showing of present danger, and holding instead that a statute which required a show-
ing of future danger comported with due process): In re LaBelle, 728 P.2d 138, 146 (Wash. 1986)
(upholding a statute which permitted commitment of the "gravely disabled", against a challenge that
the constitution required a finding of "imminent" danger); Moore v. Wyoming Medical Center, 825 F.
Supp. 1531, 39 (D. Wyo. 1993) (upholding a Wyoming statutory revision which had eliminated an
"imminent" danger requirement in favor of a "substantial probability" requirement). In Moore, the
District Court articulated a judicial role rationale for distinguishing between judicial and medical no-
tions of danger:
[N]either the medical nor the legal profession has accurately defined or predicted "danger-
ousness." ... Nonetheless. courts must attempt to define and evaluate the contours of "dan-
gerousness." especially where, as in this case, a genuine issue of fact exists regarding
whether the detainee was dangerous at the time the state detained her.
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b. Probability of Danger
Some state statutes do not speak of the likelihood of danger at all,
requiring only "danger of harm to self or others. 2 41 Most states, however,
do specify the strength of the required probability of harm. Formulations
range in strength from a "likelihood" of harm;242 through a "reasonable
expectation" of harm;143 to a "probability" of harm; to a "substantial
probability" of harm."4 No empirical relationship has been shown be-
tween different articulations of probability and the frequency of finding
241. See statutes cited supra note 234. As noted previously, some courts appear to finesse the
probability issue entirely, by insisting that the proper inquiry is whether the respondent is "presently
dangerous." See discussion of recent overt acts supra at Part IV.D.3 . Moreover, even statutes which
state some degree of probability for danger to others often define danger to self in terms of a present
condition. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401(b) (1999) (inability to meet physical needs: "a
result of that mental illness is unable to attend to those of his or her basic physical needs such as food,
clothing, or shelter that must be attended to in order for the individual to avoid serious harm") (em-
phasis addded). The ambiguity may derive from an ambiguity in the very concept of dangerousness;
for example, one dictionary defines "dangerous" as "[f]raught with ... risk; causing or occassioning
danger; perilous, hazardous, risky, unsafe." IV OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 242 (2d ed. 1989).
242. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545(a) (2ooi & Supp. 2003) ("likely to injure himself or other per-
sons"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-1 (1993) ("likely to do substantial physical or emotional injury"); IOWA
CODE § 229.1 15.a (2000) ("likely"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59 -2 946(f)( 3 ) (2002) ("likely"); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 43-1-3 (Michie 1978) ("more likely than not").
243. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/1-I19 (1997) ("reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm");
MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 330.I40I(9)(a) (1999) ("reasonably... expected"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3
(2ooi) ("reasonable probability"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02 (2002) ("reasonable expectation");
50 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. § 7301 (2001) ("reasonable probability"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-i-i(5)(a)
(1999) ("reasonable expectation").
244. CONN. GEN. STAT. § I7a-495 (1992) ("substantial risk"); FLA. STAT. ch. § 394.467(i)(a)2.b.
(2002) ("substantial likelihood"); GA. CODE ANN. 3 7 -3 -1(9.I)(A)(i) (1995) ("substantial risk"); IDAHO
CODE § 66-317(k)(I)-(2) (20o0) ("substantial risk"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.o2(2) (West 2003)
("substantial likelihood"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1009(0) (1999) ("substantial risk"); N.H. REV. STATE.
ANN. § 135-C:3 4 (1995) ("potentially serious likelihood"); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 9.01 (2002) ("substan-
tial risk"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (20OI) ("substantial risk"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-2
(1997) ("substantial risk"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-501 (2001) ("substantial likelihood"); WASH. REV.
CODE § 71.05.020 (2002) ("substantial risk"); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 51.20 (1997) ("substantial probabil-
ity"); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-101 (2001) ("substantial probability"). Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 28:2 (20OI) ("a reasonable expectation that there is a substantial risk") (note that in at least a few
jurisdictions, the stated probability of danger for one kind of danger is stronger than for another. See,
e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123 § I (West 1986) (gravely disabled: "a very substantial risk of
physical impairment or injury to the person himself as manifested by evidence that such person's
judgment is so affected that he is unable to protect himself"), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. § I (West
1986) (danger to others: "substantial risk"); compare ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B § 3801 (West t964)
("[a] reasonable certainty that severe physical or mental impairment or injury will result to the per-
son..."), with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B § 38oi (West 1964) ("substantial risk"); N.J. STAT. ANN.
30:4-27.2(h) (danger to self: "probable"), and N.J. STAT. ANN. 30:4-27.2(i) (danger to others or prop-
erty: "substantial likelihood").
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danger.245 Appellate courts usually describe the evidence at hand, and
then declare whether or not it meets the statutory standard.246
In doing so, courts use discretionary, non-statistical, and non-
actuarial methods; no court has reduced the probability component of
dangerousness to a statistical formula.47 Even courts that have passed on
the admissibility of actuarial instruments for predicting danger have in-
sisted that the legal determination reflects a balancing of policies, not the
quantification of risks."" Courts uniformly find that assessing the prob-
ability of danger requires a discretionary balancing of the individual's
right to act freely and society's need for protection from harmful behav-
ior.249 Such statements thus describe fact-finding on probability that re-
quires the weighing of public and private interests, and not fact-finding
dominated by the precise quantification of risks.
c. Nature and Degree of Potential Harm
Statutory definitions of danger also vary substantially in the nature
and degree of prospective harm that the proponent must establish. For
example, as to "danger to others," the simplest formulation leaves the
nature of the harm undefined. 5° Some states specify physical (or "bod-
245. See John Monahan & Eric Silver, Judicial Decision Thresholds for Violence Risk Management,
2 INT'L. J. OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 2003, No.I 1-6 (2003) (describing the results of a survey of
twenty-six trial judges, asking them to set the decision threshold for instituting short-term civil com-
mitment as a "danger to others," using assessments of risk derived from the Macarthur Risk Assess-
ment instrument).
246. See, e.g., In re Barnard, 616 N.E.2d 714, 730 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (affirming a commitment un-
der a "reasonable expectation" standard); In re Pollard, No. A-92-863, 1993 WL 183594, at *8 (Neb.
App. June 1, 1993) (unpublished opinion) (affirming a commitment on a "substantial risk" standard).
247. See People v. Super. Ct. (Ghilotti), 44 P.3d 949,953-54 (Cal. 2002) (addressing the meaning of
the term "likely to engage in acts of sexual violence" as a standard for initial evaluation prior to formal
commitment). The California Supreme Court discussed various verbal formulae for assessing the
meaning of the term "likely," and settled on one which required initial evaluators to find "a serious
and well-founded risk" of reoffense. Id. at 968. The court clarified that this did not mean "a greater
than 50 percent chance the person would reoffend," id. at 97o, but did mean "more than the mere pos-
sibility." Id. at 972. While the court noted that the term must be interpreted in light of the statutory
purpose, it also advised interpretation "in light of the 'difficulties inherent in predicting human behav-
ior' . . . particularly in mathematical terms." Id. at 971.
248. See infra Part I.B. (discussing cases which address statistical methods of assessing danger).
249. See, e.g., Pollard, 1993 WL 183594, at *8 (affirming a commitment under a substantial prob-
ability standard, and rejecting an argument that a psychiatric expert needed to testify to a particular
degree of probability: "[a] medical expert's testimony need not be couched in the magic words 'rea-
sonable degree of medical certainty or a reasonable probability,"' quoting Shahan v. Hilker, 488
N.W.2d 577, 58o (1992)); Matter of Foster, 426 N.W.2d 374,378-79 (Iowa 1988) (interpreting the overt
act requirement in Iowa's statute, and discussing the probability standard as a balancing of individual
and societal interests); People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768. 774 (Colo. 1988) (reviewing other states' defi-
nitions of danger, and holding that due process requires that the "likelihood" of danger mean "a rea-
sonable basis to believe that the individual's mental illness results in a present danger").
250. As keywords, statutes without definitions focus on "harm," ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.4 (975),
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30-735 (2002), IND. CODE ANN. § 12-7-2-53 (West 200T), MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-
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ily") harm.25' No state includes prospective threats, but many specify past
threats as evidence of future harm.25 ' Only a handful of states include ne-
glect of others under the person's care as a form of danger. '53 In many
states, sexual violence towards identified groups not only qualifies as
harm, but often justifies an entirely separate commitment process.254 A
small minority of states includes the prospect of psychic or emotional
harm to others in their definition of danger.255 A comparable minority in-
clude danger to the property of others.256
"Danger to self" appears in all states as a form of danger. As with
danger to others, this includes potential physical harm to the proposed
patient, phrased either as a general standard 57 or as more specific acts,
typically suicide or self-mutilation.25 States usually deal with threats to
GEN. I § io-632 (2000), Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.350 (West 2000), NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1009 (I999), NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. 4 33A.310 (2000), 50 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-58o
(1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7101 (2000); "danger," CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5256.6 (West 1998),
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-10-109 (West 2002), N.H. REV. STATE. ANN. § 135-C:34, OR. REV. STAT.
§ 426.005 (1993) ("is dangerous"), VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 0959 Supp. 2002); or "injury," MONT.
CODE ANN. § 53-21-126 (2001).
251. "Physical": ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-501 (2003), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-495 (West 1992),
GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1, HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-1 (1993), IDAHO CODE § 66-317 (2OOO), 405 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 5/1-119 (1997), IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.1 (2000), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2946 (2002), Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.oi I (1999), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:2 (West 2001), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
34-B § 3801 (West 1964), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123 § 1 (West 1986)
, 
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 330.1401 (West 1999), MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 (West 2003), MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-61 (I999), N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. § 9.01 (2002), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (West 2001), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-2
(I997), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-I-1 (1999), UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-I2-234 (2OOO), WASH. REV.
CODE § 71.05.020 (West 2002), W. VA. CODE § 27-1-12 (2001), WIS. STAT. § 51.20 (997), WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 25-10-101 (2001). "Bodily": ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-207 (1997), FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 394.467
(West 2002). N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-3 (Michie 1978), TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-501 (2001). Cf. D.C.
CODE ANN. § 2 1-545 (2001) ("injure himself or others").
252. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-207 (1997); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5300 (1998); MINN. STAT.
§ 253B.02 (West 2003).
253. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.oi (1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401 (1999); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (West 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 271-12 (2001).
254. See supra note 20 (discussing sexually violent offender commitment statutes) and Part II.B
infra (assessing cases which consider the admissibility of predictive expertise in such statutes).
255. HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-1 (1993) ("substantial... emotional injury"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.1
(2000) ("serious emotional injury on members of the person's family or others who lack reasonable
opportunity to avoid contact with the person").
256. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5001 (1995) ("harm ... to property"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2946
(2002) ("substantial damage to another's property"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02 (2002) ("inflicting
significant property damage").
257. See supra note 234.
258. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-3 (Michie 1978) ("suicide or... serious bodily harm to himself by vio-
lent or other self-destructive means"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3 (2001) ("suicide" and "self-
mutilation"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02 (2002) ("suicide" but not physical harm to self); 50 PA.
ANN. STAT. tit. § 7301 (2001) ("suicide" and "mutilation"): S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-I-I (1999) ("in-
flict serious physical injury upon himself").
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self in the same way as threats to others.59 Only one state permits civil
commitment based on psychic harm to self.2'6
Neglect of oneself (as opposed to active violence) supports commit-
ment in most states. The traditional approach includes neglect as a type
of "danger to self. '2S6' An increasing number of states permit commitment
on a finding that the person is "gravely disabled. ' ',62 The content of this
term of art varies from state to state. Its central meaning references a
handful of different sorts of risks, including "inability or failure to pro-
vide.., the essential human needs of food, clothing, shelter, and medical
care. ' 2'6 Second, "gravely disabled" references a lack of judgment result-
ing from mental illness which in turn can expose the defendant to unwar-
ranted, severe risks of harm from others-essentially a passive
recklessness towards identifiable dangers posed by other people. 64 Third,
the term can reference loss of the mental functioning necessary for ac-
complishment of routine daily tasks. 65
259. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
260. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:2 (2001) ("inflict ... severe emotional harm upon his own per-
son"). Some states include the prospect of mental deterioration, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B § 38OI
(West 1964) ("severe... mental impairment or injury.., to the person"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-
02 (2002) ("substantial deterioration in mental health which would predictably result in dangerous-
ness"). See also infra notes 262-65 (discussing statutes allowing proof that the defendant is "gravely
disabled").
261. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-207 (Michie 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467 (West 2002); GA. CODE
ANN. § 37-3-1 (1995); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-119 (West 1996); IowA CODE ANN. § 229.1 (West
2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2946; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 38O; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
123 § I (West 1986); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401 (West 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02
(West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-61 (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126 (2OO); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 83-1009 (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-3; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3; N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 25-03.1-02; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (West 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A § 1-103 (West
2001); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426.005 (Michie 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-I-I; TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 33-6-501 (2001); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034 (Vernon's 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18
§ 7101 (2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-1-12 (Michie 2001): WIs. STAT. ANN. § 51.20 (997); WVO. STAT.
ANN. § 25-10-101 (Michie 2001).
262. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735 (Michie 2002); ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.755 (Michie 2002); CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 515o (West 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-10-109 (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17a-495 (West 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-60.2 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 66-329 (Michie Supp.
2003): IND. CODE § 12-26 (West 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:54 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-
1-3 (Michie 1975) ("grave passive neglect"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.040 (West 2002).
263. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-IO-IO2(5)(A)(I) (West 2002). See also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 5oo8(h)(I)(A); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-495 (West 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-I (I993);
IDAHO CODE § 66-317 (Michie Supp. 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-7-2-96 (West 2002); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 28:2.
264. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27 -10-102(5)(A)(II) (West 2002) ("[l]acks judgment in the manage-
ment of his resources and in the conduct of his social relations to the extent that his health or safety is
significantly endangered and lacks the capacity to understand that this is so").
265. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(4) (West 2002) ("manifests severe deterioration in
routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over
his or her actions and is not receiving such care as is essential for his or her health or safety").
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The standard formulation of "danger to self and others" omits men-
tion of any specific degree of severity; where present, such requirements
take two forms. The statute may allow evidence of conduct that matches
recognized felony-level crimes of physical violence: for example, murder,
battery, or sexual assault. 66 More commonly, the statute uses qualifying
adjectives or adverbs, which require that the threatened harm be "seri-
ous
' '2 67 or "substantial. ' ' 68
d. Assessment of Definitions
The composite picture that emerges from this review displays dis-
tinctive characteristics of fact-finding about future dangerousness. 69 The
essentials involve a determination by the fact-finder that the respon-
dent's mental illness causes a risk of harm to self or others. Thus, mental
illness, causation, risk (or probability), and harm form the central proofs.
Variations include the degree or probability of the risk, the strength of its
short-term likelihood, and the nature and severity of the harm. Most
terms are decidedly indeterminate: they speak, for example, of "substan-
tial probability" or "severe harm." To be sure, the different types of
harm seem more well-defined; here, the statutes permit overlapping
proofs of harm, so that if evidence fails on one, the petitioner may still
prevail on another. Fact-finding on danger thus entails simultaneous as-
sessments of multiple possible harms, using indeterminate rhetorical
standards to reach a decision on the size of the risk, the potential for
harm, and the severity of harm involved.
This composite picture prompts useful insights. First, the indetermi-
nacy of the critical elements allocates a zone of discretion to the fact-
finder on the desired conclusion. As the courts have often noted, this
zone responds to an adversarial balancing of interests: the state's desire
to protect and to treat the individual against the individual's interest in
remaining at liberty. In assessing probability, imminence, and severity,
and in selecting among harms, the fact-finder not only can, but must, bal-
266. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-501 ("the person has threatened or attempted homicide or
other violent behavior"); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 25-Io-iOI ("physical harm to other individuals as mani-
fested by a recent overt homicidal act, attempt or threat or other violent act, attempt or threat").
267. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-501 (West 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-207 (West 2003); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. I6, § 5001 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467 (West 2002); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/I-I19 (West 1996); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401 (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.350 (West
2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1009 (i999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § I35-C:34 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:4-27.2 (West i98i); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 1-103 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-I7-580
(Law Co-op 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-i-i (Lexis 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-50; TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034 (Vernon 2003); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-4 (Michie 2001).
268. ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.4 (West 2003); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5300 (West 1998); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 334-i; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2946 (Supp. 2oo2); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.oi I (West 2003).
269. See also Grant H. Morris, Defining Dangerousness: Risking a Dangerous Definition, so J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 61, 67-71 (1999) (describing different statutory methods of defining danger).
[Vol. 55:1I
DAUBERT & DANGER
ance these competing interests. The legal definitions thus do not struc-
ture the decision primarily as a search for accuracy in prediction, much
less for statistical quantification of risk. Rather, they seek to justify judi-
cial action: either psychically and physically coercive compassion; or po-
tentially harmful freedom.
Second, the statutory definitions seem to suggest a method for fact-
finding on danger that parallels the methods of clinical assessors. In most
states, explicit language requires proof by historical facts and expert tes-
timony; no state adopts a statistical or actuarial methodology for finding
danger. Fact-finders must thus infer danger from the prior actions (or in-
actions) of the respondent, coupled with interpretive testimony from an
expert. Even without an "other act" requirement, the rules of sufficiency
reviewed earlier typically require some showing of conduct outside of
expert prediction. Such an approach expresses traditional evidentiary
values. Courts make inferences from what has already happened (and
from the best available skilled insight) about the significance of those
events for the future.
Third, legal decision-making on dangerousness encourages a clinical
method; it is itself clinical decision-making. It focuses on the individual,
and seeks to identify the unique features of that individual that might jus-
tify intervention. It does not refer to groups with which the individual
may share characteristics, nor to what members of that group might do or
be shown statistically to have done. It entails complex decision-making,
with uncertain rhetorical standards applied to overlapping points of fac-
tual focus. It assumes inaccuracy and unreliability, but requires a strong
degree of moral conviction that the decision about danger justifies the
choice of severe intervention or risky inaction.
Fact-finding on danger thus accepts the discretion to balance com-
peting interests, the reliance on both direct observation and specialized
opinion, and the imperative of decision-making to justify coercive action
against an individual. Clinical and actuarial prediction relate to this fact-
finding in different ways, and neither fits perfectly: the scientific goal of
statistically accurate prediction diverges widely from the judicial man-
date of balanced and restrained use of state power.
5. Conclusion: Predictive Testimony in Civil Commitments
But Daubert does not require a perfect fit. This section on commit-
ment law suggests how courts might assess the variability in Daubert's fit
requirement. First, the fit inquiry should ask how far courts have inte-
grated concerns over the quality of given expertise into the structure and
content of the legal process in question. This integration might consist of
matters as fundamental as the constitutional adequacy of evidence or
process; as technical as the allocation of the risk of error through burdens
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of proof; and as pragmatic as the case law definition of facts deemed suf-
ficient to support the required legal finding. With predictions of danger,
courts have shaped the commitment process to some extent because of
the unreliability of expert opinion.
Second, we can infer that "fit" means in part the degree to which the
particular expertise supplements and constrains the uncertainty inherent
in the relevant fact-finding. Prediction of future behavior is inherently
uncertain. Predictive expertise may not be all that reliable; but when it
comes to prediction, nothing else is better. This inference relies on both
evidentiary necessity and on cool assessment of alternatives: information
which, despite its flaws, offers a useful improvement on unaided judicial
fact-finding.
Third, we can infer that fit requires assessing how prevalent both the
expert witness and the given opinion are within the process. Mental
health professionals and their views on danger dominate the commitment
process from initiation to treatment to termination of the order. This fact
assures that trial judges will be both familiar with the experts and their
methodologies, and will have regularly heard argument from advocates
seeking to admit (or to attack) their conclusions.
Finally, we can infer that fit requires comparing the inferential proc-
ess embodied in the expertise to the inferential processes embedded in
the fact-finding. Such a comparison allows an intriguing conclusion for
predictive expertise: that courts would be more likely to find common
ground with clinical than with actuarial methods, both as a matter of
methodology and as a matter of decision. Taken to its logical extreme,
this point might mean that courts would have greater difficulty admitting
actuarial assessments into evidence.
As we shall see, however, appellate courts have never excluded ei-
ther form of opinion. This makes sense, especially if we see reliability
and fit existing in a dynamic relationship under Daubert: the question-
able reliability of clinical judgments would be offset by their extraordi-
narily good fit; while the greater reliability of actuarial assessments
would overcome a lesser fit with the demands of individualized fact-
finding. In effect, the balancing of reliability and fit should work differ-
ently for different kinds of expertise, even within the same case.
II. DAUBERT (AND FRYE) AND DANGER:
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT PREDICTIONS
Appellate courts uniformly admit expert psychiatric predictions in
civil commitments, whether based on clinical prediction or actuarial as-
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sessments.7" Prior to Daubert, few cases discussed the question; since
Daubert, every appellate court to have reviewed the question has admit-
ted expert predictions. This unanimous and unflinching acceptance of
these opinions by courts is surprising. How can this expertise, so thor-
oughly questioned and cautiously advanced, receive no appellate disap-
proval, in a Daubert regime focused on scientific reliability? In those
states that have adhered to Frye, how can this expertise, so roundly cri-
tiqued by its own practitioners, qualify under a "general acceptance"
standard? Daubert allows more consistent answers to these questions
than does Frye, but only if we understand it as a test that looks to some-
thing more than mere scientific validity.
This Part discusses the admissibility question in detail. Section A re-
views the case law, assessing how predictive expertise has fared in those
cases that openly address admissibility. Despite the uniform results, the
rationales vary widely. In particular, while all courts applying Daubert
have conceived of it as a "scientific reliability" test, each of these courts
has had to stretch this standard to apply it to predictive testimony. Frye
courts have faced an even more daunting task; they have had to explain
either how predictive testimony satisfies the general acceptance standard,
or why it should receive no special testing at all. Section B offers a
sounder approach to the acceptance of predictive expertise, combining
the notions of reliability and fit. This approach acknowledges the strong
differences between the clinical and actuarial approaches, and explains
how Daubert offers a doctrinally sound method for admitting the expert
testimony that each produces.
Before this, one short tangent is in order: How does the treatment of
predictive expertise compare to the evidentiary handling of other forms
of psychiatric, behavioral, or other "soft" expertise? Both before and af-
ter Daubert, this kind of expertise has come before the courts in many
different forms.27 ' Daubert left open whether its test applied to expertise
270. One author has suggested that a series of recent trial court decisions indicates a trend towards
excluding these opinions. See Donna Cropp Bechman, Sex Offender Civil Commitments: Scientists or
Psychics?, I6 CRIM. JUST. 24, 31-32 (2OO1) (identifying trial court decisions in Iowa, Arizona, Florida
and Missouri which have excluded predictive opinion in sex offender commitments.) However, in the
first two states, appellate opinion has more recently indicated a firm acceptance of such opinions we
discuss each below. Neither Florida nor Missouri have as yet seen an appellate resolution of the issue.
271. In addition to predictive testimony, a non-exclusive list of the uses of psychiatric or psycho-
logical expertise includes the existence of a syndrome or a diagnostic category in explanation of a par-
tiuclar party's behavior, see Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189, 1192 (Ind. 1989) (rape trauma
syndrome): Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 833-34 (Pa. 1992) (child sexual abuse syn-
drome); Fowler v. State, 958 S.W.2d 853, 862-64 (Tex. App. 1997) (consistency with behaviors of a
domestic violence victim); Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 743 (Wyo. 1993) (child sexual abuse accomo-
dation syndrome); the presence or absence of a mental state, proof of which was required by relevant
law, such as insanity or specific intent, see Douglas v. United States, 386 A.2d 289. 296 (D.C. 1978)
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in the behavioral or psychic sciences, or indeed, to any opinions based on
non-scientific expertise."' Kumho Tire resolved this by applying Daubert
to all expertise.273 However, many jurisdictions decline to follow Daubert,
and continue to apply Frye. In effect, the behavioral, psychic, and soft
sciences now receive review under three different approaches: applica-
tion of Daubert; application of Frye; or exemption from any special test-
ing.
Predictive expertise has been subject to these same three ap-
proaches; what differs are the results. Judicial opinion, split on virtually
every other form of behavioral or psychic expertise, has so far unani-
mously accepted predictive expertise in civil commitments. 74 This con-
(mental capacity); Cecil v. Commonwealth, 888 S.W.2d 669, 674-75 (Ky. 194) (addressing expert tes-
timony on defendant's insanity); In re Estate of Dokken, 604 N.W.2d 487, 494 (S.D. 2000) (testamen-
tary capacity); the uncertainty and unreliability associated with witness's capacity for accurate
testimony, see McCleery v. City of Bakersfield, 216 Cal. Rptr. 852, 856-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (ad-
dressing expertise on the reliability of eyewitness testimony); Campbell v. State, 814 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Colo.
191) (same); Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 552-53 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (same); the accuracy and
persistence of memory, especially of traumatic events, see Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp.
1055, 1o56 (E.D. Mich. i995) (same); Logerquist v. McVey, I P.3d 113, 115 (Ariz. 2000) (assessing ad-
missibility of expert testimony on repressed memory); Wilson v. Phillips, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204. 206-08
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (same); and the usefulness of hypnosis, see Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 436
A.2d 170, 171 (Pa. 198 1) (hypnotically refreshed testimony).
It is well beyond the scope of this Article to offer a complete analysis of all of these cases.
272. Compare Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518-19 (Ioth Cir. 1996) (Daubert
limited to novel scientific evidence or the hard physical sciences), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042 (1996),
with Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 126 F.3d 679, 685-88 (5th Cir. 1997) (Daubert applies to clinical
medicine, but specific factors discussed in Daubert do not apply), and Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121
F.3d 984, 99-91 (5 th Cir. 1997) (applying Daubert to expert testimony in engineering), and Cook v.
Am. S.S. Co., 53 F.3 d 733. 738 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying Daubert to technical and other specialized
knowledge), and Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1996) (Daubert ap-
plies to social science experts, in this case sociologists and statisticians), and United States v. Cordoba,
104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1997) (Daubert doesn't apply to expert testimony regarding the modus op-
erandi of drug traffickers because not based on scientific knowledge), and United States v. Webb, 115
F.3d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 1997) (Daubert doesn't apply to expert testimony as to why people typically
hide guns in the engine compartments of their cars), and Coleman v. Exxon Chem. Corp., 162 F. Supp.
2d 593, 617 (S.D. Tex. 2OO) (affirming exclusion of expert statistical evidence, but applying Daubert),
and Ohio ex rel. Montgomery v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1247, 1252-53 (S.D. Ohio 1996)
(applying Daubert to expert statistical testimony).
273. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-49 (1999); see also Elcock v. Kmart Corp.,
233 F.3d 734, 744 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Kumho Tire... extended the rigorous gatekeeping function as-
signed to trial judges by Daubert... to cases involving non-scientific testimony."); See also FED. R.
EViD. 702 advisory committee's note to 2000 Amendment ("[Tjhe Court in Kumho clarified that this
gatekeeper function applies to all expert testimony, not just testimony based in science.").
274. Only an occasional quixotic, non-binding opinion has questioned this result. In Fernandez v.
State, 564 S.W.2d 771, 773, 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), the majority upheld the exclusion of polygraph
evidence; the dissent critiqued this exclusion by contrasting it with the admission of predictive testi-
mony, despite its flaws. In Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 1996 WL 474106, at *I (3d Cir.
Aug. 22, 1996), opinion withdrawn and case set for en banc hearing, 93 F.3 d 1146 (3d Cir. 1996), a ma-jority of a the three judge panel determined that prisons fell within relevant statutes preventing dis-
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sensus confirms that predictive testimony is an outlier, even among cog-
nate areas of specialized knowledge. Given this state of affairs, some-
thing more than straight reliability must explain the courts' willing use of
the expertise.
A. ADMITTING PREDICTIONS OF DANGER
.. Daubert and Scientific Reliability
Only a few states have used Daubert to assess the admissibility of
predictive testimony. The most extensive treatment has occurred in
Texas, primarily in death penalty cases. Texas originally followed Frye,
but in the early 199os rejected that standard in criminal cases, and after
Daubert, aligned both civil and criminal evidence standards with the
Daubert approach. " 5 Texas also has a long history of appellate litigation
over the use of predictive testimony in the penalty phase of capital tri-
als, " 6 including in cases that involved testimony by "Dr. Death," an ex-
ability-related discrimination, and remanded the case for a determination whether violence-prone of-
fenders could participate in community-based rehab programs. Id. at *19.
In partial dissent, Judge Becker opposed remand for determination of the claimants' likelihood
of danger, on the grounds that predictive science could produce no reliable answers, and thus that re-
mand served no useful purpose: "In my view, this is a meaningless exercise." Id. at *19.
Finally, in Flores v. Johnson, 21o F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2ooo), the court, acting per curiam, affirmed
the rejection of a habeas petition from a Texas death penalty sentence, as an impermissible collateral
attack. In a special concurrence, Judge Garza reviewed predictive testimony using the Daubert stan-
dard and opined that Daubert should lead to the exclusion of such testimony, and an overturning of
Barefoot. Id. at 462-66. See infra text accompanying note 297 (discussing Judge Garza's argument
about the reliability standard of Daubert).
275. Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (overturning Frye and requiring
the proponent of "novel scientific evidence" to establish "(a) the underlying scientific theory must be
valid; (b) the technique applying the theory must be valid; and (c) the technique must have been prop-
erly applied on the occasion in question." Note that sections (a) and (b) of the quoted standard focus
on the validity of the scientific theory and its application, while section (c) focuses on its application to
the dispute, arguably a relevance standard. The same court later held that the Kelly standard applied
to all forms of expert testimony, novel or not. Hartman v. State, 946 S.W.2d 6o. 62-63 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997)-
See also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995) (con-
firming Kelly, approving Daubert, and requiring a proponent "to show that the expert's testimony is
relevant to the issues in the case and is based upon a reliable foundation"). The court reviewed and
approved the Daubert factors, adding to this non-exclusive list "(2) the extent to which the technique
relies upon the subjective interpretation of the expert;... [and] ... (6) the non-judicial uses which
have been made of the theory or technique." Id. at 557 (citations omitted).
276. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 88o, 896 (1983) (affirming the use of psychiatric predictions
of danger in capital penalty proceedings, despite their unreliability, against a due process challenge):
Estelle v. Smith. 451 U.S. 454, 469 (198i) (requiring Miranda warnings and notice to counsel in ad-
vance of any psychiatric examination which might produce testimony about future dangerousness in
death penalty litigation). Several cases assess the sufficiency of expert predictions for a given death
sentence. See Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (sufficient); Crawford v.
State, 617 S.W.2d 925, 933 (Tex. Crim. App. I98O) (no expert testimony, still sufficient); Cantu v.
State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 674-75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (sufficient); Fuller v. State, 827 S.W.2d 919, 935
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pert with a long-standing habit of predicting future dangerousness with
close to absolute certainty.277
In early cases, the Texas courts held predictive expertise admissible
without any special testing."" By the early 199os, Texas courts had begun
to discuss the validity of psychiatric predictions and continued to admit
them for a variety of reasons. 79 Finally, in Nenno v. State, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the admissibility of predictive testi-
mony under its version of Daubert.s° The court initially saw the question
as whether these standards applied to "nonscientific expert testimony
(i.e. that involving technical or other specialized knowledge)," and an-
swered with a "qualified yes."2S" It stressed the flexibility and complexity
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (sufficient). Contra Cook v. State, 858 S.W.2d 467, 474-75 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993) (rejecting attacks on the expert's knowledge and on the use of hypotheticals).
277. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899; see also Fuller v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 491, 497 (5th Cir. 1997) (re-
jecting an attack on the testimony of Dr. James P. Grigson). The Fifth Circuit noted that Dr. Grigson
had been labeled "Dr. Death" by the media, and had received a series of unfavorable articles on his
career. It also noted that "[t]he American Psychiatric Association Las reprimanded him twice for his
testimony, and it has filed an amicus curiae brief with the Supreme Court urging the Court to prohibit
his predictions because the association finds the predictions unreliable." Id. at 497. Defendant had
claimed that because of this coverage, including academic criticism of the doctor's past conclusions,
the doctor had lied in predicting danger with absolute certainty. The Court held that such an argument
went to weight, and not to admissibility. Id. See also U.S. v. Rojas, 15 M.J. 902, 923-24 (NMCMR
1983) (affirming admission of Dr. Grigson's testimony, and noting his response to a question about the
A.P.A.'s position in opposition to the forensic use of predictive opinions, that "he disagreed with this
opinion which he ;elt was held by a small percentage of the APA membership"); Gardner v. Johnson,
247 F.3d 551, 556 n.6 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that Dr. Grigson's sobriquets included "the hanging psy-
chiatrist"; describing his absolute certainty about the future violent behavior of Randall Dale Adams,
a man later found to have been convicted by the use of falsified evidence; and describing his expulsion
from membership of the American Psychiatric Association and the Texas Society of Psychiatric Physi-
cians "for 'arriving at a psychiatric diagnosis without examining the individuals in question and for
indicating, while testifying as an expert witness, that he could predict with ioo percent certainty that
the individuals would engage in future violent acts"'). Contra Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313, 324
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (holding Dr. Grigson's testimony sufficient without special challenge); Fuller
v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (citing Barefoot to reject a challenge to Dr. Grig-
son's testimony that "absolutely there is no question, no doubt, whatsoever, that [Appellant] ... will
commit future acts of violence'); Cook v. State, 858 S.W.2d 467, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (rejecting
an attack on Dr. Grigson's knowledge of the defendant's background); Carter v. State, 851 S.w.2d 390,
391-94 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding the doctor's testimony admissible against a general admissibility
challenge).
278. See Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d at 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (noting earlier cases that held
such testimony admissible if the trial court determined them relevant, followed by a line of cases
which, in addition, required a showing of the expert's qualifications).
279. Id. (citing Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)). See also Carter v.
State, 85I S.W.2d at 393 (holding predictive testimony admissible if it helps the jury determine a fact in
issue and is otherwise relevant; citing Duckett v. State, 797 S.W.2d 9o6, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 199o);
Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding predictive testimony admissible
where the expert had strong professional credentials)).
28o. Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.zd 549, 56o-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (emphasis omitted).
281. Id. at 56o.
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of the trial court's gatekeeping function, especially as to evidence built
on the soft sciences, including "the social sciences or fields that are based
primarily upon experience and training as opposed to the scientific
method. '218 The court held that the requirement of reliability applies with
less rigor to soft rather than to hard sciences. It articulated alternate cri-
teria for assessing reliability: "(I) whether the field of expertise is a le-
gitimate one, (2) whether the subject matter of the expert's testimony is
within the scope of that field, and (3) whether the expert's testimony
properly relies upon and/or utilizes the principles involved in the field.""
On the strength of these criteria, the court held admissible clinical pre-
dictions by a doctor with extensive experience studying the risk of future
sexual victimization of children.284 Notably, Nenno addressed predictive
testimony in a death penalty case; no Texas case has assessed predictive
testimony in civil commitments. The appellate cases have simply as-
sumed such evidence to be admissible in civil commitments without dis-
cussion. 5
An appellate court in Iowa, however, has used Dauberts6 to assess
predictive testimony in a civil commitment. The court first issued a panel
282. Id. at 561.
283. Id. The court indicated its belief that "[t]hese questions are merely an appropriately tailored
translation of the Kelly test to areas outside of hard science," and indicated that factors such as
Daubert's four criteria did not necessarily apply to non-hard scientific expertise. Id.
284. Id. at 562. Specifically, it found that research into such behavior constituted a "legitimate field
of expertise," that the witness' testimony was within the scope of that field, and that the witness had
used methods characteristic of those practicing in this field. These methods included: "interviews, case
studies, and statistical research...; [study of] a thousand cases that concerned the issue of future dan-
gerousness in some fashion... [and of] ... solved cases to attempt to understand the dynamics of what
occurred; ... personal interviews with inmates convicted of child sex offenses, examining the inmates'
psychological records, and examining the facts of the offenses involved." Id. The court acknowledged
the lack of any peer review of this expertise, but held that went more to weight than to admissibility.
Id.
285. See, e.g., Goldwait v. State, 961 S.W.2d 432, 434-35 (Tex. App. 1997) (affirming a commit-
ment order based on evidence which included testimony from two doctors who offered clinical testi-
mony predicting danger; held, state had met its burden of clear and convincing evidence, without any
discussion of the admissibility of these opinions).
286. Technically, Iowa uses a flexible approach, which includes, but is not restricted to the Daubert
standard. In Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the Iowa Supreme Court indicated that Iowa trial
courts did not have to use Daubert in assessing expert testimony. 59o N.W.2d 525. 533 (Iowa 1999).
However, they could do so:
trial courts may find it helpful, particularly in complex cases, to use one or more of the rele-
vant Daubert "considerations" in assessing the reliability of expert testimony. Therefore,
trial courts may, in their discretion, consider the [four Daubert factors] if deemed helpful in
a particular case.
Id. (citation omitted). See also State v. Atwood, 602 N.W.2d 775, 783 (Iowa 1999) (applying an abuse
of discretion standard to trial court rulings on admissibility); In re Detention of Holtz, No. 01-0243,
2002 WL 663683 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002) (on file with author) withdrawn and superceded by In
re Detention of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (en banc).
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opinion in April 2002 that excluded opinion evidence based on actuarial
assessments. However, in September 2002, the court (through the same
judge) issued an en banc decision that admitted the same evidence.7 The
April opinion used Daubert to assess testimony based on various actuar-
ial assessment tools; none of them satisfied this Daubert screening."" The
defendant had offered rebuttal witnesses whose only purpose was to ad-
dress the weaknesses of the various actuarial methods under a Daubert
standard."" The court concurred with this expert: "[T]here was no foun-
dation to show proper testing of these instruments, peer review or publi-
cation and the evidence was insufficient to show acceptance of these
actuarial risk assessment instruments in the scientific community."" 9 The
opinion included cites recent literature stressing the limitations on these
instruments. 9'
287. In re Detention of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613,619-20 (Iowa App. 2002).
288. Holtz, 2002 WL 663683, at *2, *5 (superceded opinion; on file with author) (assessing the
RRASOR, the Static-99, the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tools (MnSOST) and the Minnesota
Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised (MnSOST-R)). Neither the parties nor the court assessed how
these actuarial tools might combine with clinical opinions on danger. See supra Part II.B.i.b (identify-
ing various different actuarial scoring instruments for assessing risk).
289. Holtz, 2002 WL 663683, at *3-*4 (on file with author). One witness testified that:
[tihe reliability is unknown and has not been established in scientific review, and I think
that their reliability is uncertain, first of all, because it hasn't gone through that process, and,
secondly, because the task of those tests is very difficult, is to try to predict future behavior,
and that's obviously a very difficult thing to do. So I think those tests are new, unproven,
and the reliability is unknown.
Id. at *4. Another rebuttal witness confirmed this assessment:
Now, I think common sense and certainly our professional views tell us that predicting fu-
ture behavior of individuals is a bit tricky anyway because we know that's going to be a dif-
ficult thing. But when we develop tests to do that, we have to do so in a way that ensures
that they have some reasonable degree of accuracy in doing so. And none of these tests has
been subjected to any kind of evaluation that would allow you to say with a degree of cer-
tainty that they can predict somebody's future behavior. They're simply too new.
Id. This witness noted not only the lack of any credible peer review, but also the impossibility of such a
review:
They've never been published in a way that would allow you to evaluate their predictive ac-
curacy. So not only they are not accepted, it's impossible for them to be accepted right now.
It would be impossible for some years until people actually subject the research on which
these things were based to some kind of independent evaluation.
Id. Finally, this witness indicated that, even if valid, the tests have limited utility.
[Ilt is acceptable to use the actuarial instruments as a way of trying to determine the pres-
ence of various kinds of risk factors.... [W]hat is not acceptable at this time is 'adding up
those numbers to get some kind of a-score that you can then change into a prediction of
the future.'
Id. at *5.
290. Id.
291. Id. The cites are as follows:
Donna Cropp Bechman, Sex Offenders Civil Commitments: Scientists or Psychics?, 16-SUM
CRIM. JUST. 24, 26-3o (2001); Grant H. Morris, Defining Dangerousness: Risking A Danger-
ous Definition, io J. CONTEMP. LEOAL ISSUES 6I, 89-92 (i999); John Q. La Fond & Bruce J.
Winick, Foreword Sex Offenders and The Law, 4 PSYCHOL., PuB. POL'Y, & L. 3, 6-8 (1998);
Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for Predictions of Dangerous-
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Curiously, in withdrawing this opinion, the same judge wrote a sec-
ond opinion, issued en banc, that contained virtually the same review of
facts, procedure and precedent.2 The en banc opinion added a descrip-
tion of testimony from the actuarial expert, who had conceded the new-
ness of the tests, but stressed that he had used them only as part of an
overall clinical assessment. 93 The en banc opinion omitted its earlier cita-
tion to hostile literature, and emphasized instead that "[o]ur research has
revealed no state appellate court decision which has found actuarial in-
struments inadmissible at [sexually violent predator] proceedings." '294 The
opinion then approved admission, but only as part of a thorough clinical
prediction:
ness in Sex Offender Commitment Proceedings, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 33 (997). Even
those who cautiously endorse the actuarial instruments acknowledge that the reliability and
validity has not been sufficiently established. See, e.g., R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know
About Sex Offender Risk Assessment?, 4 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 50, 52-53 (1998) (stating
that the actuarial instruments are modestly accurate); Grant T. Harris et al., Appraisal and
Management of Risk in Sexual Aggressors: Implications For Criminal Justice Policy, 4 Psy-
CHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 73, 90-91 (1998) (recognizes there is a risk for false positives, indi-
viduals predicted as likely to reoffend who do not); Judith V. Becker & William D. Murphy,
What We Know and Do Not Know About Assessing and Treating Sex Offenders, 4 PSYCHOL.,
PUB. POL'Y, & L. 1i6, 126-27 (1998) (stating there is still number of false positives which
could lead to some individuals being detained who would not reoffend).
Id.
292. In re Detention of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613,614-16 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (en banc).
293. Id. at 617, 619-2o. The opinion substantially shortened its summary of the rebuttal testimony.
Id. at 617- 8.
294. Id. at 619 (quoting In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001) (citing People v. Ward, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) ("In civil commitment
cases where the trier of fact is required by statute to determine whether a person is dangerous or likely
to be dangerous, expert prediction may be the only evidence available."); People v. Poe, 88 Cal. Rptr.
2d 437, 44o (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (use of RRASOR upheld); Garcetti v. Super. Ct.,
102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (use of PCL-R, RRASOR and Static 99 upheld); In re
Detention of Walker, 731 N.E.2d 994,998 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (use of RRASOR upheld); In re Deten-
tion of Strauss, 20 P.3d 1022, 1024 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (use of MnSOST, RRASOR and VRAG
upheld); In re Detention of Campbell, 986 P.2d 771, 779 (Wash. 1999) (reliance on actuarial and clini-
cal assessment proper and weight to be given evidence is question for the jury). See also State, ex rel.
Romley v. Fields, 35 P.3d 82, 89 (Ariz. Ct. App 20oi) ("use of actuarial models by mental health ex-
perts to help predict person's likelihood of recidivism is not the kind of novel scientific evidence or
process to which Frye applies"); Commonwealth v. Reese, No. CIV.A oo-oi8i-B, 2001 WL 359954 at
*9 (Mass. Super. April 5, 2001) ("[S]tatistics, in general, are better predictors of future sexual danger-
ousness than clinical judgments.")). The cited cases use different standards of review, and are analyzed
in this Article under their appropriate sections.
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[W]e are not concluding that actuarial risk assessment instruments are
reliable per se or have our approval when used alone and not in con-
junction with a full clinical evaluation. We note this was not the situa-
tion or issue presented in the instant case. The instruments were used
in conjunction with a full clinical evaluation and their limitations were
clearly made known to the jury.9
The en banc opinion provides no explanation for the change.2'
Only one member of one court, Judge Emilio Garza, has indicated a
willingness to reject predictive testimony under a Daubert standard, al-
beit in a solo concurrence to a majority opinion that turned on an unre-
lated issue. 97 Using the four original Daubert factors as guidelines, Judge
Garza found: (I) no coherent testing of individual opinions or of general
clinical methods has been performed; (2) no peer review of individual
opinions, along with negative peer assessments of clinical methodology;
(3) a minimum error rate of fifty percent; and (4) an overwhelmingly
negative professional consensus on predictive reliability.28 The judge's
argument seem tendentious; other decisions by other courts have
reached more balanced and also more favorable assessments of clinical
opinion. Moreover, Judge Garza found fault with a thin clinical opinion,
not a richer, more textured mix of clinical and actuarial information.'
Nonetheless, if we assume a narrow view of Daubert, there is much to be
said for Judge Garza's approach. If Daubert focuses solely on scientific
295. Holtz, 653 N.W.2d at 619-20 (emphasis omitted).
296. The court's en banc opinion offers some clues for the switch, but none are determinative.
First, one can view the increased stress on the proponent's expert as a recognition of the abuse of dis-
cretion standard of review; given the existence of some evidence to support the trial court, reversal
was not warranted. Second, the more thorough assessment of primary legal authority may have been
conclusive. Third, the stress on the interplay of clinical and actuarial methods may have inspired
greater confidence than actuarial methods standing alone. Finally, both the quoted testimony and the
cited authority stress the lack of any feasible alternative proof to sustain a judicial prediction of dan-
ger. This Article will return to these points later. See infra Part II.B.
297. Flores v. Johnson, 21o F.3d 456, 458-7o (20oo) (Garza, J., specially concurring) (affirming a
Texas conviction and death sentence of a Mexican national, and rejecting claims based on ineffective
assistance of counsel and violation of rights protected by the Vienna Convention). His colleagues in
the per curiam opinion rejected his argument in a brief footnote focused on the lack of any constitu-
tional issue. Id. at 456 n. i ("It is the inescapable fact that a lay jury is asked to judge future dangerous-
ness. We cannot then reject as constitutionally infirm the admission into evidence of the same
judgment made by a trained psychiatrist."). The concurring opinion reviews testimony by Dr. James
Griffith, a doctor with a record of predictive testimony in Texas death cases equal to that of Dr. Grig-
son. This testimony is clinical, not actuarial. Indeed, one gravamen of Judge Garza's complaint focuses
on the fact that the doctor never interviewed the defendant, but based his opinion on listening to tes-
timony at trial and on hypothetical questions. Id. at 45h.
298. Id. at 464-65.
299. See In re Detention of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 617 (Iowa Ct. App 2002) (en banc decision).
See also Commonwealth v. Reese, No. CIV.A oo-o18i-B, 2001 WL 359954 at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Apr. 3, 2001) (comparing clinical and actuarial methods with "guided clinical judgment," which incor-
porated both methodologies).
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validity, his discussion lays a strong foundation for excluding predictive
expertise."°
Neither the Texas nor the Iowa opinions, however, rest solely or
even primarily on scientific reliability. The Nenno opinion applies
Daubert with less rigor to experience-based expertise, rejects the use of
traditional scientific methods, and asks solely whether the relevant field
of expertise is "legitimate," a term to which the Court assigns no con-
tent.3" ' The en banc opinion in Holtz replaces the panel's earlier, scien-
tifically focused rejection of predictive expertise with a mix of precedent
and deference to fact-finder discretion.3 "2 Taken together, the justifica-
tions offered in these decisions rely not on science but rather on the me-
chanics and pragmatism of dispute resolution: the need for legitimacy; an
appropriate deference to fact-finders; the reliance on legal precedent;
and a trust in adversarial processes to limit the force of weak expertise.
Not coincidentally, the same or similar considerations permeated my ear-
lier review of how the use of predictive testimony has shaped civil com-
mitment proceedings overall.3"3 At the very least, these opinions debunk
the need for a purely scientific reading of Daubert and Kumho Tire, and
confirm that courts can and will assess the fit of testimony within the
broader purposes and processes of litigation, before excluding it as unre-
liable.
2. Frye and General Acceptance
At first glance, any discussion of Frye may seem tangential to the
application of Daubert to predictive expertise. For at least a few reasons,
however, a consideration of Frye promotes understanding of Daubert's
role in this setting. First, Daubert itself retains a concern for general ac-
ceptance. Moreover, more states have coped with predictive expertise in
civil commitments using a Frye approach than a Daubert approach.
These states have had difficulty applying Frye, and some have eliminated
Frye entirely as a test for predictive expertise. Finally, the ways in which
the Frye jurisdictions have adapted their standard confirm a central con-
300. But see John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary Admis-
sibility, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 910-15 (200o) (applying the Daubert factors to predictive testi-
mony, and determining that a sound argument for general admissibility exists).
301. Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 56i (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). If the field is found "legitimate,"
the expert's opinion need only fall within the scope of that field and use the principles and methodolo-
gies of that field. Id. The Court completely fails to offer any standard for distinguishing legitimate
from illegitimate fields of inquiry.
302. In re Detention of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d at 619-20. Indeed, this opinion expresses the view that
more scientifically based objections to predictive testimony "went to the weight the evidence should
receive as opposed to the issue of admissibility." Id. at 619.
303. See supra Part I.C (discussing the accommodation of predictive unreliability in the content,
process, and structure of civil commitments).
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tention: that admissibility of expertise requires as much of an assessment
of its fit to a given dispute, as it does of an inquiry into its scientific valid-
ity.
Two states have explicitly applied the "general acceptance" standard
to predictive testimony: Washington and New Jersey. In the leading
Washington case, the proposed patient elicited testimony at trial about
the lack of general acceptance in the relevant community;3" on appeal,
the Washington State Psychiatric Association joined as amicus curiae,
making the same argument." The court disagreed, and affirmed the trial
court's ruling that the evidence was admissible. The court articulated its
long-standing standard for general acceptance, in terms of "whether the
evidence being offered is based on established scientific methodology."'""
The court's reasoning, however, focused on how well-established predic-
tive expertise had become in the courts, rather than in the scientific
community. It noted its earlier acceptance of predictions on constitu-
tional grounds, and repeated the warning that rejecting predictions
would "eviscerate" the civil commitment process.3" In effect, the court
concluded that the strong fit between commitment cases and psychiat-
ric/psychological testimony overcame any unreliability in the predictions:
The sciences of psychology and psychiatry are not novel; they have
been an integral part of the American legal system since its inception.
Although testimony relating to mental illnesses and disorders is not
amenable to the types of precise and verifiable cause and effect rela-
tion petitioners seek, the level of acceptance is sufficient to merit con-
sideration at trial."'
304. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, Ioi6-t8 (Wash. 1993) (affirming admission of psychiatric opinions
predicting dangerousness under Washington's version of the Frye standard). Over a decade earlier,
Washington had ruled that use of psychiatric predictions in civil commitments did not violate due
process standards. In re Harris, 654 P.2d to9, iii (Wash. 1982) (rejecting a due process challenge to
the use of psychiatric predictions to justify civil commitment). Anticipating Barefoot, the Washington
Court found little in the existing law to overturn reliance on predictive expertise on constitutional law.
Id. In its view, psychiatric predictions were central to commitments; rejection of such opinions "would
eviscerate the entire law of involuntary commitment as well as render dubious the numerous other
areas where psychiatry and the law intersect." Id. The Court also noted the relationship between pro-
cedural protections and constitutional adequacy, noting that courts could constrain the risk of error
from predictions "by requiring demonstration of a substantial risk of danger and by imposing proce-
dural safeguards and a heavy burden of proof." Id. To this end, it construed the relevant statute to re-
quire a showing of a "recent overt act" as a prerequisite to a finding of danger. Id. at 1 13. In re Young,
857 P.2d at los6.
305. Id.
306. Id. (quoting State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 507 (Wash. 1993)).
307. In re Young, 857 P.2d at l16-17 (quoting In re Harris, 654 P.2d at it1). It also noted several
legislative enactments which it determined implied an acceptance of psychiatric predictions.
308. In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1017. Later Washington cases have followed Young, both as to clini-
cal predictions, In re Detention of Campbell, 986 P.2d 771, 779 (Wash. 1999) (affirming admission of
predictive expertise in a sex offender case); Pedersen v. State, No. 43031-9-I, 2000 WL 426460, at *5
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In New Jersey, one appellate court applied Frye to actuarial assess-
ments3°9 against the back-drop of a well-developed case law on civil
commitment 3' and a long-standing acceptance of the Frye standard."'
New Jersey courts had long applied Frye to testimony based on the be-
havioral sciences and psychiatry, 2 holding that the proponent of exper-
tise can prove general acceptance through expert testimony,
authoritative scientific and legal writings, or judicial opinions."3
The appellate division in In re Commitment of R.S. undertook a de
novo review of the admissibility of expert evidence based on actuarial as-
(Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2000) (affirming admission, despite renewed claim that the methods were not
generally accepted); State v. In re Detention of Soliz, No. 44127-2-I, 2000 WL 965007, at *12-*13
(Wash. Ct. App. July 3, 2000) (affirming admission, against a claim of unreliability for the lack of actu-
arial methods); and as to the use of actuarial assessments; In re Detention of Thorell, 2000 WL 222815,
at *5-*6 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2000) (affirming admission of the VRAG, the RRASOR, and the
SORAG); In re Detention of Strauss, 20 P.3d 1022, 1025 (Wash. Ct. App. 2ooi) (affirming admission
of actuarial methods). A few of these cases held that questions about the "general acceptance" of the
inferential methods were a matter of weight and not admissibility, and could be accurately assessed by
the finder of fact. See In re Detention of Strauss, 20 P.3d at 1026; Pedersen, 2o00 WL 42646o, at *5:
Soliz, 2000 WL 965007, at *I2-*13.
309. In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 89-95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (affirming
admission of various actuarial assessment instruments). No New Jersey case has explicitly discussed
clinical predictions: many cases permit these without question. Many of these cases express the institu-
tional role argument: "The final determination of dangerousness lies with the courts, not the expertise
of psychiatrists and psychologists. Courts must balance society's interest in protection from harmful
conduct against the individual's interest in personal liberty and autonomy." In re Registrant G.B., 685
A.2d 1252, 1256 (N.J. 1996) (holding admissible expert testimony in a Megan's Law case). See also In
re A.I., 696 A.2d 77, 81-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (affirming high risk designation for peti-
tioner under Megan's Law, despite contrary expert opinion); In re J.L.J., 509 A.2d 184, I86 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (affirming general commitment, despite allegedly unanimous psychiatric
opinion indicating no danger).
310. See State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 296 (N.J. 1975) (setting constitutional minima for civil com-
mitment proceedings). The state also has a sexually violent offender commitment process, N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 30:4-27.24 to -27.38 (West 2003) ("New Jersey Sexually Violence Predator Act" or "SVPA"),
see also John Kip Cornwell et al., The New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act: Analysis and Recom-
mendations for the Treatment of Sexual Offenders in New Jersey, 24 SETON HALL LEolS. J. I, 5-8 (999)
and the original version of Megan's Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to :7-II (West 1999) (the "Registra-
tion Law and Community Notification Law") (requiring registration of known sex offenders, and noti-
fication to any community in which such an offender resides), a process which requires some
predictive testimony.
31l. While it applies Daubert in toxic tort litigation, it uses Frye for all other purposes, both civil
and criminal. State v. Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d 336, 341 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 2000) (noting the displace-
ment of Frye by Daubert in federal courts, but also noting the continued viability of Frye in New Jer-
sey, except for toxic tort litigation): In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 89 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
2001) (noting the same).
312. State v. Fortin, 745 A.2d 509, 513-15 (N.J. 2000) (behavioral expertise subject to Frye stan-
dard); State v. Cavallo, 443 A.2d 1020, 1024 (N.J. 1982) (psychiatric testimony subject to same stan-
dard of admissibility as other expert testimony); State v. Free, 798 A.2d 83, 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
2002) (reversing a court order admitting expert psychiatric testimony on false confessions where trial
court applied a Daubert rather than a Frye standard).
313. State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d 596, 621 (N.J. 1997).
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sessments." 4 Seven witnesses testified about "general acceptance" at
trial, and the parties submitted briefs identifying both scientific literature
and legal precedent for and against the admission of the actuarial instru-
ments in question. As in Washington (and Iowa), the court relied largely
on prior judicial admission of these opinions as an indicator of general
acceptance." 5 Yet its discussion often veered away from general accep-
tance, and focused both on the reliability of the underlying science and
on the utility of the evidence to the dispute.' 6 The court reviewed each
witness's testimony in detail,"7 and noted two primary realities: the con-
stitutional adequacy of predictive opinion;' 8 and the incremental value of
predictions to fact-finding on danger, given its "sufficient reliability.
319
The court held the Frye standard did not require unanimous accep-
tance: "[A] party need not necessarily show there is a unanimous belief
in the absolute infallibility of the techniques that underlie the scientific
314. In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 86 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 2ooi). The court limited its
eventual acceptance of the expertise to cases in which it was used as part of clinical testimony. Id. at
90.
315. Id. at 95-97. The court cited to cases from Washington (discussed in this section), California
(discussed at Part II.A.3 infra), Minnesota and a series of cases which have accepted actuarial assess-
ments "without comment" (both discussed at Part lI.B.2 infra).
316. Id. at 88 ("The sole question, then, is whether actuarial instruments as indicators of sexual
offender recidivism have achieved a state of the art so that an expert's testimony based in part upon
them is sufficiently reliable.").
317. In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d at 76-84. The state offered four witnesses, and R.S. three;
all seven witnesses agreed to a series of propositions: (i) Actuarial assessments were not "psychologi-
cal" tests, in the sense that they did not test a specific personality trait or mental disorder of the re-
spondent, id. at 92; (2) Actuarial assessments serve as tools to assess risk; they rely on static features
the respondent's personality, and identify the risk of reoffense for a group which shares those features,
id. at 77; (3) Thus, actuarial assessments did not in fact predict that the specific respondent would
commit a sexual offense in the feature, but only allowed the inference that someone with characteris-
tics like the respondent's had a specified risk of reoffense, id. at 79-8o; (4) As risk assessment tools,
many but not all of the actuarial instruments at issue had been statistically validated, id. at 78; (5) Fi-
nally, the experts agreed generally as to how the various instruments ranked in order from most to
least statistically valid. Id. at 78-85. The experts disagreed about general acceptance, on the validity of
tests as predictive tools, and also use of these tools as aids to judicial fact-finding. Id.
318. Id. at 89-91. The court reviewed Barefoot's constitutional approval of clinically-based predic-
tions, noting that the case had approved clinical predictions, and stating that, given this, it would cer-
tainly have approved actuarial assessments. The court also noted that prior New Jersey precedent had
approved as "reliable" or "helpful" the scale for assessing risk embedded in New Jersey's Megan's
Law (the RRAS), which all of the experts in this case had agreed to be the least validated form of risk
assessment tool. "Since the RRAS satisfied the requirements of due process and fundamental fair-
ness .... we conclude it also satisfies these constitutional elements in the present matter." Id. at 88.
319. Id. at 91. The court saw sufficient reliability as heavily dependent on the "context of the pro-
ceedings involved," id. (quoting State v. Cavallo, 443 A.2d 1020, 1o26 (N.J. 1982)), and determined
that the expert testimony in instant case supported a conclusion of reliability: "The extensive expert
testimony ... concerning validation studies, cross-validation studies, reliability studies, correlation co-
efficients, and clinically-derived factors attests to such reliability in this context, where the actuarials
are not used as the sole or free-standing determinants for civil commitment." Id.
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evidence.... [The proponent must show] that.., the relevant scientific
community widely, but perhaps not unanimously, accepts [the technique]
as reliable.""32 The court narrowed its definition of the relevant commu-
nity primarily to authors of articles favorable to actuarial assessments.32 '
It rejected articles offered by the defendant by discounting the credibility
and weight which the court would ascribe to the authors' conclusions.3"'
New Jersey precedent, in its view, did not require "a specific number of
articles to satisfy the test of general acceptance."3 '3 All it sought was "a
consensus of acceptance," which the court found in the existence of many
"serious" articles, in listings of workshops, and in the availability of
sources on the Internet.3 4
In re Commitment of R.S. reflects the only published de novo deci-
sion on the facts underlying admission of predictive testimony.33 To its
credit, the opinion offers a fairly clear explication of the statistical and
inferential validity of actuarial tools. It does an adequate job of applying
Daubert's reliability concerns to predictive testimony. But it said that it
applied Frye; and as a Frye analysis, the case distorts the controlling
standard, and illustrates three primary weaknesses of applying Frye to
expertise as disputed as predictive opinion:
(i) Degree of professional acceptance. The New Jersey court
played with numbers by limiting its pool of favorable arti-
cles and by padding its numbers with references to work-
shops and Internet citations. The court did not explain
why it chose one pool of consensus and rejected others.
320. Id. at 89.
321. Id. at 92-93. The court's narrow focus on articles submitted by the parties is, of course, a natu-
ral and reasonable outgrowth of the adversarial system. At the same time, it seems a flaw in the Frye
standard, as applied to scientific literature, to rest an assessment of that literature on the capacities and
resources of the parties to such proceedings.
322. For example, as to one of the respondent's articles, the court formed an "impression... that
while the author has extensive experience testifying as an expert witness in commitment hearings, he
has little experience actually developing or testing risk assessment techniques." Id. at 94. As another
example, the Court used a single article written by one of the respondent's witnesses, Dr. Randy Otto.
as a means of rebutting the weight to be ascribed to that witness' own testimony. Id. at 93.
323. Id. at 94.
324. id. at 94-95.
325. Despite its limits, the case strongly influenced the Iowa appellate court to reverse course
completely, from excluding actuarial assessments as unreliable science to affirming their admission as
sufficient for judicial purposes. See In re Detention of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 619 (Iowa Ct. App.
2002) (discussed in Part II.A.2 supra). The only other state to have applied Frye directly, predictive
opinions came without discussion under Frye. State v. Villeza, 942 P.2d 522, 538 (Haw. 1997) (holding
expert psychiatric predictions of danger admissible in civil commitment case, without any Frye analy-
sis). Hawaii uses a Frye standard, see State v. Montalbo, 828 P.2d 1274, 1279-81 (Haw. 1992), but the
court in Villeza did not apply the "general acceptance" standard. 942 P.2d at 538. Instead, it held that,
in reaching an opinion, the expert used materials "reasonably relied upon by experts in the field of
clinical psychology ...." Id.
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(2) General acceptance for forensic purposes. The New Jersey
court noted the frequency with which actuarial assess-
ments are used for purposes of "screening" or for "risk as-
sessment" decisions during treatment; but pure actuarial
assessment in fact reflects a small portion of predictive ex-
pertise.326 The court did not explain how and why it chose
to accept a particular usage as persuasive."'
(3) Strength of professional disagreement. The New Jersey
court referred frequently to its chosen community as "pro-
fessionals who assess sex offenders for risks of reof-
fense";32s but the court narrowed the pool to only those
experts who favor their own expertise.3"9 The court offered
no rationale for this narrowing.
The general acceptance standard seems inadequate where deep divi-
sions about a given expertise exist in the expert community. One might
expect that Frye might require exclusion in such a case. But the New Jer-
sey and Washington cases do the opposite. They transform the Frye
standard into something very much like a "sufficient reliability" test,
which focuses most notably on the mild but distinct incremental helpful-
ness of these opinions to the fact-finding process. The concerns expressed
in these cases parallel the approach of the Daubert courts; they in effect
balance reliability and fit under the guise of a "sufficient reliability" test.
326. See supra note 122 (citing an acknowledgment that the vast majority of assessments of danger
occur clinically, and that few assessors use purely actuarial methods).
327. More specifically, a court would assess whether all persons engaged in the particular practices
(e.g., danger assessments) use such assessments; to determine the entire range of opinion within the
whole group; and to justify explicitly why one group's opinion has been selected as "acceptance" over
another.
328. See, e.g., In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 200t).
329. Two variations of this approach are plausible: either explicitly to describe the "particular
field" as including only proponents of the particular science; or to define the field using definitions
unrelated to the science, but in such a way as to include only proponents of the science. Both are logi-
cally flawed, explicitly results-oriented, and inconsistent with a general acceptance standard. See
Donna Cropp Bechman, Sex Offender Civil Commitments: Scientists or Psychics?, 16 CRIM. JUST. 24,31
(2001) ("the 'relevant scientific community' for purposes of analyzing [actuarial instruments] under
Frye or Daubert is not only comprised of the clinicians who administer the instruments...").
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3. Exempting Predictive Expertise
Many states use neither Daubert nor Frye's general acceptance stan-
dard to gauge the admissibility of expert testimony.33 ° Indeed, many
states explicitly exempt predictive expertise from any special testing,33'
applying instead other rules on expert testimony and standard tests for
relevance. This section first discusses the rationale for exempting predic-
tive expertise, and then assesses how it might fare under traditional rele-
vance analysis.
Many Frye states apply the test to "novel scientific evidence," but
exempt certain categories of expertise from the Frye standard, notably
medical or psychiatric expertise. For example, Calfornia courts have
carved out an exemption from the state's Frye test332 for medical and psy-
chiatric testimony. While expertise generally creates a false "aura of cer-
tainty" that might overly influence a fact-finder,333 the concerns do not
apply to a medical or psychiatric expert. Rather, "jurors may temper
their acceptance of his [sic] testimony with a healthy skepticism born of
330. Some states have adopted neither Daubert nor Frye, but have instead chosen their own dis-
tinct standard for assessing the admissibility of expert testimony. See, e.g., Harper v. State, 292 S.E.2d
389, 395 (1982) (affirming exclusion of "truth serum" medication; standard for admitting novel scien-
tific testimony is "whether the procedure or technique in question has reached a scientific stage of
verifiable certainty, or ... whether the procedure 'rests upon the laws of nature'). No state has yet
applied such a state-specific test to predictive expertise.
One might also argue that the rationales of such cases as In re Detention of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d
613 (Iowa App. 2002), or In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), cre-
ate what are in effect new state standards that do not comply rigorously with the mandates of
Daubert (in Iowa) or Frye (in New Jersey). Yet these cases are more accurately seen as adjustments
(or distortions) of the relevant standards, rather than as entirely new standards.
33I. Kumho Tire extended Daubert to all types of expertise; if applied in all Daubert jurisdictions,
this approach eliminates any exemption for predictive expertise. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing
Kumho Tire's clarification that Daubert's holding applies to "scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge").
332. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1976) (reversing admission of testimony based on spectro-
graphic voiceprint analysis, and affirming Frye as the prevailing test for 'novel' scientific evidence).
The California Supreme Court has specifically retained its test and rejected Daubert as unpersuasive.
People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 331 (Cal. 1994) (rejecting Daubert and reaffirming Kelly/Frye as the
controlling standard). In Leahy, the court responded to criticism of Frye by reasserting its rationale
from Kelly, and by noting some purported advantages of Frye over Daubert: the outsourcing of estab-
lishing new scientific procedures from the courtroom to the laboratory; the ability of trial courts to
avoid de novo review each time expertise appears; and finally, the availability of "a battery of well-
qualified scientific and medical personnel" as witnesses. Id at 327-30. The opinion stresses the pre-
sumed inexperience of trial judges in assessing scientific principles, id. at 331, and clarified the unanim-
ity required for general acceptance: "the views of a typical cross-section of the scientific community,
including representatives, if there are such, of those who oppose or question the new technique." Id. at
336 (citing Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1248).
333. See Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1245.
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their knowledge that all human beings are fallible." '334 Thus, Frye does
not apply "even when the witness is a psychiatrist and the subject matter
is as esoteric as the reconstitution of a past state of mind or the predic-
tion of future dangerousness .... .""'
California courts have exempted predictive testimony from the Frye
test virtually without dissent.136 Non-evidentiary cases offer no barrier to
predictive expertise,337 and evidentiary cases repeatedly confirm the ex-
emption of psychiatric predictions from Frye. For example, in People v.
Ward, the defendant in a sexually violent predator commitment proceed-
ing argued that clinical predictions lacked general acceptance."'s The
334. People v. McDonald, 69o P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1984) (reversing a conviction where trial court
excluded psychiatric testimony on the fallibility of eyewitness identification).
335. Id. While California courts have uniformly admitted predictive expertise, they have reached
disparate results for other uses of psychiatric testimony. For example, in People v. Stoll, the California
Supreme Court affirmed the admission of expert testimony offering a diagnosis of defendant's mental
illness, to support the inference that defendant could not have acted as charged. People v. Stoll,
783 P.2d 698, 710 (Cal. 1989). The court held that the testimony satisfied the exemption because it con-
tained nothing which might unduly prejudice the jury with an unwarranted aura of certainty. Id. The
Court found the uncertainty of such diagnoses (which combined clinical and psychometric assess-
ments) untroubling: "[T]his process is a learned professional art, rather than the purported exact "sci-
ence" with which Kelly/Frye is concerned ..." Id. Contra People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 301 (Cal.
1984) (applying KellylFrye to exclude expert testimony concerning child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome); People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1383-84 (Cal. t982) (applying Kelly/Frye to exclude post-
hypnotic testimony of a hypnotised witness).
336. See People v. Murtishaw, 631 P.2d 446, 471 (Cal. I98i) (reversing death sentence due to im-
proper admission of predictive testimony by a psychopharmacologist). The Court in Murtishaw did not
apply Kelly/Frye, but excluded the predictions because the probative value of "unreliable predictions"
was outweighed by its substantial prejudicial impact. Id. at 470-71. See infra notes 358-61 and accom-
panying text (discussing relevance analysis of predictive expertise). Indeed, the court specifically dis-
tinguished civil commitments from death penalty cases:
In most of the other cases in which courts have upheld admission of opinion testimony fore-
casting future violence ... the trier of fact is required by statute to determine whether a per-
son is "dangerous ...." In such cases expert prediction, unreliable though it may be, is often
the only evidence available to assist the trier of fact.
Id. at 469.
337. Neither constitutional nor procedural rules required the exclusion of predictive expertise.
People v. Bennett, 182 Cal. Rptr. 473, 478 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming the use of expert predictive
testimony without reference to Kelly or Frye); People v. Henderson, 166 Cal. Rptr. 20, 27 (Cal. Ct.
App. i98o) (affirming admission of expert testimony on danger in a sexual offender commitment
case); People v. Mapp, 198 Cal. Rptr. 177, 181-82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming continued commit-
ment, and noting the centrality of expert predictions of danger in commitment cases); People v. Super.
Ct. (Blakely), 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 388, 398 (Cal. Ct. App, 1997) (remanding case for trial on state's claim
for continued commitment: "the instant statutory scheme contemplates that in said proceeding, the
trier of fact shall be aided by the expert testimony of psychologists or psychiatrists"). These non-
evidentiary cases created the procedural and substantive context within which the imperfections of
predictive testimony could survive. See Henderson, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 27 ("Although admittedly those
techniques do not produce certainty, the significance of this failure to meet an ideal of perfection is a
consideration for the trier of fact in weighing the effect of the testimony.")
338. People v. Ward, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming the admission of
clinical predictions of future dangerous sexual conduct).
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court disagreed and distinguished predictive testimony from evidence
"involving novel devices or processes" and expert medical testimony.339 It
stressed that, "in civil commitment cases, where the trier of fact is re-
quired by statute to determine whether a person is dangerous or likely to
be dangerous, expert prediction may be the only evidence available.""34
California courts have reached the same result in evaluating actuar-
ial assessments. In Garcetti v. Superior Court, the trial court had excluded
an actuarial assessment tool used as the basis for expert's prediction in a
sexually violent predator case. 34' The appellate court reversed, noting the
long-held exemption for opinions by doctors and psychiatrists, and ex-
tended the exemption to the methods used by experts in formulating
their predictions. The court reasoned that "it does not matter if the psy-
chiatrist used clinical or actuarial models or even whether the psychiatrist
followed the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual published by the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, since experts are not restricted to one meth-
odology or another in rendering predictions on future dangerousness. 342
Holding that the exemption from Frye applied, the court was remarkably
unconcerned with the weaknesses of expert predictions. "[I]t is of no
consequence," the court wrote, "if a difference of opinion exists among
professionals relating to which methodology should be utilized.... It is
also of no consequence that the reliability of the instrument being right is
only 70 percent according to validity or accuracy rates.
343
339. Id. (citing People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698, 712 (Cal. 1989) (psychiatric prediction is art, not sci-
ence)).
340. Indeed, at least a few cases have suggested that expert psychatric predictions are not only the
only evidence, but legally required and even legally sufficient in their own right to sustain a commit-
ment order. See, e.g., People v. Devers, No. Ao95661, 2002 WL 724931, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25,
2002).
341. Garcetti v. Super. Ct., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 216-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
342. Id. at 238.
343. Id. Later cases follow this result. In People v. Woods, No. Co372o3, 2001 WL 1649216, at *5-
*8 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2001), an appellate court reviewed admission of two actuarial assessment
tools (the "RRASOR" and the "Static 99"). The court noted that the instruments had been used as
part of a clinical assessment; each was "merely the starting point in the expert's analy-
sis... [and] ... not an infallible prediction of the likelihood to reoffend." Id. at *6. The court held that,
since "[b]oth experts testified the assessment instruments used were imperfect predictive tools, and
that other factors were also considered in reaching an opinion," the exemption from Kelly / Frye still
applied. See also People v. Hayes, No. Ao93285, 2002 WL 462277, at *5-*6 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26,
2002) (affirming admission of an actuarial assessment tool "Static 99" when used as part of a clinical
assessment).
But see People v. Williams, No. Do35886, 2001 WL 1464186, at *4-*7 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov 19,
2OOl) (applying Kelly to an actuarial assessment tool (HCR 2o) and determining that the tool was
"generally accepted"). Williams made no mention of the exemption; the only California decision to
apply the traditional test to any part of a predictive opinion, the case appears to be an anomaly.
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A similar approach to exempting predictive expertise appears in
Arizona, another pro-Frye'44 and anti-Daubert state.34 As the Arizona
Supreme Court explained in Logerquist v. McVey:
Frye is inapplicable when a qualified witness offers relevant testimony
or conclusions based on experience and observation about human be-
havior for the purpose of explaining that behavior....
... [E]xpert evidence based on a qualified witness' own experience,
observation, and study is treated differently from opinion evidence
based on novel scientific principles advanced by others46
The Arizona court thus distinguished opinions resting on the ex-
pert's own experience, observation, and study from opinions based on
principles advanced by others and applied by the expert to the facts of
the relevant case.347 The court stated that any disagreement in the rele-
vant community went to weight, and not to admissibility.348 The court did
344. State v. Valdez, 371 P.2d 894, 898 (Ariz. 1962) (excluding polygraph evidence due to lack of
general acceptance). Note that, unlike California, Arizona uses an evidentiary code closely patterned
after the Federal Rules. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. EVID. 702.
345. Logerquist v. McVey, I P.3d 113, 133-34 (Ariz. 2000) (reversing a trial court's application of
the Frye test to exclude psychiatric testimony in support of a claim of repressed memory of sexual
abuse). The Arizona Supreme Court had deferred until 2000 the decision whether to incorporate the
new federal standard. See State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1183 (Ariz. 1993) (reserving decision on the
adoption of Daubert, given the number of unresolved questions about its application); State v. John-
son, 922 P.2d 294, 296 (Ariz. 1996) (same: "The federal courts have not yet had a fair opportunity to
apply Daubert; thus it is too early to properly evaluate it."). It criticized Daubert for what it described
as an unwarranted shift of decision-making authority from the jury to the trial judge, enabling trial
judges to substitute their judgment about the reliability (and even the credibility) of expertise for that
of the jury. Logerquist, I P.3d at 130-32. It also noted: the relative inexperience of trial judges in as-
sessing scientific reliability, id. at 129; the burdensome, time-consuming nature of pre-trial hearings in
a Kumho regime, id., and the likelihood that Daubert would produce more arbitrary results, thus more
uncertainty than the Frye standard, id. at 125.
346. Logerquist, i P.3d at 123.
347. Id. A later Arizona court would refer to this distinction as a distinction between inductive and
deductive reasoning. State ex rel. Romley v. Fields, 35 P.3d 82, 88 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2ooi) ("the induc-
tive-deductive dichotomy in Logerquist"). In Logerquist, the court relied both on California precedent,
and on a range of Arizona cases, including: State v. Lindsey, 720 P.2d 73, 77 (Ariz. 1986) (behavior
patterns of incest victims: Frye not applicable, evidence admitted); State v. Roscoe, 700 P.2d 1312,
1319-20 (Ariz. 1984) (dog handler's interpretation of tracking dog's scent identification: Frye not ap-
plicable, evidence admitted); State v. Varela, 873 P.2d 657, 663-64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome: Frye not applicable, evidence admitted); State v. Tucker, 798 P.2d
1349, 1355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 199o ) (behavior of child molesters and victims generally: Frye not applica-
ble, evidence admitted). Logerquist, i P.3 d at 119-21. With these, the Court contrasted State v. Hum-
mert, 933 P.2d. 1187, II92-93 (Ariz. 1997) (statistical assessments of probabilities derived from DNA
statistics: Frye applicable, evidence excluded).
348. Logerquist, I P.3d at 124.
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not address predictive testimony, although it did allude to the unreliabil-
ity of expert predictions in arguing against the adoption of Daubert.349
The distinction between the expert's own observation and the ex-
pert's interpretation of separately derived data creates a possible diffi-
culty for actuarial assessments. Barely eighteen months after Logerquist,
an Arizona court faced exactly that challenge.350 The trial court relied on
Logerquist's distinction to exclude testimony based on actuarial assess-
ments, which contained "data derived by a technique or principle devel-
oped by others."35' The appellate court reversed. It noted that the lower
court's reliance on Logerquist was understandable, but found its reliance
too mechanical. Logerquist's holding applied to any expert behavioral
evidence.352 Actuarial assessments did not have "an aura of infallibil-
ity ... they are subject to interpretation and their predictive value is far
less than ioo%. In addition, the testifying expert must still explain to the
fact-finder why he or she believes that a particular individual will likely
re-offend or not re-offend.
'353
Only California and Arizona have explicitly exempted expert psy-
chiatric predictions of danger from special testing under a Frye- or
Daubert-like analysis.354 But few cases in any state impose special stan-
dards on the admissibility of expert predictive testimony in commitment
cases; indeed, few discuss admissibility at all. Including California and
Arizona, only seven states have articulated rationales for the handling of
349. Id. at 126. The court assumed that Daubert would exclude predictive testimony. and saw that
result as in conflict with the Supreme Court's approval of psychiatric predictions in Barefoot. Id. at
126-27. How, the Arizona court asked, could the Supreme Court's acceptance of predictive expertise
in the constitutional case square with its new evidentiary standard of scientific reliability? ld. at 127.
The Arizona court speculated that perhaps the Supreme Court might apply different standards in civil
and criminal cases, or perhaps the Supreme Court "had reason to see things differently in the ten years
that elapsed between Barefoot and Kumho." Id. See also Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to
Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double Error, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 753 (1998), cited in Logerquist, i
P.3d at 127.
350. State ex rel. Romley v. Fields, 35 P.3d 82, 88 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that Frye did not
apply to clinical testimony based on actuarial assessments of future sexually dangerous behavior). The
case arose after "[diozens of individuals ... filed motions requesting Frye hearings to contest the ad-
missibility of expert opinion testimony on recidivism based on actuarial instruments in SVPA hear-
ings." Id. at 84.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 88 (citing People v. Ward, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Stoll, 783
P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989)).
353. Romley, 35 P.3d at 89.
354. A Florida appellate court has also noted (in dicta) that it would also have exempted predic-
tive testimony Frye. Westerheide v. State, 767 So. 2d 637, 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (Frye claim
concerning clinical predictions withdrawn before appeal), case resolved on other grounds, 831 So. 2d
93. 112 (Fla. 2002). Interestingly, the lower court noted that actuarial assessments "may very well be
subject to a Frye analysis." Id.
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expert predictive testimony;... all other state cases that discuss predictive
testimony use rationales unrelated to its admissibility."56 Traditional evi-
dentiary analysis would identify two sources of additional challenges:
other provisions of the rules for expert testimony, and standard screening
for relevance.357
A good example of the latter appears in a Colorado decision,"' in
which the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed admission of predictive ex-
pertise using standard screening for relevance and prejudicial impact.359
355. The four states already discussed also include Texas and Iowa (Daubert), and Washington and
New Jersey (Frye). See infra notes 358-61 and accompanying text (discussing the last state, Colorado.)
356. See cases cited supra under Part I.C (discussing the impact and influence of psychiatric testi-
mony on civil commitment proceedings). How should one interpret the dearth of case law on point?
Why have advocates mounted so few sustained challenges on evidentiary grounds, especially given the
persistent scholarly and psychiatric criticism of predictive testimony? To be sure, advocates may prefer
to use the academic criticism to contest its weight, or even to offer contradictory testimony, hoping to
dilute the persuasive impact of predictive testimony with their own conflicting expertise.
It also seems plausible that Barefoot has had a suppressing effect on both trial courts and practi-
tioners. We have seen in this and preceding subsections how often courts have referenced Barefoot's
constitutional accommodation of predictive expertise. See infra Part II.C.i (discussing the admissibility
of predictive testimony under due process standards).
It seems less plausible to assume that only these six states (and a handful of others) have admit-
ted predictive testimony in commitment cases, while all others have excluded them. Not only is this
inconsistent with the reasoning of the cited cases, and with Barefoot; it also seems inconsistent with the
central role that predictive testimony plays in the commitment process.
357. See Logerquist v. McVey, I P.3d 113, 132 (Ariz. 2000). The court there said:
The Rules of Evidence, and Rule 702 itself, erect barriers to admission of all opinion evi-
dence: the evidence must be relevant, the witness must be qualified, and the evidence must
be the kind that will assist that jury.
[T]he rules also permit trial judges to reject even relevant evidence that meets the Rule
702 test if the probative value is "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion.., or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time ... " ARIZ. R. Evi. 403.
Id. (citations omitted); State ex rel. Romley v. Fields, 35 P-3 d 82, 89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (following
Logerquiest and citing Arizona Rules 702, 703 and 403 as baseline tests for admissibility of predictive
testimony). See also infra Part II.B (discussing traditional challenges to expert qualifications).
358. Vialpando v. People, 727 P.2d IO9O, 1093-96 (Colo. 1986) (reversing the exclusion of the peti-
tioner's expert witnesses using a traditional evidentiary analysis). The trial court in this case had ex-
cluded witnesses offered by the petitioner for release from a criminal commitment, despite the fact
that he had allowed the prosecution to offer witnesses testifying to the petitioner's future dangerous-
ness. The Court made no mention of Frye, although Colorado uses that standard, Fishback v. People,
85i P.2d 884, 89o (Colo. 1993) (affirming Colorado's use of the Frye standard), and recognizes an ex-
emption from Frye for "social science or experienced-based opinions," Schultz v. Wells, 13 P.3d 846,
849 (Colo. App. 2000) (accident reconstruction evidence: Frye not applicable, evidence excluded), cit-
ing Brooks v. People, 975 P.2d 1105, 1115 (Colo. 1999) (interpretation of dog-tracking evidence: Frye
not applicable, evidence admitted) citing cases on either side of the distinction, Schultz, 13 P.3 d at 849-
50.
359. Vialpando, 727 P.2d at 1094 ("whether... the proffered evidence relates to a fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action.. . whether ... the proffered evidence makes the exis-
tence ... [of that fact] more probable or less probable .... [and] whether.., the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury"), citing COLO. R. EvID. 401-403. See also FEo. R. EVID. 401-403.
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The predictive testimony satisfied this screening: "[T]he potential dan-
gerousness of a defendant is a critical element .... The proferred evi-
dence tended to make the existence of a 'fact of consequence to the
determination of the action'-the absence of future dangerousness-
more probable with the evidence than without it."3  Weighing probative
value against potential prejudicial impact, the court noted the centrality
of the danger issue, the conflict in testimony between experts, and the
presence (in the excluded testimony) of "foundational" information that
the jury could use to assess all of the expertise.
Does predictive testimony really require expertise? If behavioral
evidence lacks any "aura of certainty," the fact-finder can evaluate its
content in light of his or her own experience, and lay testimony on the
topic should be admissible. Such an approach would eliminate even the
standard testing for credentials and basis imposed by most jurisdictions
on expert testimony, and leave only relevance testing.52 But no jurisdic-
tion has approved lay predictions of danger to the exclusion of expert
testimony. At best, courts have indicated that, as a matter of evidentiary
sufficiency, commitment courts may rely on lay opinion and discount ex-
pert testimony on danger."63 None go so far as to approve a lay witness'
opinion about prospective danger. Given the persuasive and functional
360. Id. at 1095.
361. Id. at IO96. The unfairness of excluding the patient's experts while admitting the state's had a
strong influence on the court in Vialpando. One might construct an argument that the probative dan-
gers of expert predictive testimony substantially outweighs its probative value. The unreliability of
predictive testimony should severely reduce its probative value under a 403 analysis; moreover, the
certainty with which predictions can be phrased, coupled with the potential confusion arising from im-
precise use of actuarial assessments, pose strong probative dangers. Yet no case has excluded predic-
tive testimony from civil commitment on these grounds; and the very centrality of the danger issue in
commitments, coupled with the difficulty of predicting danger generally, may well counterbalance the
probative risks of such testimony. See People v. Murtishaw, 631 P.2d 446, 469 (Cal. i98i) (excluding
predictive expertise from the sentencing phase of capital cases, but distinguishing civil commitments
on these grounds).
362. At the same time, many of the functional advantages of expert testimony would disappear.
See supra Part I.A. (discussing differences between lay and expert testimony).
363. See Hill v. State, 358 So. 2d i9o, 2o6-o9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (discussing the balance be-
tween lay and expert testimony in commitment cases, and indicating that since "psychiatrists' predic-
tions of future dangerousness are increasingly subject to doubt, ... lay testimony on an issue may be
more weighty than that of experts"); People v. Hockenberry, No. Ao9 5 277 , 2002 WL 1000075, at *2-*3
(Cal. Ct. App. May 16, 2002) (affirming admission of testimony about future danger from an individual
who was neither a psychiatrist or a psychologist); People v. Sword, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81o, 819 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994) (affirming a determination of dangerousness in the absence of any expert psychiatric tes-
timony on danger); In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 898 (D.C. i99i) (affirming the admission of expert
testimony on danger despite defendant's challenge to the experts' qualifications because "there is
nothing inherently unattainable [even] about a [lay judicial officer's] prediction of future criminal con-
duct for purposes of preventive detention") (internal quotations omitted). All of these cases affirm the
sufficiency of lay observation testimony to support a trial determination of danger; none explicitly ap-
prove admission of lay testimony on danger.
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advantages of expert testimony, it seems unlikely that any advocate
would choose to try.
In conclusion, exempting predictive expertise from special testing
under Frye seems puzzling at best. It rests on an untested, probably
untestable empirical assertion: that expert testimony about behavioral
matters lacks "the aura of authority" for a fact-finder that justifies any
special testing. To exempt strongly controversial expertise from Frye's
focus on general acceptance also seems questionable.
Yet exemption offers two useful insights into the evidentiary prob-
lems posed by predictive expertise. Predictive testimony may lack "gen-
eral acceptance," or for that matter, "scientific reliability," and that
failure may justify exclusion. Yet predictions can never be made with cer-
tainty; predictive testimony may thus never attain "general acceptance"
or "scientific validation." Faced with a legal mandate to decide danger,
courts will admit whatever help they can, and adjust or make exceptions
to evidentiary rules where useful information does not and cannot satisfy
their requirements. While doctrinally questionable, this approach has
strong pragmatic appeal, one which underlies not only the exemptions
from Frye but also the "fit" component of Daubert.
Second, these courts contend that fact-finders can assess the weak-
nesses of behavioral testimony, and that objections about reliability go to
weight, not to admissibility. These contentions may express a deeper in-
sight: that the inferential processes through which "experts" predict dan-
ger parallel the mental process through which fact-finders reach a finding
of dangerousness. Fact-finders and experts alike must draw inferences
from history, testimony, first-hand exposure, and specialized inference
(some of it statistical) to reach conclusions about danger. In exempting
predictive testimony, these courts essentially accept a kinship with the
predictive experts, which permits courts to adapt the expertise to the dif-
ficult exercise of decision-making in this context.
B. FIT AND RELIABILITY OF EXPERT PREDICTIONS IN CIVIL COMMITMENTS
The preceding sections argue that every court that has accepted pre-
dictive expertise has either distorted or refused to apply stated eviden-
tiary standards. One might well end the analysis here, and chalk up the
results to the courts' desire to protect the public from violent, mentally ill
people. Such capitulation to a desired result, however, seems both ill-
advised and unnecessary. A richer understanding of the Daubert stan-
dard permits the construction of a coherent rationale for admitting pre-
dictive expertise, without abandoning the rule of law. This reassessment
focuses on the twin concerns of fit and reliability, and articulates a fuller
content for each. To limit reliability to purely scientific validation, and to
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equate fit with baseline logical relevance raises severe problems with any
opinion that lacks (aad which is likely always to lack) validation by scien-
tific method. It thus seems appropriate to ask whether fit and reliability
mean something more complex than simple relevance and scientific va-
lidity.
The notion of fit includes logical relevance; but this Article has al-
ready suggested that "fit" entails other questions: (i) the degree to which
courts have accommodated concerns over the expertise within the struc-
ture and content of the relevant legal process; (2) the degree to which the
particular expertise supplements and eases the inherent difficulty of fact-
finding on an issue; (3) the prevalence of the particular expertise within
the relevant process; and (4) the similarity of the inferential process em-
bodied in the opinion to the inferential processes required for fact-
finding.64 Where answers to these questions indicate strong fit for a given
expertise, fit may then counter reliability and overcome concerns about
scientific validity.
Reliability also means something different and broader than scien-
tific validity. Expertise must use "the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice.., in the relevant field, ' 6 but that does not
mean that a court must use the same methods, or apply them to the same
purpose. Instead, it means that the ideas, methods, and application em-
bodied in the opinion must be sufficiently reliable for use in the court-
room. Trial courts may adjust the standards of validity scientists might
use to the quite different standards that apply in deciding hard cases with
limited data and limited time.
The richer notion of "fit" and the dispute-oriented definition of reli-
ability explain and justify the courts' approaches to predictive testimony.
The next subsections explore these standards in the context first of pre-
dictive opinions, and then of actuarial assessments.366
364. See supra Part I.C (articulating different ways in which predictive testimony fits with civil
commitment process).
365. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1997).
366. These sections also discuss briefly, and in passing, the challenges facing courts which continue
to adhere to Frye.
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i. Clinical Predictions
Clinical predictions satisfy Daubert's fit requirement in a special, and
perhaps even unique way in civil commitment proceedings . 6 In this set-
ting, courts (and legislatures) have accommodated concerns with expert
unreliability in numerous ways: through the development of constitu-
tional standards, heightened burdens of proof, special rules of suffi-
ciency, and the patterning of evidence. Acknowledging the pervasive
distrust of predictive expertise, courts have nonetheless noted its incre-
mental utility in carrying out the fundamentally impossible task of pre-
cise prediction. Clinical decision-makers and judgments permeate the
legal process for commitment-at initiation, in testimony, in treatment,
and in termination phases. Courts have skeptically, but persistently, used
predictive opinions as a touchstone in the shaping of the commitment
process.
Clinical assessments also have a strong affinity with judicial fact-
finding on danger. Clinicians assess danger through in-person contact
and appraisal of the individual, documentary review, reconstruction of
patient history, and even (these days) statistical assessments. Clinicians
use this pool of information to reference prior experience with similar
cases, to identify and constrain intuitive and subjective judgments, and to
formulate predictions of whether the individual will become dangerous.
This description applies with equal force to judicial fact-finders. Courts
have on occasion attempted to articulate the mix of information that they
require in reaching the legal conclusion of danger,""' even using terms
that parallel clinical assessments. It thus should come as no surprise that
courts find nothing novel or foreign in clinical assessments, or that they
believe that fact-finders are able to assess the reliability of the inferences
that clinical predictions invite.
However unreliable clinical predictions may be as a science, they
have sufficient minimal reliability to satisfy Daubert's dispute-oriented
reliability standard. To be sure, no one can articulate exactly how a clini-
cal expert will reach a conclusion on danger. This reality results in part
from the mix of different kinds of data; and in part from the different
kinds of reasoning, including intuition, that predictions require. Yet the
constitutional minima of civil commitments permit-indeed require-
predictions, 369 and the courts have fashioned a process that accommo-
dates this mandate by assuring both a broad pool of information and am-
367. This paragraph summarizes conclusions reached through more thorough analysis in Part I.C.,
supra.
368. See supra Part 1.C.3 (discussing complex fact-finding as a method to make predictions in civil
commitments).
369. See supra Part I.C.i (describing the constitutional requirement of mental illness and danger).
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pie help from those with specialized insight. Formed through a process
virtually identical to fact-finding, and applied in a context designed to ac-
commodate its weaknesses, expert clinical predictions satisfy Daubert's
minimal standards of reliability.
370
To say these things, however, is not to advocate a per se rule of ad-
mission for clinical expertise. Proponents should use well-qualified ex-
perts, with backgrounds that reveal some experience in clinical
assessment of danger.37" ' Experts should come prepared to acknowledge
the weaknesses in the inferences underlying a given opinion. They should
identify and distinguish among the different data and methods used in
formulating the opinion. Where the opinion rests solely on intuition or
guesswork, or fails to account for conflicting data, or ignores ambiguities
or uncertainties, or substitutes bias for informed and skilled assessment,
opponents should attack. Trial courts should exclude testimony that does
not rise to a minimal level of utility for dispute resolution purposes, and
even where it does, should exclude such evidence when it introduces
prejudicial or confusing content.37 If a proponent can overcome these
370. States using a Frye standard to assess clinical predictions face a more difficult justification.
Strict application of Frye to clinical predictions should lead to exclusion. Few if any scientists would
testify that clinical predictions have "general acceptance." See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 88o, 920-
21 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1017 (Wash. 1993). Courts have either
used a severely distorted version of general acceptance, including reliability and familiarity as factors,
supra Part II.A.2, or by exempting clinical predictions entirely from the demands of Frye. See, e.g.,
People v. Ward, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 832 (Cal. App. 1999) (affirming the admission of clinical predic-
tions of future dangerous sexual conduct); supra Part II.A.3. In other words, there is nothing in the
strict logic of "general acceptance" which would permit the admission of predictive expertise. Frye
courts should thus exempt it from Frye testing, relying on the test's traditional limitation to "novel"
scientific evidence. Given the deep intertwining of predictive opinion with commitment process, this
expertise arguably seems less "novel" than, say, actuarial assessments.
371. The assurance provided by experience relates to one of the analytical processes underlying
clinical expertise: the ability to compare a specific pool of data for one person to comparable pools of
data gathered while assessing others. In essence, this process replicates informally what actuarial as-
sessments seek to do with statistical formality: compare the individual to a group of other similar indi-
viduals, and draw inferences about the individual from that comparison. As Grove and Meehl put it:
the clinician ... attempts to do a subjective, impressionistic, in-the-head job of actuarial
computation .... [T]he clinician's brain is functioning as merely a poor substitute for an ex-
plicit regression equation or actuarial table. Humans simply cannot assign optimal weights
to variables, and they are not consistent in applying their own weights.
Grove & Meehl, supra note 76, at 315. The description (and critique) applies with equal force to judi-
cial fact-finders, with the difference that fact-finders have the societal mandate to engage in precisely
such an analysis.
372. Phrased more technically, the opponent of psychiatric predictions should challenge both on
FED. R. EVID. 702 grounds (as interpreted by Daubert) and on FED. R. EVID. 403 grounds (relating to
the balance of probative value and prejudicial effect). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to as-
sess the relationship between the two rules, I contend that the 702 analysis adds a layer of assessment
distinct from and additional to that imposed by FED. R. EVID. 403. Daubert relates specifically to ex-
pert opinion: the drawing of inferences from complex data; the use of scientific or other specialized
methods to organize and structure both data and inference: and the special influence that such inferen-
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challenges, however, the joint fit-reliability standard within Daubert pro-
vides ample ground for admitting clinical predictions.
2. Fit and Reliability for Actuarial Assessments
Actuarial assessments prompt a different dynamic balancing of
Daubert's twin factors. Actuarial assessments have emerged more re-
cently and their judicial use has so far focused on commitments for sexu-
ally violent offenders. Still, Daubert should permit admission of these
opinions as well, at least for carefully limited purposes.
How well do actuarial assessments fit the demands of civil commit-
ments? Courts have had limited occasion to process concerns about this
expert testimony into civil commitment proceedings. They have either
limited the inferences drawn from statistical methods;373 or tried to define
the potential uses of various "risk factors" as factual elements sufficient
to reach a finding of danger.374 Moreover, it is difficult to assess the
prevalence of free-standing actuarial assessments, especially outside
commitments for sexual offenders.375 At the same time, actuarial assess-
ments do seem to ease at least one part of the task of making predictions.
They permit a fact-finder to understand better how shared risk factors
can lead to valid inferences about risks; and (in the opposite direction)
might also lead to the deflation of stereotypes about other groups with
whom the defendant may share attributes.
How similar are the inferential processes of actuarial assessment to
those required for fact-finding in commitment cases? Judicial fact-finding
uses multiple sources of data and disparate analytical methods to reach
an individualized prediction of danger."76 By contrast, actuarial assess-
ments focus on behaviors of a separate group of diverse individuals who
share certain characteristics with a defendant, make statements about
tial methods (if undisclosed or unchallenged) may have on uninformed fact-finders. These concerns
justify handling under a rule separate from the fundamental, pervasive balancing of probative value
against prejudicial impact.
373. See In re Young, 857 P.2d at IoI6-I7; In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 94 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001).
374- See In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 88 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2001) (upholding the use of
actuarial instruments "as a factor in the overall prediction process" -"allocating weight to risk factors
in accordance with scientific literature and expertise is an acceptable method of predicting future
criminal sexual behavior"). This absorption of risk factors into legally acceptable (and perhaps even
sufficient) prerequisites for finding danger goes beyond questions of admissibility, and may raise sig-
nificant concerns about commitment standards which rely solely on "risk factors" for a conclusion of
danger. See also Part I1.C.3 supra (describing complex fact finding as an accommodation for clinical
predictions).
375. See supra note 81 (citing Grove and Meehl for the proposition that most assessors of danger
use clinical and not actuarial methods).
376. See supra Part I.B.i (describing similarities between clinical prediction and judicial fact-
finding on danger).
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degrees of risk that a defendant shares with that group, and depend ex-
clusively on statistical methodologies for their validity.377
There are three important differences between judicial fact-finding
and actuarial methods: in sources, in inferential methods, and in the pur-
pose of the evaluation itself. As to sources, statistical methods focus on
similarities between the defendant and the relevant group, and on the
behavioral consequences tested by the actuarial assessors for that group.
By contrast, judicial fact-finders must make decisions about individuals.
Accordingly, they must consider characteristics in the defendant that fall
outside the statistically significant similarities, and assess behaviors dif-
ferent in both kind and intensity from those in the statistician's group. In
effect, actuarial assessments focus on other people doing other things,
while a fact-finder takes the defendant as found, and assesses traits and
behaviors in multiple combinations, not just those presented by the actu-
arial test."'
The differences in the inferential processes are equally fundamental:
actuarial assessments make inferences at once broader and narrower
than individuated fact-finding requires. To mention the statistical risk is
certainly relevant;379 but actuarial assessments make statistical statements
about broad pools of individuals, and about risks averaged over that
group. Moreover, actuarial assessments address only a well-defined pool
of factors that may or may not provide an exhaustive portrait of the indi-
vidual on trial. In effect, actuarial assessments are inevitably crude, be-
cause they cannot measure the full congeries of traits for the person on
trial.38"
377. See supra Part I.B.i.6 (describing actuarial assessment methodologies).
378. Cf JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT 130-35 (2002) (identifying "two
primary reasons.., given in support of allowing clinicians the option to use their judgment to revise
actuarial violence risk assessment estimates"). This study suggests two comparable risks of inaccuracy
for pure actuarial assessments: "questionable validity generalization," i.e., the use of instruments de-
veloped based on a group with one demographic to assess the risk of violence in groups with other
demographics; and "rare risk or protective factors," i.e., the presence of unusual or rare factors in a
given case which "precisely because they are rare-will not have been properly taken into account in
the construction of the actuarial instrument." Id. at 132.
379. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
38o. As to the kinds of behavior recognized as dangerous by the assessment tool, there is some
indication that existing tools are underinclusive, and do not fully reflect the range of behaviors recog-
nized as meeting legal definitions of danger. If true, this would lead the assessment tool to reach con-
clusions that in fact understated the risk factors for a group with the given characteristics. See Randy
K. Otto, On the Ability of Mental Health Professionals to "Predict Dangerousness": A Commentary on
Interpretations of the "Dangerousness" Literature, 18 LAW & PsYcHoL. REV. 43, 54-59 (994).
These disparities between fact-finding on danger and actuarial assessments can, and perhaps will
be narrowed to the point where they do not raise any evidentiary concerns. See Erica Beecher-Monas
(2001 article).
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Finally, actuarial methods differ from fact-finding in design and
function. Actuarial analysis seeks to summarize and to explain how a cer-
tain group of people have acted in the past, expressed as a differential
risk. It advises and informs, but makes no decision about a dispute. By
contrast, juridical fact-finding seeks an explicable basis on which to take
action that balances strongly held and conflicting individual and societal
interests. It must thus justify itself by reference to the individual, and
necessarily calls for more than just generalized statements about how
other groups have acted in the past.
Despite this lack of a close fit, actuarial assessments have provably
greater reliability than clinical predictions when offered for properly lim-
ited purposes. The system of statistical assessment can be explained and
justified; it has strong internal coherence. Moreover, the weaknesses of
assessments are subject to ready testing through the adversarial process,
especially with reference to disparities between the actuarial conclusion
and the contingent, contextual reality of a defendant. If properly limited,
then, the extensive literature validating both the significance of the risk
factors, and the probability statements of the actuarial tools, more than
satisfy Daubert's dispute-oriented reliability concern.35'
Some courts seem to accept actuarial assessments only by admitting
them as part of clinical predictions. The cases neither address the issue
squarely nor develop it fully, but they do suggest some trends. The ma-
jority view would admit actuarial assessments when integrated into clini-
cal predictions.8 ' No court has yet addressed the admissibility of an
381. Actuarial assessment becomes unreliable when offered for other purposes. For example,
some proponents of assessment tools argue that they produce predictions of probable danger of this
defendant, and even that an actuarial assessment demonstrates that the defendant has a "propensity
for violence." See, e.g., R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk Assessment?, 4
PUB. PoL'Y & L. 50, 67 (1998) ("[Bloth actuarial and mixed clinical / actuarial methods can be expected
to reliably identify a small subgroup of offenders with an enduring propensity to reoffend.") (emphasis
supplied), cited favorably in In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 93-94 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2001)
(favorably assessing Professor Hanson's views generally). Offered and argued for this purpose, actuar-
ial assessments fall well below Daubert's reliability standard: by definition, the methods produce nei-
ther predictions for individuals nor descriptions of mental states.
At an extreme, use of risk factors in this way could result in the creation of an evidentiary pre-
sumption of danger, in the form of: "If you find [certain risk factors], then you may/must infer danger."
This Article does not discuss this potential for new presumptions. But the discussion of commitment
process earlier in this Article makes it seem unlikely that courts will substitute legal presumptions for
complex fact-finding on danger. See Part I.C supra (discussing judicial accommodation of predictive
uncertainty in commitment jurisprudence).
382. See, e.g., In re Detention of Strauss, 20 P.3d 1022, 1026-27 (Wash. App. 2001) (admitting re-
sults from the MnSOST, RRASOR, and the VRAG tests as part of "an overall risk assessment");
State ex rel Romley v. Fields, 35 P.3d 82, 89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (admitting actuarial instruments
when offered as part of clinical testimony); People v. Woods, No. Co37203, 2001 WL 1649216, at *5-*6
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2001) (affirming use of the RRASOR and the Static 99 as part of a clinical as-
sessment); People v. Hayes. No. Ao93285. 2002 WL 462277, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2002) (af-
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actuarial assessment presented outside the context of a clinical predic-
tion. However, one or two opinions have stated the view that actuarial
assessments are in fact "better than" clinical predictions.""3 The division
in the courts parallels, and perhaps reflects, the division in the scientific
community."'4
Daubert does not require this linkage between the two differing
forms of predictive expertise; it admits both.' ss Actuarial assessments sat-
firming use of the Static 99 when used as part of a clinical assessment). Compare Westerheide v. State,
767 So. 2d 637, 656-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (distinguishing between clinical predictions formed
without any reliance on actuarial methods, and clinical predictions resting at least in part on such
methods; the latter would be subject to Frye, while the former would not), with Green v. State, 826 So.
2d 351, 353-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (admission of expert testimony involving the use of actuarial
methods as part of clinical predictions held harmless, without ruling on whether admission was error).
383. Comm'r v. Reese, No. CIV.A oo-oi8Si-B, 2001 WL 359954, at *8-*io (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 5,
2001) (finding no probable cause to continue detention of a defendant alleged to be sexually violent).
The trial court identified three possible methods of predicting the likelihood of sexual reoffense: clini-
cal judgment; statistical analysis; and "guided clinical judgment." Id. at *9. It noted that "statistical risk
progression scales ... have substantially greater predictive accuracy than clinical judgment," and that
"... statistics, in general, are better predictors of future sexual dangerousness than clinical judgments."
Id. at *9. See also In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 93-95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (fa-
vorably assessing Professor Hanson's views); In re Registrant C.A., 679 A.2d 1153, 1170 (1996) (af-
firming use of a statistical methodology in Megan's Law cases: "the use of actuarial concrete predictors
is at least as good, if not in most cases better, in terms of reliability and predictability than clinical in-
terviews"). See also In re Detention of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 613, 619 n.5 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (cit-
ing Reese's appraisal of statistical methods of prediction without comment). See also Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 922 n.4 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Sitatistical prediction is clearly more
reliable than clinical prediction.").
Taken to an extreme, this view might not only result in separate admission of actuarial assess-
ments, but also reverse the court's historical tolerance of clinical predictions, perhaps by requiring all
clinical predictions to rely on statistical methodologies. See also Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Gar-
cia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CAR-
Dozo L. REV. 1845, 1897-19OO (2003) (arguing that Daubert requires the exclusion of clinical
predictions, but that actuarial instruments may improve judgments of juries in death penalty sentenc-
ing proceedings).
384. See supra Part I.B (describing the division in the research community between advocates of
clinical, guided clinical and pure actuarial approaches). The parallel is not precise: no court has ac-
cepted pure actuarial assessments, and a faint trend exists towards allowing them only when coupled
with clinical assessments, a trend which appears to reflect a consensus in the treatment community; the
scientific research community appears more severely divided.
See also JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT 133-34 (2002) (analogizing predic-
tion of violence to predicting the weather). This analogy notes that weather forecasters rely heavily on
carefully collected metereological data, processed by sophisticated programming, and presented to
local meteorologists for use; the local observer preserves the ability to alter the prediction "if he or she
looked out the window and saw threatening clouds approaching." More affirmatively, the study notes
empirical studies that show that "clinical" methods improve "actuarial" weather predictions: "[tihe
clinically revised predictions of temperature and precipitation are consistently more valid than the un-
revised actuarial ones." Id. at 134.
385. Again, this does not mean a per se rule of admissibility. Qualifying the expert; monitoring the
application of the actuarial tool to the defendant; challenging mismatches of risk factors; or noting the
presence of other factors not accounted for by the relevant tools: all serve as bases for challenge. Trial
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isfy Daubert's twin standards of reliability and fit, albeit with a different
dynamic than with clinical predictions.386 The concerns about fit may help
explain the considerably greater lengths to which courts have had to go
in admitting actuarial assessments, at least compared to clinical opinions.
These concerns will most probably also lead cours to accept actuarial as-
sessments primarily as part of clinical assessments for the foreseeable fu-
ture.
CONCLUSION
This Article has described a new model for assessing expertise, ex-
tracting it from the puzzling receptivity of courts to notoriously unreli-
able predictive testimony about future dangerousness. This model
requires courts to assess the validity of expertise in other disciplines, and
to understand the degree of rigor imposed by that discipline on a given
opinion. But the model reformulates Daubert's reliability concern as one
focused on the demands of judicial fact-finding. The model requires
courts to fit the opinion to the case at hand, which entails a richer inquiry
than a mere search for bare relevance. Fit surely includes the four con-
siderations described in this Article-integration, incremental value,
prevalence, and similarity of inference -but others may exist as well.
So described, the model has potential significance in three different
ways. For mental health law and practice, this Article concludes that
courts have consistently gotten it right; it aligns current doctrine with
decades of consistent judicial opinion. Predictive testimony should be
admissible in civil commitment cases under Daubert. Does this basic con-
clusion take the mental health profession off the hook? The answer is
"no," not least because rejecting a per se rule of exclusion does not re-
quire a per se rule of admission. Predictions must still receive separate
testing in the mechanics of trial. The relevant test is different from scien-
tific validation, but contains its own rigors and ambiguities., 8' Nor does
judges should also exclude actuarial assessments if offered as individualized predictions or as descrip-
tions of internal propensities. Indeed, FED. R. EvIn. 403 (or an equivalent balancing of probative dan-
gers with probative value) might also lead to exclusion when actuarial assessments come in as a
description of a propensity.
386. The leading case to use Frye deviated from strict adherence to a "general acceptance" stan-
dard and substituted a reliability standard together with a relatively careful limitation of its probative
value to the narrower purposes described here. In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 92-94 (N.J.
Super. App. Div. 2001). While significantly more scientific literature accepts actuarial assessments
than clinical predictions, courts using Frye must still make a choice about which portion and what per-
centage of the expert community to use when gauging "general acceptance." (The same problem ap-
pears for predictions which combine clinical and actuarial methods.). See supra Part I.A.2 (critiquing
the judicial use of Frye) and note 370 (recommending exemption from Frye for clinical predictions).
387. See supra Parts II.C.1-2 (discussing grounds for succesful challenging of particular predictive
opinions, both clinical and actuarial).
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the rule endorsed here endanger future improvements in predicting dan-
gerousness. Mental health professionals have pragmatic pressures within
their own discipline that drive the need for improvement. They are
unlikely to accept judicial standards for their practices, which encompass
different concerns and purposes than dispute resolution.
The dynamic model proposed here also raises useful questions, both
for theoretical and empirical researchers. Exactly what is the relationship
between fit and reliability? Is it possible to map a coherent picture of that
dynamic? In the case of predictive expertise, the two concerns act in in-
verse proportion: The strength of the fit overcomes weaknesses in the re-
liability of predictive testimony, and vice versa. But that may not be true
in all cases, and may in fact reflect unique features of predictive testi-
mony as well as of civil commitments. The analysis set forth here, includ-
ing its inquiry into constitutional baselines, burdens of proof, standards
of sufficiency, patterns of evidence, and definitions of central facts, may
help guide research about the limits of expert testimony in other areas of
law.
This model also has intensely practical consequences for the federal
courts, and for those states that have made the switch to Daubert.388 Trial
judges can require proponents of unfamiliar expertise to show not only
the degree of rigor a particular field requires, but also the utility of that
standard for the particular category of case. How closely will the infer-
ences drawn by the expert parallel those required of the fact-finder?
Have courts already accommodated the opinion within the structure and
procedure of the related law? Into just what context will the expert
speak, with regard to substantive rules, burdens of proof, standards of
sufficiency, and the mix of other evidence? How complex or intractable
is the fact the expert opinion addresses, and how does the expertise add
to fact-finding on that point? As these questions become settled for a
given type of opinion in a given type of case, the number of hearings, and
the disparity in results should abate, both at trial and at the appellate
level.
The model described here reinforces a more fundamental point. The
Daubert cases deal not solely with science, nor even with the reliability of
expertise standing alone. Rather, these cases focus on how new ideas are
integrated into dispute resolution processes and (more specifically) on
how to use advances in empirical and theoretical inquiry to help satisfy
388. The discussion of reliability and fit here may also be of use in Frye jurisdictions, although it
seems doubtful. This Article suggests that the Frye standard should have difficulty with a highly dis-
puted opinion that nonetheless integrates well with the demands of dispute resolution in a given case.
Despite that suggestion, it seems unlikely that any state now adhering to Frye will revise that decision
in light of this Article.
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the judicial imperative to decide cases. The cases set the terms on which
fact-finders borrow from other disciplines; but, in so doing, they require
fact-finders (and their judicial shepherds) to retain the discipline and
pragmatic judgment acquired from years of resolving previous disputes.
Judicial decision-makers must ask not only whether new knowledge can
be justified in its own terms, but also whether, when, and how new
knowledge has a role to play in advancing the just and expedient resolu-
tion of conflict.
In short, predicting danger does require expertise, but not primarily
mental health expertise, even in its newer, more quantified form. Rather,
courts must bend the separate, but distinctly similar disciplines of mental
assessment and behavioral prediction to the service of judicial expertise.
Authoritative prediction of danger remains a judicial task and a judicial
discipline. Courts and advocates should search other disciplines for help
with this vital task. They should accept that help, even if less than per-
fect, so long as it fits the needs of the case.
